The Constitutionality of Deceptive Speech Regulations: Replacing the Commercial Speech Doctrine with a Tort-Based Relational Framework by Howard, Alan
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 41 | Issue 4
1991
The Constitutionality of Deceptive Speech
Regulations: Replacing the Commercial Speech
Doctrine with a Tort-Based Relational Framework
Alan Howard
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Alan Howard, The Constitutionality of Deceptive Speech Regulations: Replacing the Commercial Speech Doctrine with a Tort-Based
Relational Framework, 41 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1093 (1991)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol41/iss4/5
ARTICLE
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
DECEPTIVE SPEECH REGULATIONS:
REPLACING THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH
DOCTRINE WITH A TORT-BASED
RELATIONAL FRAMEWORK
Alan Howard*
Under the commercial speech doctrine, deceptive speech that is
deemed commercial may be regulated while in general decep-
tive speech that is deemed noncommercial may not be. How-
ever, the critical determination of whether speech is commercial
lacks standards, resulting in arbitrary rulings. The author pro-
poses that the commercial speech doctrine be scuttled in favor
of a relational framework that examines a regulation's impact
on protected speech, the nature of the speech affected, and the
justification for protecting a listener's reliance on the regulated
speech.
* Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. Thanks are owed to my
research assistants, Janet Franklin, Bart Mantia, Celynda Brasher, and Eric Stahlhut. I
am also grateful to those colleagues who participated at a workshop on the article at St.
Louis University School of Law. Finally I want to single out my brother, Bruce Howard,
for special recognition. Bruce, formerly a member of the University of Southern California
Law School Faculty and now a partner in the Los Angeles law firm, Allen, Matkins, Leck,
Gamble & Mallory, generously found time to discuss with me various aspects of the article
during its period of gestation and to make valuable comments on subsequent drafts.
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INTRODUCTION
A BROAD AND diverse range of statutory and common lawhas developed to regulate speech that is deemed to be "decep-
tive."' The Supreme Court of the United States has not regarded
deceptive speech itself as worthy of first amendment protection.2
However, since regulating deceptive speech can chill,' or actually
restrict,4 protected speech, the regulations must be analyzed under
the first amendment to determine whether they unduly burden
protected speech. To date, however, courts, including the Supreme
Court, have subjected very few regulations of deceptive speech to
first amendment review.5 In the few cases where courts have en-
gaged in first amendment review, judges have done little more
than apply the "Commercial Speech Doctrine," a simplistic "ei-
ther/or" test that distinguishes between "commercial" and "non-
commercial" speech under the first amendment, with the former
receiving no more than "rational basis" protection and the latter
1. "Deceptive speech" in this article means false or misleading speech. "False
speech" means untruthful speech, such as speech that is contrary to fact. "Misleading
speech" is not technically false but may mislead listeners because it is incomplete, creates
false impressions, or is otherwise flawed.
2. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49-50 n.10 (1961) (including
misrepresentation and false advertising among the limited categories of speech not afforded
first amendment protection).
3. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964) (establishing
constitutional value of avoiding "self-censorship").
4. A regulation designed, or at least purporting, to censor only deceptive speech
might also suppress nondeceptive, protected speech for at least two reasons. First, a speech
regulation could be enforced in a biased manner. A regulator may, in bad faith, attempt to
enforce a regulation against truthful speech simply because the regulator disapproves of the
speech. See F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 81-82 (1982). Sec-
ondly, regardless of bias, a regulator may mistakenly suppress truthful speech. See Posner,
Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1, 24-25 (1986).
These risks increase for speech that is more difficult to verify and for regulations that
define deceptive speech more broadly or vaguely. See Cass, Commercial Speech, Constitu-
tionalism, Collective Choice, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1317, 1371 (1988). Including truthful but
misleading speech within a deceptive speech regulation poses an even greater risk of over-
regulation than one that reaches only false speech. See Shiffrin, The First Amendment and
Economic Regulation Away from a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw.
U.L. REV. 1212, 1218-19 (1983).
5. The Supreme Court has only considered deceptive speech regulation in the areas
of commercial advertising, false light invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, defamation, and, to a limited degree in one case, political speech. See infra notes
220-22 and accompanying text. A few lower courts have considered challenges to other
types of deceptive speech regulations. For example, courts have considered such challenges
in connection with advertisements by businesses addressing political issues. See infra text
accompanying notes 130-218.
DECEPTIVE SPEECH
receiving "strict scrutiny" protection, if not total immunity.6
This article contends that many more deceptive speech regu-
lations should and will be subjected to first amendment challenge
and review.7 The regulations' undue impact on protected speech
will be the primary concern. As such challenges increase in fre-
quency, it will become more apparent that courts considering de-
ceptive speech under the first amendment need a more sophisti-
cated analytical framework than the procrustean Commercial
Speech Doctrine.
The richness and complexity of the content of regulated
speech and the multiplicity of contexts in which deceptive speech
is used and regulated in our society quickly stretch the simplistic
Commercial Speech Doctrine to its breaking point. Consider a
cigarette manufacturer that disputes scientific claims about to-
bacco or attempts to air more innocuous advertisements; an organ-
ization created by the insurance industry that takes out ads blam-
ing high insurance premiums on a "litigation crisis"; an
investment broker who discusses an investment; a birth control
manufacturer that promotes family planning; a politician who in-
tentionally lies about his or her voting record to raise more cam-
paign funds; a lawyer who attempts to solicit or advise clients to
challenge a law; and an oil company that criticizes federal inter-
national policy. Should the first amendment analysis of speech
regulation begin and end by questioning whether the speech "does
'no more than propose a commercial transaction' ,,?" Many courts
facing such scenarios have felt compelled to use this simplistic
first amendment analysis. Not surprisingly, jurists have often
struggled with the naive and ineffectual simplicity of this analysis
when dealing with complex questions.9
This article proposes a more coherent and complex analytical
framework, referred to as the "Relational Framework," which fo-
cuses on the relationship between deceptive speakers and victim-
ized listeners. The Relational Framework considers, on a case-by-
case basis, which party, the speaker or the listener, should have a
6. See infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
7. A number of regulations, such as common law rules relating to misrepresentation
and professional malpractice, have not even received lower court consideration. See infra
text accompanying notes 219-45.
8. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Re-
lations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 114-29.
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"truth burden" or "burden of care," and the nature of that bur-
den. In some cases, the listener may have a reasonable expectation
of truthful, careful, or honest speech and a special need for the
government to ensure that expectation. These cases normally in-
volve listeners seeking factual information or professional advice,
rather than lay opinion, enlightenment, inspiration, or entertain-
ment. Here, the listener is often in a particular listening mode,
such as a consumer's fact-gathering mode, or a client or patient
mode where professional advice is sought. However, in other cases,
first amendment values may be best served by recognizing the lis-
tener's responsibility to hear speech with a critical, more active
ear. Examples include a listener hearing a political speech or a
reader reading a novel or a newspaper editorial. Similarly, the Re-
lational Framework considers whether speech should be afforded
special first amendment protections because of risks such as cen-
sorship or chill, or whether the speech is hardy, objective, or oth-
erwise especially suited to survive strict regulation. This Rela-
tional Framework also distinguishes speech that primarily
implicates speaker values, such as self-expression, from speech
that primarily implicates listener values, such as the listener's in-
terest in obtaining information that will aid him or her in making
decisions. The Relational Framework draws this distinction to il-
lustrate why the first amendment is more likely to permit regula-
tion of deceptive speech implicating listener values than deceptive
speech implicating speaker values.' 0
This article contains four parts. In the first, the proposed Re-
lational Framework is presented and discussed. The second dis-
cusses and criticizes the Commercial Speech Doctrine and exam-
ines cases applying the Commercial Speech Doctrine to deceptive
speech regulations. The Relational Framework is then applied to
the same cases to illustrate that the Relational Framework pro-
vides courts with a better means of assessing the regulations' con-
stitutionality. The third part discusses kinds of deceptive speech
regulation that are ripe for, but have not yet been subject to first
amendment challenge, although they would not violate the Rela-
tional Framework. The fourth part examines deceptive speech reg-
ulations that courts have viewed as noncommercial. Again, the
10. The Relational Framework recognizes an exception to this analysis for political
speech where listeners should receive less first amendment protection despite the usefulness
of truthful political speech in the listener's decision-making processes. See infra text ac-
companying notes 246-73.
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courts' analyses are contrasted with the Relational Framework.
I. THE RELATIONAL FRAMEWORK
A. A Tort-Based Approach
Virtually all deceptive speech regulations are designed to pro-
tect a listener's reliance on the truth of the regulated speech.,,
Each deceptive speech regulation potentially affects protected,
nondeceptive speech.
In determining whether a deceptive speech regulation violates
the first amendment, the proposed Relational Framework focuses
on three analytical elements: (1) the extent to which the regula-
tion impinges upon protected speech, (2) the nature of the pro-
tected speech, and (3) the justification for protection in terms of
the relationship between the speaker and the listener, and the allo-
cation of the "truth burden" between them. Where the impact on
important protected speech is great and the justification for its
protection is weak, the regulation may violate the first
amendment.
Although firmly rooted in the fundamental tenets of the first
amendment, the Relational Framework proposed in this article
also draws from traditional tort law analysis. This hybrid pedigree
is not surprising, since most instances of deceptive speech regula-
tion are based on tort law remedies against intentional or negli-
gent misrepresentation. 2 The Relational Framework provides a
11. The principal purpose of most deceptive speech regulations is promoting rational
decision making by removing erroneous information from the decision-making process. In-
dividual listeners are injured when they rely on false statements to their detriment. See,
e.g., 2 F. HARPER, F. JAMEs & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF ToRTS § 7.1, at 378 (2d ed. 1986)
("The type of interest protected by the law of deceit is the interest in formulating business
judgments without being misled by others . . . ."); Note, Protecting The Rationality of
Electoral Outcomes: A Challenge to First Amendment Doctrine, 51 U. Cm. L. REV. 892,
913 (1984) (noting that some states have enacted campaign statutes seeking to protect
voters from being misled by false information).
False information threatens political and economic markets. See Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976) (arguing
that accurate commercial information is indispensable to the proper allocation of resources
in our free enterprise system); Note, supra at 914 (statutes that prohibit false political
statements "foster rational electoral outcomes" and "enhance[] good government"). Some
deceptive speech regulations also protect nonlistener, third party interests. For example, the
primary purpose of defamation actions is to protect the reputation of third parties. See 2 F.
HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, supra § 5.1, at 24-37.
12. See generally 2 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, supra note 11, §§ 7.1-7.15
(discussing the elements and characteristics of the toris of misrepresentation and
nondisclosure).
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first amendment analysis of the constitutionality of deceptive
speech regulations by examining the regulations in terms of tort
law principles such as appropriate or acceptable standards of care
and reasonable expectations and reliances. The Relational Frame-
work identifies circumstances that justify protecting a listener's
expectation in accurate, expert, or super-accurate speech. The Re-
lational Framework also identifies circumstances where imposing
a burden of care on a speaker would not be proper, either because
such a burden unduly chills protected speech, or because the lis-
tener should not have a protected right to, or expectation of, accu-
rate speech.
The tort elements of the Relational Framework also play a
role in its implementation. This article recommends that the Rela-
tional Framework be used to determine, among other things,
whether the standard of care imposed on a speaker is unconstitu-
tional. For example, the Relational Framework might indicate
that the first amendment would permit the imposition of a negli-
gence standard, but not a strict liability standard on a speaker.
This type of analysis is very similar to the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,1" where the Court stayed
within the doctrinal confines of traditional tort law in applying the
first amendment to defamatory speech regulation. 4 Beginning in
New York Times and continuing through the entire line of defa-
mation cases, the Supreme Court has required that libel law con-
form to the constitutional rules of free speech. The Supreme
13. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
14. In "constitutionalizing" the defamation tort, the Supreme Court did not uproot
traditional libel tort principles and replace them with a different and distinct first amend-
ment test. Instead, the Court simply modified the common law strict liability tort of libel.
See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 113, at 772-74 (4th ed. 1971)
(discussing the strict liability common law tort of libel and its development). The court did
this largely by reshaping the common law strict liability standard of libel to make it more
closely resemble the common law tort of deceit. See Note, Tort Liability for Nonlibelous
Negligent Statements: First Amendment Considerations, 93 YALE L. 744, 750 (1984)
("Rather than substitute a new set of First Amendment standards for existing tort princi-
ples in libel, the Sullivan Court expanded the traditional privilege of 'fair comment' to give
proper First Amendment protection to those who comment on the conduct of public offi-
cials." (footnotes omitted)). Compare New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80 (announce-
ment of the "actual malice test" under which a statement is fraudulent if made "with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not"), with
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 526 (1976) ("A misrepresentation is fraudulent if the
maker (a) knows or believes that the matter is not as he represents it to be, (b) does not
have the confidence in the accuracy of his representation that he states or implies, or (c)
knows that he does not have the basis for his representation that he states or implies.").
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Court has accomplished this by increasing liability standards from
strict liability to other standards of fault, such as intentionality,
recklessness, 15 or negligence,"" and by shifting burdens of proof
and presumptions from defendants to plaintiffs,'17 rather than by
applying more traditional first amendment doctrine such as the
"clear and present danger" test i" or the simple balancing test.19
This Article proposes a similar tort-based analysis for deceptive
speech, which shares much in common with defamatory speech.
The multidimensional nature of the Relational Framework
reflects, and attempts to take into account, the multiplicity and
variety of forms and contexts of deceptive speech regulation. As
Parts II, III, and IV of this article discuss in more detail, current
law regulates deceptive speech in a broad spectrum of contexts.
This spectrum ranges from holding speakers strictly liable for
even truthful but "misleading" speech to the other extreme of
holding speakers virtually blameless for intentional lies. At one
end of the regulatory spectrum is speech, such as commercial ad-
vertising, that the government has been permitted to regulate with
virtually no first amendment limitation. Current federal law, for
example, allows the federal government (most notably, the Fed-
eral Trade Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion) to impose numerous extreme restrictions on commercial ad-
vertisers and the sellers of securities.2 0 These restrictions include
15. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (public figure,
public issue, intentional infliction of emotional distress); Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45
(1982) (public official, public issue, nondefamatory false speech); Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (public figure, public issue, defamation); New York Times, 376
U.S. at 279-80 (public official, public issue, defamation).
16. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (private figure, public
issue, defamation).
17. See, e.g., Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776-77 (1986)
(shifting the burden of proving falsity in public speech cases involving private figures from
defendant to plaintiff); New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80 (shifting the burden of prov-
ing the falsity and defamatory nature of the speech in public speech cases involving public
officials from defendant to plaintiff).
18. See, e.g., Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941) ("the substantive evil
must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances
can be punished").
19. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 869-72 (1982). See generally
Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in .the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in
First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1482, 1501-06 (1975) (suggesting a balanc-
ing of first amendment rights against the state's interest in flag desecration cases involving
"improper use" statutes).
20. Since 1938 the Federal Trade Commission has been empowered to regulate de-
ceptive commercial advertising. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(A)(2) (1988) ("The Commission is
10991991]
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(1) strict liability for false speech2' and strict liability for true but
(even unintentionally) misleading speech,22 (2) a duty to issue
"corrective" speech dictated by the agency after it determines, in
its own discretion, that prior statements were false or mislead-
empowered and directed to prevent ... unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce."); FTC Powers, 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 11 7536 (1988) (describing FTC
powers to prevent deception in commerce). The Securities and Exchange Commission's
authority to regulate deceptive "securities" speech is found in various provisions of the
securities acts. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77h(d) (1988) (authorizing the commission to sus-
pend a registration statement-required when enrolling securities with the commission-if
the registration contains any untrue statements); id. § 78n(e) (prohibiting deceptive state-
ments, acts, and practices in connection with tender offers). See generally L. Loss. FUNDA-
MENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 699-869 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing the Securities and
Exchange Commission's authority to regulate fraud and manipulation).
Other federal regulatory bodies with authority to regulate deceptive speech include the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, see 7 U.S.C. § 6c(A)(C) (1988) (prohibiting
price falsification in any commodity transaction); id. § 12a(2)(G) (authorizing the commis-
sion to assess a penalty against an applicant for registration that willfully makes a false
statement on its application), the Food and Drug Administration, see 21 U.S.C. §
331(q)(2) (1988) (prohibiting falsification on any required report); id. § 352(n) (requiring
that true information regarding various topics be included in all advertisements), and the
United States Postal Service, see 39 U.S.C. § 3005 (1988) (authorizing the postal service
to act to prevent fraudulent schemes operated through the mails).
21. The FTC has authority to regulate deceptive advertising whether or not the ad-
vertiser's misrepresentation was made knowingly, recklessly, or even negligently. See, e.g.,
Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749, 763 n.70 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("Innocence of
motive is not a defense .. "), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978); Chrysler Corp. v. FTC,
561 F.2d 357, 363 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("An advertiser's good faith does not immunize it
from responsibility for its misrepresentations .... "). Similarly, the SEC's regulatory au-
thority over deceptive securities speech (such as deceptive speech contained within registra-
tion statements, proxy materials, or other corporate reports filed with the SEC) is not con-
fined to cases where untrue statements were made knowingly or negligently. See, e.g., SEC
v. Okin, 58 F. Supp. 20, 23 (S.D.N.Y. 1944). The securities acts also provide for strict civil
liability against issuers for their deceptive speech. See, e.g., Greenapple v. Detroit Edison
Co., 618 F.2d 198, 203 (2d Cir. 1980) (acknowledging that an issuer is strictly liable to a
stock purchaser under 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1988), when the registration statement contains
materially false or misleading statements).
22. Cases upholding FTC regulatory authority over misleading advertising claims in-
clude American Home Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681, 686-87 (3d Cir. 1982) (finding
that literally true claims are deceptive if they communicate misleading impressions); Trans
World Accounts, Inc. v. FTC, 594 F.2d 212, 214 (9th Cir. 1979) ("[m]isrepresentations
are condemned if they possess a tendency to deceive."); Chrysler Corp., 561 F.2d at 363
(concluding that advertising claims capable of conveying misleading impressions even
though other nonmisleading interpretations may also be possible may be deceptive).
For a discussion of SEC authority to regulate misleading speech in proxy statements,
see L. Loss, supra note 20, at 477-80. The securities laws make the issuer strictly liable to
"any person acquiring such security" for misleading statements in the registration state-
ment. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k. However, the law limits the victimized purchaser to restitution.
See id. § 77(e); see also Goldman v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 332 F. Supp. 699, 706-
07 (E.D. Mich. 1971), aff/d, 467 F.2d 439 (6th Cir. 1972).
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ing,23 and (3) a requirement that, on the agency's demand, speak-
ers provide documentation of the factual basis of their claims. 4
Moreover, administrative agencies usually decide the critical ele-
ments of these regulations, with the judiciary playing a minor,
deferential role and abjuring independent review.25
Further along the regulatory spectrum is a large body of ex-
pert speech that is subject to demanding negligence standards. Ex-
amples of this type of speech include the diagnoses and opinions of
doctors and lawyers, which are regulated by malpractice common
law.26 Still further along the spectrum is speech that is regulated
only if grossly negligent, reckless, or intentionally false. Common
examples are criminal fraud statutes that require proof of an in-
tent to deceive.2 7 At the furthest end of the regulatory spectrum is
speech such as political speech or literature, where it is unclear
that the first amendment allows any government regulation of
even intentionally false speech. Although one federal appellate
court has questioned the constitutionality of campaign lying
laws,28 other courts have upheld these laws if they reach exclu-
sively deceptive speech made knowingly or with reckless disregard
of its accuracy2 9 -the New York Times actual malice test. Even
in these contexts, however, the courts have carefully guarded the
right to an independent judicial review of the critical fact-based
23. See Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749, 759-63 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978). Similarly, the SEC has authority to require corporations to
correct false or misleading statements contained in registration statements and proxy
materials. See L. Loss, supra note 20, at 459-60.
24. The FTC's advertising substantiation policy states that making a claim without
adequate substantiation is a deceptive practice, even if the claim is true. See, e.g., National
Dynamics Corp. v. FTC, 492 F.2d 1333, 1336 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 993 (1974);
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 481 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1112 (1973). See generally Note, The FTC Ad Substantiation Program, 61 GEO. L.J.
1427, 1428-32 (1973) (describing the claim substantiation principle).
25. For example, federal circuit courts traditionally have deferred to both the FTC's
interpretation of advertising claims and its determination of their truthfulness. See, e.g.,
Simeon Management Corp. v. FTC, 579 F.2d 1137, 1142 (9th Cir. 1978) ("We are not to
set aside the Commission's action unless it is apparent that it is unsupported by substantial
evidence, or is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance
with law." (citations omitted)).
26. See infra text accompanying notes 231-45.
27. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988) (federal mail fraud statute); 18 U.S.C. §§
1621-1623 (1988) (federal perjury statute).
28. See Rudisill v. Flynn, 619 F.2d 692, 695 (7th Cir. 1980) ("Attempts to establish
limits on deceptive speech or requirements for disclosure in election campaigns may create
their own constitutional difficulties."); see also infra text accompanying notes 246-73.
29. See, e.g., Vanasco v. Schwartz, 401 F. Supp. 87, 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), afd, 423
U.S. 1041 (1976).
1102 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1093
determinations."0
Before applying the Relational Framework to specific types of
deceptive speech regulations, it will be helpful to describe and an-
alyze each of the Relational Framework's three elements
individually.
B. The Relational Framework's Elements
1. Prong One: The Impact on Protected Speech
Although it is reasonable to question whether deceptive
speech itself is entitled to first amendment protection,"1 the pri-
mary concern of the Relational Framework is the extent of the
deceptive speech regulation's impact on speech that is not decep-
tive, and thus clearly protected by the first amendment. 2 As pre-
viously noted, such an impact may occur in at least two ways.
First, the deceptive speech regulation may chill nondeceptive
speech.33 Second, the deceptive speech regulation may directly re-
30. See, e.g., Lebron v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 749 F.2d 893, 897
n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Pestrak v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 670 F. Supp. 1368, 1377 (S.D.
Ohio 1987).
31. Generally, the Supreme Court adheres to the view that factually false speech is
undeserving of first amendment protection. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 340 (1974) ("erroneous statement of fact is not worthy of constitutional protection
. ... ). However, since its decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964), the Court has provided varying degrees of first amendment protection to uninten-
tional defamatory speech. The Court's explanation for protecting some libelous speech is
the need to provide breathing space for nondefamatory protected speech in situations where
the deceptive speech, if not protected, would likely bring about an unacceptable degree of
self-censorship. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340-341.
To date, the Court has not afforded similar strategic protection to calculated false-
hoods. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) ("[a] lie, knowingly and deliber-
ately published about a public official should [not] enjoy . . . immunity"). But cf. Picker-
ing v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 n.6 (1968) (the issue of whether the first
amendment protects "harmless" false statements, even when made deliberately, was left
undecided). Moreover, the Court has not had occasion to consider whether a "beneficial"
lie or a "white" lie exists and, if so, whether these intentional falsehoods should be afforded
first amendment protection. For example, do parents have a free speech right (or a due
process right or even freedom of religion right) to deceive their children deliberately as to
the existence of Santa Claus or the Easter Bunny? Some argue that other white lies, such
as medical placebos, serve useful purposes and should be afforded first amendment protec-
tion. See generally S. BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 57-122,
passim (1978) (discussing ethical dilemmas posed by beneficial lies).
32. The nondeceptive speech would not be protected if it fell within the narrow scope
of any other unprotected category such as "fighting words," see Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), or "obscenity." See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957).
33. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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strict nondeceptive speech if it happens to apply, or be applied, to
such speech. 4
Assessing the impact of deceptive speech regulations on pro-
tected speech requires reference to the factors mentioned by the
Supreme Court in footnote twenty-four of its historic commercial
speech case, Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citi-
zens Consumer Council, Inc.,-the hardiness and objectivity of
the speech.3 5 Although the Court in Virginia Pharmacy noted the
relevance of the hardiness and objectivity of the speech to distin-
34. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. Although the two concepts of chilling
speech and directly restraining speech are related, and often overlap, they are not identical.
Certain regulations, although only applied to actually deceptive speech, will prevent some
cautious speakers from engaging in a certain amount of nondeceptive speech. Other regula-
tions, because of their broad scope or sloppy or biased enforcement, will actually restrict
nondeceptive speech directly. Obviously, the more the latter is known to occur, the more
likely is the former.
35. 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976). In the first paragraph of this lengthy footnote,
the Virginia Pharmacy Court identified two attributes that it characterized as "common-
sense" differences between commercial and noncommercial speech and that justify giving
the government more leeway to regulate deceptive commercial speech under the first
amendment:
In concluding that commercial speech enjoys First Amendment protection, we
have not held that it is wholly undifferentiable from other forms. There are com-
monsense differences between speech that does "no more than propose a com-
mercial transaction" and other varieties. Even if the differences do not justify
the conclusion that commercial speech is valueless, and thus subject to complete
suppression b& the State, they nonetheless suggest that a different degree of pro-
tection is necessary to insure that the flow of truthful and legitimate commercial
information is unimpaired. The truth of commercial speech, for example, may be
more easily verifiable by its disseminator than, let us say, news reporting or po-
litical commentary, in that ordinarily the advertiser seeks to disseminate infor-
mation about a specific product or service that he himself provides and presuma-
bly knows more about than anyone else. Also, commercial speech may be more
durable than other kinds. Since advertising is the sine qua non of commercial
profits, there is little likelihood of its being chilled by proper regulation and fore-
gone entirely.
Id. (citation omitted).
In later cases, the Court has, as it did in footnote 24, discussed the attributes of "har-
diness" and "objectivity" as being distinct. In fact the two factors are related. A speaker
making more objectively verifiable claims should be more confident that he or she can
prove the nondeceptive nature of the speech and thus should be less chilled by deceptive
speech regulations. For this reason, more easily verifiable speech would also tend to be
hardier. See infra text accompanying note 43.
Objectivity is also an important factor in assessing the likelihood of overregulation.
The government is less likely to mistake truthful speech for false speech where the speech
is objective in nature. See Posner, supra note 4, at 39-40 ("A false representation regard-
ing the price, quality, or quantity of a good or service offered for sale can usually be un-
masked in a legal proceeding without a great expenditure of time and money or a great risk
of error.").
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guishing commercial from noncommercial speech, the factors are
also relevant to analyzing the extent to which a deceptive speech
regulation chills protected speech.3 6 The objectivity of the speech
is also relevant to determining whether there is a substantial risk
of protected speech being inadvertently restricted.3 7
Presently, courts use analytical factors such as hardiness and
objectivity primarily as footnote rationalizations for affording
commercial speech less protection than noncommercial speech. 38
Both concepts, however, apply generally to the regulation of any
deceptive speech-not just commercial speech-and should be
used explicitly and directly in a broader, more complex frame-
work. Thus, instead of playing a supporting role in a one-dimen-
sional morality play about the second class status of commercial
speech, hardiness and objectivity should play a leading role in the
review of deceptive speech regulations.
Almost by definition, "hardy" speakers are less likely to be
chilled by government regulations. The Virginia Pharmacy Court
36. Neither hardiness nor objectivity are unique to commercial speech, notwithstand-
ing footnote 24. Many critics have noted that noncommercial speech can be as hardy and/
or as objective as commercial speech. See Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amend-
ment Theory, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 372, 386 (1979). The hardiness of some anti-abortion
speech and anti-nuclear speech, where not even the prospects of criminal arrest and impris-
onment have served to deter the most ideologically committed speakers, supports Professor
Farber's view. Other examples of hardy noncommercial speech include speech largely com-
pelled by law such as nonprivileged grand jury testimony and filling out one's tax return.
See infra text accompanying note 41.
In addition, commentators have pointed out that much speech traveling under the flag
of political speech is no less driven by economic self-interest than is any commercial adver-
tisement. See Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591, 633 (1982)
(newspapers and commercial magazines are in the business of making money as well as
presenting political speech). General Motors, Israel, and Citizens for a Fair Tax System
retain professional lobbyists to assist legislators in ascertaining "the public interest" be-
cause commercial advertising is not the only kind of speech motivated, at least in part, by
money.
Commentators also have challenged the Court's use of objectivity in distinguishing
commercial from noncommercial speech. They have noted that objective speech may be
found in packages not labeled commercial speech and that some commercial packaging
contains speech that is not objective. A politician's misrepresentation of his or her educa-
tional background is as subject to verification as a commercial advertiser's listing of prod-
uct ingredients and much more subject to verification than a commercial advertiser's
claims about quality. See, e.g., id. ("many statements made in the course of political de-
bate . . . are simply assertions of fact, which are presumably verifiable"); Shiffrin, supra
note 4, at 1212, 1218 (questioning the idea that commercial speech is more susceptible of
verification than political speech).
37. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758
n.5 (1985).
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suggested that financially motivated commercial advertisers will
continue searching for a way to spread their message, even when
faced with arduous government regulations and barriers.3 9 This
point extends far beyond commercial speech, or even speakers
with economic interests.40 For example, the average citizen has
strong incentive, due to applicable criminal and civil sanctions,
among other things, to speak fully and truthfully in a whole range
of contexts, such as on income tax returns.4" In these circum-
stances, even burdensome speech regulations are unlikely to chill
the relevant speech, especially to the extent that the speech and its
accuracy are actually mandated by law.42 On the other hand, one
can easily imagine examples of far less hardy speech, such as a
teacher's letter of recommendation. If Congress enacted a law
that punished potentially misleading speech in the context of rec-
ommendations, it would not be surprising if many students in
search of employment would find themselves without recommen-
dation letters. When analyzing this speech regulation under the
first amendment, the hardiness of the speech in question must be
39. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24.
40. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (noting similarities between commer-
cial and noncommercial speech). Attacking the relevance of the hardiness factor in chill
analysis, Professor Redish has argued that a regulation can readily influence what hardy
speakers say, even if the regulation does not chill them from speaking. He writes: "The
possibility of regulation would not deter [the commercial advertiser] entirely from advertis-
ing, but it might deter him from making certain controversial claims for his product."
Redish, supra note 36, at 633. Redish's argument has limited weight for two reasons. First,
"content-chill" is much less likely to occur with easily verifiable speech, which a speaker
can more confidently regard as not deceptive. See supra note 35 (discussing the objectivity
factor). Second, even less verifiable, controversial claims are less likely to be chilled when
the speaker is strongly motivated. Often a strongly motivated speaker will decide that the
benefits of the speech outweigh the regulatory costs-at least this balance will favor speech
that is hardy more often than speech that is not. Thus the hardiness of the speech is even
relevant to Professor Redish's "content-chill"; the hardier the speech, the more the speaker
will resist the modifying effects of regulation, especially to the extent that the chilling
effect conflicts with the reasons that the speaker wants to speak. For example, a profit-
minded advertiser who feels strongly that boastful and controversial quality claims help
sales will be less likely to cut back or tone down those claims because of arduous
regulations.
41. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 6651 (1988), as amended by Act of Dec. 19, 1989, Pub. L.
No. 101-239, § 7741(A), 103 Stat. 2404 (civil liability for negligent failure to file a tax
return); 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (1988), as amended by Act of Nov. 29, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
647, § 3303(A), 104 Stat. 4918 (criminal liability for willful failure to file a tax return).
42. Some laws not only mandate certain speech but also require that the compelled
speech be truthful. Failure to file a truthful tax return exposes a taxpayer to civil and
criminal liability. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C.A. § 6662 (West Supp. 1991) (civil liability for negli-
gently filing a false return); 26 U.S.C. § 7207 (1988) (criminal liability for fraudulently
filing a false return).
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considered, inter alia, in relation to the potential chill on protected
speech.
Objectivity is relevant to both the factors of chill and of di-
rect regulation. Government regulation requiring certain speakers
to communicate facts accurately is less likely to chill speech when
the speaker can determine the accuracy of the information in a
relatively straightforward and affordable manner. 43 Similarly, reg-
ulations addressing deceptive "facts" are less likely to engender an
inadvertent restriction on directly protected speech than deceptive
"opinions." Since it is easier to determine the truth or falsity of
more objective information, it is less likely that a court or agency
will inadvertently impose a direct burden on the communication of
accurate information."
On the other hand, regulating subjective speech, such as
opinion, is far more treacherous. First, cautious speakers of opin-
ion are more likely to be chilled by speech regulations because
they will have more difficulty determining the similarity between
their opinion and a specific instance of regulated speech. It is
much easier to feel comfortable that one is stating a price cor-
rectly than to be confident that one's opinion will not mislead any
significant minority of listeners. The risk of inadvertent direct reg-
ulation of protected speech is also greater with valuative speech.
An agency or a jury is more likely to stray from the decision a
judge would have made in the case of deceptive opinions than in
the case of false objective information. Moreover, a biased deci-
sion maker (be it judge, jury, or agency) may be more tempted to
label (or may feel it is easier to get away with labelling) contro-
versial opinions as "false" than more objective and verifiable facts.
Thus, regulating subjective communications is more likely both to
chill and to affect protected, nondeceptive speech than regulating
objective speech.
In addition to hardiness and objectivity, three other key fac-
tors affect the impact of a regulation on nondeceptive speech. A
regulation's procedure, standard, and legal consequences all affect
the extent of chill, and to a degree, the amount of direct regula-
tion. With respect to procedure, the risk of chill may be greater
where critical determinations are made primarily by an adminis-
trative agency or even by a jury, rather than by a judge.45
43. See supra note 35.
44. See id.
45. See Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARV. L. REV. 518, 522-
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The availability of independent judicial review may give some
speakers a bit more courage to test a regulation's limits and may
reduce the risk of inadvertent regulation. In numerous contexts,
such as in defamation and obscenity cases, the Supreme Court has
noted that the first amendment entitles a regulated speaker to an
independent examination of a jury or agency determination that
the speech is subject to the regulation. 46 Although this same right
may not apply to all speakers of deceptive speech,4" it should cer-
tainly be a factor in determining the extent of the impact on pro-
tected speech.
The standard of liability under a regulation is also relevant.
A regulation that imposes liability only on intentionally false
speech should not have much impact on even the most cautious
speakers, so long as they are not intentionally lying. On the other
hand, a strict liability standard may give the most aggressive
speakers pause, since even their most strenuous efforts to confirm
accuracy may not immunize them if they are wrong and someone
suffers. The regulation's liability standard is such a fundamental
element that often the standard itself offends the first amendment,
as in the defamation cases. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,48
the Suprernie Court ruled that regulations of libelous speech con-
cerning public officials and matters of public importance could not
be subject to any standard stricter than reckless or intentional
misconduct. A stricter standard, such as negligence or strict liabil-
ity, carries too great a threat of chilling protected speech.' 9 Parts
II, III, and IV of this article discuss how the first amendment
analysis of deceptive speech regulation, and the Relational Frame-
work analysis, focus on the acceptability of the standard of care
imposed on the speaker and the listener.
Finally, the consequences of the regulation for speakers are
relevant. For example, punitive damages, by definition, create a
much greater chill on speech.50 An example illustrates the combi-
24, 526-32 (1970) (explaining that judges are better protectors of first amendment rights
than administrative agencies or juries).
46. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984)
(defamation); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (obscenity).
47. For example, as previously noted, federal appellate courts defer to FTC determi-
nations that commercial advertisements are false or misleading. See supra note 25 and
accompanying text.
48. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
49. See id. at 277-83.
50. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) ("jury discre-
tion to award punitive damages unnecessarily exacerbates the danger of media self-censor-
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nation of all of these factors. A regulation authorizing an agency
to hold strictly liable, and to punish harshly, any poet who unin-
tentionally misleads a reader into thinking the poet believes that
taking drugs is acceptable is more likely to affect protected speech
than a regulation targeting only intentionally false statements
made by the poet's publisher about the price of the poet's book.
However, even if both regulations had the same impact on pro-
tected speech, the Relational Framework would still distinguish
the nature of the speech affected.
2. Prong Two: The Nature of the Speech Affected
The relevance of the nature of the speech affected is both
undeniable and extremely controversial. Content neutrality is a
basic first amendment principle.51 Somewhat inconsistently, the
Supreme Court has also permitted more rigorous restrictions on
certain kinds of protected speech, such as commercial speech, in
terms of the "subordinate position [of the speech] in the scale of
First Amendment values." 52 The tension between the principle of
content neutrality and the Court's prioritization of first amend-
ment values for different kinds of protected speech has been well
discussed in the literature.5" However, while the Relational
Framework recognizes, and to an extent leaves intact, this speech
discrimination inherent in the "scale of First Amendment values,"
the Relational Framework attempts to restate the bases for such
distinctions in terms more consistent with principles of content
neutrality. Thus, rather than regarding commercial speech as sim-
ply less valued than political speech, the Relational Framework
employs less content-specific factors to distinguish between cate-
gories of speech.
The primary distinction between different kinds of speech the
ship"). But cf. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 753-55
(1985) (permitting recovery of presumed and punitive damages in defamation cases with-
out a showing of actual malice if the defamatory statements do not involve matters of
public concern).
51. "[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to
restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."
Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1971); see Karst, Equality as a Central Principle
in the First Amendment, 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 20, 21 (1975) ("more fundamentally, the
principle of equal liberty lies at the heart of the first amendment's protections against gov-
ernment regulation of the content of speech.").
52. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
53. See, e.g., Farber supra note 36, at 373-76 (discussing the tension between the
commercial speech doctrine and the principle of content neutrality).
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Relational Framework recognizes is the distinction between
speech primarily serving speaker interests, such as "self-actualiza-
tion," and speech primarily serving listener interests, such as in-
formed decision making. Although the Supreme Court has recog-
nized these two sets of interests as distinct first amendment
values, 54 they have not acknowledged the usefulness of the distinc-
tion for purposes of replacing the Commercial Speech Doctrine
with a more content neutral analysis. The Relational Framework's
second prong attempts to achieve this by distinguishing between
regulations designed to limit false factual statements where first
amendment listener interests predominate and regulations
designed to limit false statements where speakers have strong first
amendment interests. The fundamental premise of the Relational
Framework's second prong is that deceptive speech regulations are
less problematic when enforced in speaker-listener contexts where
listener interests predominate.
In many contexts, the sole or primary purpose of speech is to
help listeners make informed decisions. This speech is "informa-
tional speech."55 Regulations designed to insure the accuracy of
54. For example, the majority and dissenting justices in First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765 (1978), recognized two distinct first amendment values. The Court labeled
one value "individual self-expression." See id. at 777 n.12. This value supports the
speaker's interest in expressing his or her own thoughts, whether they concern politics,
commerce, art, or science. Further, the Court has recognized a speaker's interest in convey-
ing feelings, see Cohen v California, 403 U.S. 15, 25-26 (1971), and in using speech to
entertain as well as to persuade, Schad v. Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981). The Court
recognized a second value furthered by the first amendment. This second value is the infor-
mational function of the first amendment. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777 n.12 ("The individ-
ual's interest in self-expression is a concern of the First Amendment separate from the
concern for open and informed discussion .... ." (emphasis added)). This second value
focuses on the listener and his or her interest in receiving information necessary to allow
the listener to make informed judgments, whether in deciding for whom to vote or what to
buy.
55. In this article, "informational speech" describes speech primarily serving the in-
formational function discussed in Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777 n.12; see also supra note 54.
This speech is often, but not necessarily, factual speech. It includes certain "nonfactual"
speech, such as professional opinion.
Other categories of "informational speech" discussed in this article include commer-
cial advertising, see infra text accompanying notes 77-93, product speech, see infra text
accompanying notes 223-30, and professional speech, see infra text accompanying notes
231-45. These categories of speech warrant first amendment protection because they pro-
vide information that helps recipients make rational decisions. Although the Supreme
Court has yet to discuss the first amendment protection of product speech or professional
speech, it has justified protection for commercial advertising by discussing the need to pro-
mote the first amendment's informational function. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 780 (1976) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) ("Commercial price and product advertising differs markedly from ideological
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informational speech are consistent with the purpose of the regu-
lated speech itself. An individual filling out his or her tax return
or a company preparing a price list is engaging in a protected
speech activity only because and to the extent that such speech
promotes listener interests. These listener interests may be in-
formed revenue collection, informed shopping, or other informed
activity. These first amendment listener interests depend upon the
speech's accuracy. In these examples, false speech is the enemy of
the first amendment interest in promoting informed decision mak-
ing. Simultaneously, the speech implicates few or none of the
traditional first amendment speaker values of self-expression or
self-actualization.
By contrast, the relationship between speaker and listener, in
other contexts, more directly implicates speaker interests in self-
realization. 6 Many kinds of speech, especially expressions of opin-
ion or works of art are primarily personal statements, implicating
elements of self-actualization and creativity. 57 In some such situa-
tions, perverse as it may sound, accuracy may be irrelevant to the
speaker, and even to listeners, who may benefit from, or at least
appreciate, the speech. To the speaker and even the listener an
[speech] .... The First Amendment protects the advertisement because of the 'informa-
tion of potential interest and value' conveyed rather than because of any direct contribution
to the interchange of ideas." (citation omitted)). Inaccurate information, however, would
frustrate rather than promote the first amendment's informational value of fostering in-
formed and rational decision making. See id. at 781 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("Indeed, the
elimination of false and deceptive claims serves to promote the one facet of commercial
price and product advertising that warrants First Amendment protection-its contribution
to the flow of accurate and reliable information relevant to public and private decisionmak-
ing."). Arguably, political speech is also "informational speech," but the Relational Frame-
work treats political speech separately because of policies unique to democratic processes.
See infra text accompanying notes 248-75. Additionally, the focus on the value to listeners
of "informational speech" does not mean that there are not other types of speech that
listeners value, such as entertainment. However, the value of such noninformational speech
is not primarily related to its accuracy, and, thus, for the most part the speech is not and
should not be subject to deceptive speech regulations.
56. In this article, "self-expression speech" refers to speech that serves speaker inter-
ests of self-expression or self-actualization rather than, or in addition to, the listener's inter-
est in merely receiving accurate information.
57. Professor C. Edwin Baker would limit first amendment protection exclusively to
such "self-expression speech." His speaker-centered first amendment theory does not recog-
nize any distinct listener interest in information except that it be provided freely by the
speaker. Because Professor Baker believes that commercial advertising is coerced speech,
dictated by economic considerations, and not freely spoken speech, driven by self-expres-
sion, he does not afford first amendment protection to commercial advertising, notwith-
standing its informational value to consumers. Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in
the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REv. 1 (1976).
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expressed opinion may be extremely speculative, virtually a trial
balloon. 58 To subject self-expression speech to a rigorous test of
accuracy would not be consistent with the purpose of the speech.
Similarly, the concept of truth does not apply as easily to opinions
and ideas as it does to facts. Often opinions and ideas explain or
interpret facts, and there may be more than one legitimate expla-
nation or interpretation of facts. For example, a statement that
the temperature outside is sixty degrees may be deemed false or
misleading more easily than a statement that the temperature is
too cold to go swimming. 59 In any case, deceptive speech regula-
tions of self-expression speech may threaten one set of first
amendment values, while similar regulations of informational
speech may support another set of first amendment values.
Instead of accepting or applying the concept that certain
kinds of speech may be more or less subordinate in the "scale of
First Amendment values," the Relational Framework recognizes
that different speech contexts and different kinds of speech impli-
cate different first amendment values. As discussed above, pursu-
ant to the second prong of the Framework, deceptive speech regu-
lations affecting speaker values such as the freedom of political
debate or the freedom of creative expression must simply be ac-
knowledged as more suspect under the first amendment than a
similar regulation of commercial advertising or of tax returns. Ad-
ditionally, the government's interest in protecting the listener's en-
titlement to accurate speech is less significant in the context of
self-expression speech.
3. Prong Three: The Justification for the Protection of the
Listener's Reliance
Once it is determined that the regulation in question affects
protected nondeceptive speech, and the nature of the affected
speech is assessed, the Relational Framework focuses on the rela-
58. Common law tort principles gave opinions a privileged status long before the
Supreme Court first proclaimed opinions to be largely unregulable under the first amend-
ment, see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) ("under the First
Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea."), and long before the Court began
readjusting common law doctrines to conform to first amendment requirements. See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) or TORTS §§ 539, 542, 543 (1976) (indicating that there are some
circumstances in which a recipient's reliance upon a representation of opinion is not justi-
fied and, therefore, not actionable).
59. See Posner, supra note 4, at 26 ("the truth of many ideas and the beauty of most
art cannot be resolved by any forensic process").
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tionship between the speaker and the listener to determine
whether the harm to the particular protected speech is outweighed
by the need to protect listener reliance on the speech's accuracy.
Legislatures and courts have protected listener reliance on
speech accuracy for many reasons. In the commercial advertising
context, for example, it is presumed that false or misleading ad-
vertising will interfere with marketplace efficiency. Consumers
may be led to purchase the wrong products or prevented from
purchasing those that suit their needs. Similarly, ineffective prod-
ucts may waste scarce resources, while effective products remain
underused. These economic arguments seem straightforward
enough and easily justify a constitutional receptivity to regulations
protecting consumer's interests in accurate commercial speech.60
The Relational Framework's third prong focuses on properly
allocating the burden of truth determination between the speaker
and the listener. As previously discussed, in the commercial adver-
tising context, the elaborate regulatory scheme enforcing truth in
advertising allocates the primary responsibility for truth determi-
nation to the speaker. 1 This seems fair and correct. As the Su-
preme Court itself has noted the manufacturer or distributor of a
product is generally in the best position to ascertain and verify the
60. Although this distinction is perhaps subtle, the first amendment should be under-
stood as valuing the protection of listener reliance on accurate speech, rather than as pro-
moting efficient commercial markets per se. The Virginia Pharmacy Court partially rested
its decision to extend first amendment protection to truthful commercial speech on eco-
nomic efficiency grounds. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976). For doing so, it was criticized in a dissent
by Justice Rehnquist who, while accepting the Court's economic analysis, accused the
Court of adding the promotion of free enterprise to the list of previously recognized first
amendment values. See id. at 783-84 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). This free enterprise inter-
est is the same value the Lochner Court mistakenly sought to have incorporated into the
due process clause. See Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process
and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REv. 1, 30-33 (1979). Although the Virginia Phar-
macy Court may have erred in defending first amendment protection of truthful commer-
cial speech as a means of promoting well-functioning free markets, economists and others
have defended the Court's understanding of the impact of false information on the market
place of goods. See, e.g., Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regula-
tion of Advertising, 90 HARV. L. REV. 661, 671-73 (1977); Posner, supra note 4, at 31;
Note, Developments in the Law: Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1026
(1967).
The Virginia Pharmacy Court also justified commercial speech protection and regula-
tion in terms of the first amendment's informational function. The Court reasoned that
protecting truthful commercial advertising while regulating false and misleading advertis-
ing helped ensure listeners' access to information relevant to them in making decisions. See
Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763-65; see also Redish, supra note 36, at 630-32.
61. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
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facts about the product that would be relevant to the market. 62
In an extreme example, it is far cheaper, and more efficient,
for manufacturers to determine in advance how much corn goes
into each of its thousands of cans, than to expect shoppers to
weigh each can before they buy it and then attempt to estimate
how much of the weight is attributable to the corn inside. s
If the seller is in a better position to determine this fact than
the buyer, it makes sense to require the seller to discharge this
task responsibly. Otherwise, unscrupulous, lazy, or incompetent
sellers may mislead shoppers who are likely to rely, or helpless not
to rely,6 4 on sellers' representations about their products, and who
may not be able to regulate efficiently injurious false speech.6 5
Fair play and the principles of division of labor and speciali-
zation also support placing the truth burden on the expert speaker
rather than on the lay listener. No one can or should become an
expert in all areas. Where people are forced and encouraged to
specialize, it seems reasonable and fair to provide protection to
nonexperts in their dealings with experts. Where speech, particu-
larly technical speech, is intended to inform listeners so that they
can make a purchasing decision, fairness, as much as efficiency,
justify placing the burden of accuracy on the speaker and not on
the disadvantaged and vulnerable listener. 6
The same sorts of arguments may be made to support laws
regulating deceptive political speech. Deceptive political speech
may lead some voters to vote for the wrong candidate, or prevent
62. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
564 n.6 (1980) ("[C]ommercial speakers have extensive knowledge of both the market and
their products. Thus, they are well situated to evaluate the accuracy of their message
63. See Reich, Toward a New Consumer Protection, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 23
(1979).
64. See id. at 25 (discussing unequal bargaining power, lack of coordination among
consumers, and the high costs of private litigation, as factors forcing consumers to rely on
sellers' representations).
65. One thousand shoppers defrauded of a dollar each may not bother to take the
time to do anything about the petty loss, including notifying the manufacturer that the
package's information is false.
66. The importance of this factor, i.e., the relative expertise and knowledge of the
speaker and listener, is recognized and incorporated into the common law tort concept of
"justifiable reliance." A listener relying to his or her detriment on a misrepresentation can
recover against the speaker only if the reliance is found to be justifiable. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF ToRTs § 537 (1976). To prove justifiable reliance, generally the listener must
show that the speaker had superior knowledge or expertise and that it was reasonable for
the listener to defer to the speaker's judgment and to accept the speaker's factual claims as
accurate. See id. §§ 541-542.
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them from voting for the best candidate.6 7 However, the distinc-
tion drawn by many courts between government regulation of
commercial advertising and political campaign speech is
defensible.
The allocation of responsibility for the determination of truth
or accuracy in political speech requires a different analysis than
with commercial speech. For much political speech, especially in
light of the press's active role in providing the public with political
information, the cost of acquiring information for the speaker and
listener may be similar.6 8 More importantly, however, excessive
listener protectionism in the context of political speech potentially
undermines the policy of encouraging every individual citizen to
be actively and primarily responsible for his or her own political
judgments.69 Thirdly, there are practical limits to how much a lis-
tener can or should "reasonably rely" on most political state-
ments. Even a politician's strongest promises are little more than
vague predictions about how the representative might act in the
future under changed circumstances. Should the law really at-
tempt to enforce politicians' campaign promises the way it en-
forces the promises of vendors? "Read my lips-no price increases
on tomatoes during the four year term of this contract. '7 0 Fortu-
nately, the political process generally loosely enforces many politi-
67. See Note, supra note 11, at 897 (stating that accurate voting depends, in part,
on the availability of accurate, relevant information).
68. Niemi & Weisberg, Is It Rational to Vote?, in CONTROVERSIES IN AMERICAN
VOTING BEHAVIOR 22, 27 (R. Niemi & H. Weisberg eds. 1976).
69. The basis for this claim is democratic theory. Democratic theory largely rejects
principles of specialization and division of labor, which are prevalent in the commercial
arena. These economic principles assume that some people are better suited than others to
perform certain jobs. For example, a premise of state bar exams is that some people are not
sufficiently intelligent or educated to practice law. Democratic theory, on the other hand,
rejects such a premise for performing the job of citizen. No native born citizen need pass a
citizen competency test to vote or run for office. See S. LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH
(1988). In the eyes of a democracy all citizens are, in theory, equally expert on all public
issues. What follows from this is: (1) the right of any citizen to vote or speak out on public
issues should not be "abridged" on the grounds that the citizen is not sufficiently "expert"
to evaluate or discuss the subject; and (2) citizen speakers and citizen listeners should be
treated as equals in terms of political expertise and knowledge. Therefore, it is unreasona-
ble, and in a sense, even dangerous for the citizen listener either to defer to the political
judgment of another or to accept on faith and unreflectively the factual claims made by the
citizen speaker. The point is not so much that politicians lack expertise in areas of public
policy, but rather that democracy functions best when citizens, especially voters, exercise
their own judgment and minimize unexamined deference to the judgments of others.
70. See 2 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, supra note 11, § 7.10, at 442; RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 531 (1976).
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cal promises by threatening that politicians "breaking their
promises" will be recalled or at least not reelected.
Should these arguments prevent a legislature against protect-
ing voters from politicians who intentionally lie about matters of
which they have special knowledge, such as their confidential fi-
nancial status and practices? Even the most responsible voter may
find it impossible to determine when a politician provides false
personal data. 1 Imposing the duty to investigate on the listener
may be inefficient, unfair, and unnecessary. Similarly, there may
be limits to the faith that should be placed in the concept of the
expert citizen. Even the most diligent citizen can not obtain some
information. Fortunately, an active media can partially compen-
sate for this disadvantage, though probably not enough to make
political deceptive speech laws directed at such narrow areas of
politician speech unnecessary or unwarranted.
Another factor is the concern that parties with governmental
power may censor political speech unfairly under the guise of de-
ceptive speech regulation . 2 Arguably, the truth burden should be
placed on the listener because the government cannot be trusted to
enforce objectively a rule placing the burden on the speaker.73
The concern of biased regulation appears less valid in regu-
lating commercial advertising. Unless the agency, the legislature,
or the judge has invested heavily in a competing product, the same
sort of prejudice would not be present.74
Considering all of these factors together, the Relational
Framework presumes that commercial advertising regulation is
constitutional, absent special circumstances such as undue impact
on significant protected speech or a weak justification for the pro-
tection of the listener's reliance. However, the Relational Frame-
work presumes that political speech regulation is unconstitutional,
absent special circumstances such as a minimal impact on signifi-
cant protected speech or a very strong justification for protecting
listener reliance. As suggested above, an example of the latter is a
71. The informational costs are less for the politician for these kinds of facts.
72. See supra note 4 (discussing biased enforcement of speech regulations).
73. One can conceive of devices that might mitigate the danger of biased, partisan
regulation of political speech. For example, borrowing from rules used to ensure jury im-
partiality under the sixth amendment, the law could combat biased regulation and promote
objective decision making by requiring the regulatory body enforcing the regulation to in-
clude a cross section of political interests, or require unanimity for a finding of liability.
74. See Shiffrin, supra note 4, at 1265-66; Note, Freedom of Expression in a Com-
mercial Context, 78 HARV. L. REv. 1191, 1195 (1965).
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law regulating politicians who intentionally lie about objective
facts peculiarly within their knowledge-such as their confidential
investments. Limiting the regulation to intentional falsehoods min-
imizes the chill on protected, truthful speech. Limiting the scope
of the regulation to objective facts such as investments, as op-
posed, for example, to statements about the opposing candidate's
position on a public issue, 5 the law concerns more precisely only
objective nonjudgmental facts better ascertained by the speaker
than by the listener. Otherwise, listeners should not be encouraged
to rely on the truth of a politician's claim that his or her opponent
is opposed, for example, to abortion, but may be permitted to rely
in general on statements by a politician as to whether he or she
owns stock in an abortion clinic.
In summary, the Relational Framework's third prong focuses
on the tort-based need to protect reasonable reliance of listener's
on the accuracy of the speech in question. The Relational Frame-
work is most likely to uphold regulations of deceptive speech that
are limited to statements of objective facts most efficiently deter-
mined by speakers and reasonably relied upon by listeners. The
Relational Framework is least likely to uphold regulations of de-
ceptive speech involving subjective statements upon which listen-
ers are neither likely nor should be encouraged to rely76 because
of fundamental notions of independent political citizenship. The
difficult cases are the ones falling between these two extremes.
This article next discusses areas of deceptive speech regulation in
which courts have applied the Commercial Speech Doctrine. After
describing the doctrine and criticizing its use in certain cases in-
volving deceptive speech regulations, the same cases are then ana-
lyzed under the Relational Framework.
75. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Voss, 304 N.W.2d 299, 300 (Minn. 1981).
76. The Supreme Court itself has speculated that statements, of both opinion and
fact, about politics are apt to be discounted by listeners. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 791-92 (1978) (noting that the listener may consider the source and its
credibility in evaluating political speech); Posner, supra note 4, at 40-41 (discussing the
weighing that occurs in employees' minds during a union representation election).
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II. A CRITIQUE OF THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE As
APPLIED
A. The Commercial Speech Doctrine versus the Relational
Framework
The current definition of commercial speech, according to the
Supreme Court, is a combination of a "core notion" surrounded
by a penumbral boundary defined on the basis of three character-
istics. The core notion of commercial speech is "speech which does
'no more than propose a commercial transaction.' "7 Outside this
core area is a body of commercial speech identified by some unde-
fined combination of the following characteristics:
(1) whether the speech is in the form of an advertisement,
(2) whether the speech refers to a specific product, and
(3) whether the speaker is economically motivated."8
As Justice Marshall stated in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod-
ucts Corp., while none of these factors is sufficient (or possibly
even necessary) 79 to establish the speech as commercial, "[t]he
combination of all three characteristics . . . provides strong sup-
port for the . . . conclusion that the [speech is] commercial
speech."80
As noted earlier, most courts have used the Commercial
Speech Doctrine as both a starting point and a finishing line in
determining whether the first amendment permits a given regula-
tion of deceptive speech. If the speech is deemed "commercial" in
nature, most courts, including the Supreme Court, have assumed
that there is little reason to interfere with even the most extreme
regulations. 1 If the speech is not commercial, however, courts
scrutinize the regulation strictly and usually strike it down.82
The Relational Framework in the preceding section is an al-
ternative to the Commercial Speech Doctrine.8" The Commercial
77. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Re-
lations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)).
78. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983).
79. See id. at 67 n.14.
80. Id. at 67 (emphasis in original).
81. See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 468 (1978).
82. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485,
513-14 (1984).
83. The "core notion" characteristic, and the characteristics that comprise the outer
boundary of commercial speech, can actually be better understood in terms of the Rela-
tional Framework than in terms of a definition of commercial speech itself. Beginning with
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Speech Doctrine is inferior to the Relational Framework proposed
in this Article for a number of reasons. First, the Commercial
Speech Doctrine gives determinative power to an elusive definition
test that the Supreme Court, as evidenced by Bolger, has been
unable to articulate in a precise, coherent manner.84 Considering
its purpose in the law, the "commercial speech" definition is too
conclusory, as well as being underinclusive and overinclusive, lead-
ing to both false positives and false negatives if followed literally.
Speech possessing none of the Bolger commercial speech charac-
teristics, such as a false police report, might properly be subject to
the "core notion" characteristic, speech merely proposing a commercial transaction may
tend to be relatively more hardy, more objective, and more remote from core speaker val-
ues than other forms of speech. Moreover, speakers of such speech can be assumed to have
greater knowledge of their topic than do their listeners, whose reliance on the information
should therefore be seen as reasonable. Similarly, imposing a duty of care on such speakers
probably promotes a more efficient market than requiring listeners to verify the accuracy of
the speech before acting on it.
Admittedly, such presumptions may not apply in a particular case. Primarily for this
reason, the Relational Framework would not apply a level of first amendment protection on
the basis of how speech fared in an either/or commercial speech litmus test. Rather, the
Relational Framework would enable a court to analyze the constitutionality of a regulation
in terms of its impact on protected speech, which in turn depends on the three elements of
the Relational Framework. See supra notes 31-76 and accompanying text.
Similarly, the penumbra or boundary characteristics of commercial speech are also
better understood as relevant factors in the Relational Framework, rather than as elements
of a murky definition. Speech in the form of an advertisement, for example, at least to the
extent the advertisement promotes a product or service, tends to be hardier, more objective,
and more remote from speaker values than, for example, a poem or a political commentary.
Generally, speech referring to a specific product would probably be more objective than
speech about vague moral abstractions. Finally, speakers who are economically motivated
are arguably less likely to be chilled by regulation, making their speech hardier.
Thus, the characteristics the Court currently uses to "define" commercial speech can
be reused much less formalistically and, arguably, more coherently to elucidate the degree
of impact on protected speech, the nature of the speech affected, and even the justification
for the regulation. Instead of relying on clumsy and imprecise categorizations, the Rela-
tional Framework permits a court to sort out the relevant factors in terms addressing the
first amendment's mandate to bar excessive restraints on protected speech.
84. See Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the First Amendment,
56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1181, 1185 n.17 (1988) (characterizing Bolger's effort to define com-
mercial speech as "sketchy" and "inconclusive"). It has become almost commonplace in
commercial speech cases for the Court, after applying the distinction between commercial
and noncommercial speech, to acknowledge the ill-defined nature of the distinction itself.
See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office Of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985) (stating
that the "precise bounds" of commercial speech are "subject to doubt"); Bolger, 463 U.S.
at 81 ("the impression that 'commercial speech' is a fairly definite category of communica-
tion. . . may not be wholly warranted") (Stevens, J., concurring); In re Primus, 436 U.S.
412, 438 n.32 (1978) (the line between commercial and noncommercial speech "will not
always be easy to draw").
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government regulation under the first amendment.8 5 On the other
hand, space purchased in a newspaper by the United Auto Work-
ers criticizing Chrysler's closing of a plant in which a certain kind
of car had been built should not be found to constitute "commer-
cial speech" and should be largely immune from government reg-
ulation, even though all three of the Bolger factors are present.
Thus, even if a commercial speech categorization could serve
some purpose, the court's inability to fashion a coherent definition
of commercial speech undermines its usefulness. Such an uncer-
tain definition disserves judges, who need clear doctrinal guidance,
and exacerbates the chill of protected speech. Speakers that might
approach the edge of a bright line test might be inclined to steer
well clear of an unpredictable definitional boundary.8 6 A court ap-
plying the Relational Framework avoids the quagmire of trying to
define the exact scope or definition of commercial speech, such as
whether the category is limited to speech that merely proposes a
commercial transaction, or whether it includes various forms of
related speech.8 7
A second advantage of the Relational Framework over the
Commercial Speech Doctrine is that the Relational Framework
also relieves courts of the need to classify as either commercial or
85. See United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 476-77 (1984).
86. SEC v. Lowe demonstrates the difficulty of predicting where courts might draw
the commercial speech line in any given case. See generally text accompanying notes 114-
29 (discussing Lowe at length). On the question of whether Christopher Lowe's investment
newsletter, which the SEC was seeking to enjoin, was commercial speech, two federal
judges thought that it was and two thought it was not. SEC v. Lowe, 556 F. Supp. 1359
(E.D.N.Y. 1983) (not commercial speech), rev'd, 725 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1984) (two judges
held the newsletter was commercial speech and one disagreed), rev'd on other grounds, 472
U.S. 181, 211 (1985) (decided on statutory grounds but three Justices regarded the news-
letter as commercial speech without providing analysis).
One can sympathize with the judges attempting to define Lowe's investment newslet-
ters as either commercial or noncommercial speech. Clearly investment newsletters do not
fall within the "core definition" of commercial speech. However, an assessment of invest-
ment newsletters in terms of the three Bolger "factors" is inconclusive. Although the eco-
nomic motivation factor appears to be present, the other two factors appear to be absent. In
the past, the Court has stated that economic motivation alone will not disqualify speech
from full first amendment protection. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,
Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 787 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]his Court has consistently
rejected the argument that speech is entitled to diminished First Amendment protection
simply because it concerns economic matters or is in the economic interest of the speaker
or the audience.").
87. Concededly, to some speakers the Relational Framework may not boast many
bright lines either. However, at least the Relational Framework better identifies the rele-
vant factors and requires courts to evaluate them openly. Over time, this should result in a
body of law and analytical tools that will provide clear guidance to judges and speakers.
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noncommercial various types of speech that are largely resistant
to such categorization.88 The Commercial Speech Doctrine artifi-
cially reduces complex instances of human behavior to simplistic
either/or paradigms of mere commercial proposition. The Rela-
tional Framework does not oversimplify speech by categorizing it
as either commercial or not.
A third reason for preferring the Relational Framework over
the Commercial Speech Doctrine is that the Relational Frame-
work has a more general application; it applies to all forms of
deceptive speech regulation, not just the regulation of commercial
speech. This is necessary because both statutory and common law
have long recognized that many listeners other than merely poten-
tial customers may have a reasonable expectation of truthful
speech that merits protection.8 No matter how courts define com-
mercial speech, it is unlikely that they could define the category
broadly enough to encompass all of the speech the government
properly would want and need to regulate. Unlike the Commercial
Speech Doctrine, the Relational Framework is available for re-
viewing any and all deceptive speech regulations. Since the Rela-
tional Framework does not employ the dichotomous formalism of
the Commercial Speech Doctrine, it more openly assesses the mul-
tiplicity of factors a court needs to evaluate before deciding
whether or not a deceptive speech regulation violates the first
amendment.
The commercial speech characterization glosses over signifi-
cant variations in the key underlying factors. By overestimating
the importance of this characterization and by neglecting other
relevant factors, courts may be misled into allowing improper reg-
ulation of certain kinds of commercial speech and into disallowing
permissible regulations of noncommercial speech. One form of
commercial speech might be less hardy, less objective, less remote
from core first amendment speaker values, and less reasonably re-
lied upon than another.90 Conversely, one can easily imagine
88. See supra note 86.
89. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 comments a-b, illustrations 1-3
(1976).
90. For instance, a burdensome licensing or disclosure law that heavily regulates ad-
vertisements for movies could chill artists from advertising their latest low budget art film
for a number of reasons, including the cost of compliance. In turn, such a chill on advertis-
ing could substantially abridge important protected speech by reducing the movie's audi-
ence or even by affecting the way artists create their movies. For example, to minimize a
mandated "bad language" disclosure, an artist might choose to end a movie with "Frankly,
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speech that does not fall within one of the definitions of commer-
cial speech being more hardy, more objective, more remote from
recognized first amendment speaker values, and more reasonably
relied upon than certain kinds of commercial speech, and thus
more regulable under the first amendment."n
In contrast, the Relational Framework demonstrates that
commercial speech is merely one category of speech, and an amor-
phous category at that, that may often, but will not necessarily,
have certain relevant characteristics, such as hardiness, objectiv-
ity, and remoteness from core first amendment speaker values and
may often be more fact-oriented than idea-oriented, which would
render its regulation generally more acceptable under the first
amendment. Characterizing the speech as commercial or not is an
unnecessary middle step. This characterization is at best a gener-
alization of certain relevant factors and at worst a misleading, ar-
bitrary, and inaccurate presumption.
Finally, the Relational Framework does not require courts to
justify a more lenient standard for the review of speech regulation
by making a value judgement that certain kinds of speech (for
example, speech proposing a commercial transaction) are some-
how less valuable than other kinds of speech. As noted earlier, to
justify the double standard between the regulation of commercial
and noncommercial speech, courts, including the Supreme Court,
have begun to assign commercial speech a second-class status
based solely on its content.9 2 This is a potentially dangerous ero-
my dear, I don't give a hoot."
91. Take, for example, trial testimony compelled through the question, "Do you own
a car?" Under pain of perjury or contempt, a witness is highly motivated to answer the
inquiry, and to answer truthfully. Knowing that others have been punished for lying should
not chill a speaker who is able to tell the truth, especially where not speaking is also pun-
ishable by contempt. Without running the speech through the rest of the Relational Frame-
work analysis, which would entail examination of such factors as the absence of speaker
values and the presence of reasons why juries and judges are entitled to rely on witness
speech, the Relational Framework would easily uphold the constitutionality of perjury and
contempt sanctions for this speech even though it is in no way commercial.
92. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text. Two years after Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24
(1976); see also supra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing Virginia Pharmacy at
length), the Court without prior warning announced a third rationale to justify according
commercial speech less protection than other categories of protected speech. In addition to
being more objective and hardier, the Court proclaimed that commercial speech was also
less valuable than noncommercial speech. In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, Justice Pow-
ell, writing for the majority, declared that commercial speech occupies a "subordinate posi-
tion in the scale of First Amendment values." 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978). Justice Powell,
however, did not explain what makes commercial speech less valuable. Justice Powell also
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sion of the core principal of content-neutrality in first amendment
jurisprudence.93 In contrast, the Relational Framework does not
require a devaluation of commercial speech to justify the legality
of stricter commercial speech regulation. Although the Relational
Framework admittedly draws distinctions between different kinds
of speech and treats different kinds of speech differently, it at-
tempts to base these distinctions on more neutral and acceptable
factors than solely the value of the speech itself, such as whether
the speech implicates core speaker values or primarily promotes
the interest of listeners in receiving accurate information.
Admittedly the Relational Framework requires a court judg-
ing a deceptive speech regulation to afford greater protection to
speech with high speaker values than speech that is purely or pri-
marily informational. Rather than holding the latter less valua-
ble-it is hard to imagine speech more "valuable" to a listener
than the information that a certain liquid is poisonous-the Rela-
tional Framework bases its distinctions on the reasons that govern-
ment regulation of informational speech is more appropriate and
did not attempt to reconcile his assessment of lower value with the Court's earlier analysis
in Virginia Pharmacy, which seemed to indicate that commercial speech was as important
as, and as valuable as, political speech. See Shiffrin, supra note 4, at 1218 (contending that
the Virginia Pharmacy Court equated commercial and political speech).
Justice Powell's lesser value position in Ohralik is also difficult to reconcile with his
views set out in FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). In Pacifica, decided the
same year as Ohralik, Justice Powell objected to the plurality's willingness to give some
protected speech less protection than other protected speech on the basis of its lower value.
See id. at 761 (Powell, J., concurring) ("I do not subscribe to the theory that the Justices
of this Court are free generally to decide on the basis of its content which speech protected
by the First Amendment is most 'valuable' and hence deserving of the most protection, and
which is less 'valuable' and hence deserving of less protection."). Nonetheless, in subse-
quent cases, the Court has continued to hold to the view that commercial speech is less
valuable than other forms of protected speech. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Green-
moss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 n.5 (1985); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 n.5 (1980). However, the Court has yet to explain
the characteristics of commercial speech that make it less valuable than other categories of
protected speech or to explain why such a position does not conflict with the Court's an-
nounced content-neutrality principle. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
Many commentators have disagreed with the notion that commercial speech has less
value than other categories of protected speech. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 4, at 11 ("I
am skeptical whether [commercial advertising] can be placed below political speech by
reference to differences in value."); Redish, supra note 36, at 634-35 (asserting that it is
impossible to justify any differences in the treatment of commercial and noncommercial
speech on the premise that one is less valuable than the other); Shiffrin, supra note 4, at
1282 (the lesser status for commercial speech contradicts the content-neutrality principle).
93. See Farber, supra note 36, at 374 ("[A]s a result of [the tension between the
commercial speech doctrine and the content-neutrality principle], the principle of content
neutrality has itself come into question.").
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acceptable under the first amendment than regulation of other
speech.
Several of the above listed faults of the Commercial Speech
Doctrine are related. One reason courts, including the Supreme
Court, have been unable to settle on a workable, consistent defini-
tion of commercial speech may be that they feel the definition
must include virtually any speech that they are inclined to deem
readily regulable. The balance of this section discusses several of
these cases in an effort to show that courts, struggling with the
interface between the Commercial Speech Doctrine and the regu-
lation of deceptive speech, would be better served by the Rela-
tional Framework.
B. Judicial Applications
1. Lawyer Solicitation
The Supreme Court, in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Associa-
tion,94 clearly demonstrated that it will begin and virtually end its
first amendment analysis of a state regulation of deceptive speech
by determining whether the regulated speech is "commercial."
Ohralik involved a first amendment challenge to a state regulation
prohibiting attorneys from making in-person solicitations on be-
half of their for-profit business.95 Finding the solicitation to be
commercial speech, the Court, in the words of Justice Powell, pro-
claimed that "[w]hile this does not remove the speech from the
protection of the First Amendment . . . it lowers the level of ap-
propriate judicial scrutiny." '9
After the Court determined that such speech was commer-
cial, the Court employed a mere rationality test, similar to the
deferential standard used in economic due process challenges to
regulations of nonspeech conduct.97 Not surprisingly, the regula-
tion, deemed to be rationally related to an important state inter-
est,98 was upheld notwithstanding the fact that it constituted a
94. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
95. See id. at 448-49.
96. Id. at 457.
97. See id. at 459 ("A lawyer's procurement of remunerative employment is a sub-
ject only marginally affected with First Amendment concerns. It falls within the State's
proper sphere of economic and professional regulation. While entitled to some constitu-
tional protection, appellant's conduct is subject to regulation in furtherance of important
state interests." (citation omitted)).
98. The Ohralik Court identified several interests a state might legitimately seek to
promote by banning in-person solicitations including protection against "fraud, undue influ-
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blanket prior restraint of an entire category of speech99 that even
the state would concede includes a large amount of nondeceptive
protected speech.
The extent to which the speech in Ohralik was denied true
first amendment treatment was further clarified in the Court's de-
cision in In re Primus,100 a companion case where the Court held
unconstitutional an application of virtually the same regulation as
in Ohralik to a solicitation made in writing by an ACLU lawyer.
In Primus, an attorney wrote a letter to a Medicaid patient who
had been sterilized as a condition to receiving Medicaid assis-
tance. The letter stated that the ACLU would be willing to re-
present the patient without fee in a lawsuit against the doctor who
performed the sterilization.' 0 ' The Court held that a state could
not restrict the speech unless it made a specific finding that the
particular speech it sought to restrict was in fact deceptive.10 2
ence, intimidation, overreaching, and other forms of 'vexatious conduct.'" Id. at 462. The
Court's characterization of lawyer solicitation as "conduct" rather than "speech" and its
recognition that a state can protect the listener from "overbearing" speech are two addi-
tional indicia supporting the conclusion that the Court was applying a standard of review
more deferential than it normally applies when reviewing regulations of speech. Thus, the
Court has given no indication that it would similarly allow the state to protect listeners
from such conduct outside the area of commercial speech. Indeed, it would be hard to
reconcile a similar judicial soliditude towards protecting listeners from over-bearing politi-
cal speech with the Court's often repeated support of "the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
99. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 468.
100. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
101. See id. at 914-17.
102. The Court held that Primus could not be disciplined unless the state could show
that her solicitation was in fact false or vexatious. See id. at 434-35, 438. The Court char-
acterized Primus's solicitation as tantamount to fully protected political speech and, there-
fore, the state's disciplinary action had to "withstand the 'exacting scrutiny applicable to
limitations on core First Amendment rights.'" Id. at 432 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 44-45 (1976)). The Court's suggestion that the state could have punished Primus if
her speech was, in fact, deceptive or overreaching, however, seems to indicate that the
Court does not view political solicitation speech (at least by lawyers) in the same manner
as political speech generally. Again, it is unlikely the Court would permit states to regulate
vexatious political speech. See supra note 98.
The Court has suggested that the government's authority to regulate deceptive politi-
cal speech is limited to regulating false political statements of fact, made knowingly or
recklessly. See Brown v Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 61 (1982). The Primus Court did not
decide whether the first amendment allows a state to discipline a speaker like Primus for an
innocently made misrepresentation. See Primus, 436 U.S. at 438 n.33. It is also unclear
whether the Court's discussion that Primus could be disciplined for misleading statements,
see id. at 434-36, 438, should be understood as allowing states to regulate misleading as
well as false political solicitations. Some lower courts have stated that governmental au-
thority over deceptive political speech is confined to false (as opposed to merely misleading)
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Justice Powell, the author of both opinions, explained in
Primus that the reason for the dramatic double standard was that
the Court felt the solicitation in Ohralik was apolitical and profit-
motivated, while in Primus the solicitation was related to what in
effect was political expression through litigation.103 Obviously,
such a simplistic either/or standard exaggerates the significance
of the differences between the two situations. Moreover, such an
analysis does not prepare a court for intermediate cases, such as
solicitations by lawyers who make a modest profit defending or
prosecuting the economic rights of more politically significant liti-
gants, such as minorities, women, the aged, and the disadvan-
taged. Should the judicial choice between strict scrutiny and a
mere rationality standard turn so heavily on the wealth of the cli-
ent being solicited by a lawyer or the Court's opinion of the politi-
cal or social significance of the lawsuit?'04 Certainly the fact that
one novelist is more profit motivated than another should not
change the level of protection their books receive under the first
amendment. 0 5 Even if profit motive is somehow relevant because
of its role in defining commercial speech, in Bolger the Supreme
Court made clear that profit motive is only one factor in the
statements of fact. See infra note 249.
There are two possible ways to limit the Primus Court's acceptance of state regulation
of speech actually found to be overbearing or misleading so that not all political speech
could be similarly regulated. One way is to limit the case to political solicitations by law-
yers. See Primus, 436 U.S. at 438. A second possibility is to draw a distinction between
political solicitations (including those made by a lawyer, a political candidate, or a citizens
group soliciting funds for a cause) and political statements where no request for money is
made. However, the Court has not favored such a distinction. Cf. Village of Schaumburg v.
Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 628 (1980) ("It is urged that the ordi-
nance should be sustained because it deals only with solicitation and because any chariiy if
free to propagate its views from door to door in the Village without a permit as long as it
refrains from soliciting money. But this represents a far too limited view of our prior cases
. .. ). Nevertheless, it may well be that the Court does view political solicitation, be-
cause it involves the request for money, differently than other political speech, and so there
may be a greater role for state regulation in the former situation.
103. See Primus, 436 U.S. at 438 n.32.
104. See id. at 442 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that Ohralik could have
characterized his personal injury litigation as a form of political expression as Primus had
done).
105. Support exists in Supreme Court decisions for the proposition that the economic
motivation of a speaker should not serve to limit constitutional protection. See Central
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v Public Serv. Comm'n 447 U.S. 557, 580 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) ("Nor should the economic motivation of a speaker qualify his constitutional
protection; even Shakespeare may have been motivated by the prospect of pecuniary re-
ward."); see also supra note 86.
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definition. 1 6
On the other hand, the Relational Framework analyzes fac-
tors such as profit motive and the political nature of the speech
specifically in terms of the hardiness of the speech, the remoteness
of the affected speech from recognized speaker values, and the
justification for the state regulation, including the state's interest
in protecting the reasonable expectations of listeners in receiving
accurate speech. The following systematic analysis of these fac-
tors, described in terms of the three prongs of the Relational
Framework, is a far cry from the simplistic extremism of commer-
cial/mere rationality versus noncommercial/strict scrutiny em-
ployed by the Supreme Court in Ohralik and Primus.
Under the Relational Framework's first prong, a court as-
sesses the extent to which the regulation chills protected speech.
In Ohralik, the speech chilled is primarily the speech banned:
apolitical solicitations by profit-motivated lawyers. Even outside
the strict scope of the statute, some conservative attorneys may be
reluctant to speak to groups about legal issues for fear of being
accused of trying to drum up business in violation of the law. In
short, unlike a law that allows the state to silence solicitations de-
termined to be deceptive (or speakers determined to be deceiv-
ers) 10 7 the law in Ohralik on its face encompasses nondeceptive
protected speech and may chill other speech as well. On the other
hand, profit-motivated lawyers may be considered hardy souls and
may find ways through written advertisements and "word of
mouth" to get their pitches out. The key question in the chill ele-
ment is whether the ban will prevent or unduly restrict the speak-
ers from effectively getting out the intended message to the in-
tended audience in a reasonable way.
The Relational Framework's second prong examines the na-
ture of the speech chilled. The Ohralik majority and concurrence
analyzed this issue intensely and disagreed sharply. The majority
characterized the speech at issue as little more than a nonverbal
106. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67 (1983). The Supreme
Court has yet to address or rationalize the fundamental inconsistency between its position
that a profit motive does not reduce the speaker's rights under the first amendment with
the position that commercial speech, which is defined in part by the speaker's profit motive,
should be given a lower value under the first amendment than other speech.
107. For example, the government may revoke a professional's license for past mis-
representations. See infra note 114 and accompanying text (describing the SEC's revoca-
tion of an investment advisor's license).
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business transaction,108 while Justice Marshall in concurrence ar-
gued that such speech would include important and truthful infor-
mation of use to interested aggrieved parties.10 9 Justice Marshall
appears to have the stronger position. Given the nature of lawyer
solicitations, the ban may prevent lawyers from conveying, among
other things, certain information about the law and legal rights to
potential clients, including information that might be extremely
controversial, opinionated, creative, and politically significant, as
well as being truthful and useful.
Finally, the Relational Framework's third prong focuses on
the relationship between speakers and listeners, and the state's
justification for allocating the truth burden between them. Here, it
is significant that lawyers may be able to manipulate and exploit
nonlawyers because of a lawyer's expertise, training, and practice
in the skills of persuasion." x0 On the other hand, many people lis-
ten to lawyers with some skepticism, and for good reason.
Because of the special circumstances in Ohralik, a court ap-
plying the Relational Framework to the Ohralik situation might
108. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 457 (1978) ("In-person
solicitation by a lawyer of remunerative employment is a business transaction in which
speech is an essential but subordinate component.").
109. See id. at 473 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall noted that rules
against solicitation impede the flow of important information concerning legal rights to
consumers of legal services from those most likely to provide it-the practicing members of
the bar. He also observed that Ohralik had provided his prospective clients with useful
information about their legal rights and remedies. See id.; see also Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 677 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("[T]he antisolicitation rule in Ohralik would in some circumstances
preclude an attorney from honestly and fairly informing a potential client of his or her
legal rights . . ").
The overinclusiveness of prophylactic rules and their threat to free speech has been
recognized. For example, in Zauderer the Court invalidated a prophylactic restraint on
potentially false or misleading print advertising after concluding that such a rule, almost by
definition, is not sufficiently tailored to promote the state's legitimate interest in protecting
consumers from being deceived by false or misleading claims. See id. at 644-46. The Court
wrote:
Were we to accept the State's argument in this case, we would have little
basis for preventing the government from suppressing other forms of truthful
and nondeceptive advertising simply to spare itself the trouble of distinguishing
such advertising from false or deceptive advertising. The First Amendment pro-
tections afforded commercial speech would mean little indeed if such arguments
were allowed to prevail.
Id. at 646.
110. As stated in Ohralik, "the potential for overreaching is significantly greater
when a lawyer, a professional trained in the art of persuasion, personally solicits an unso-
phisticated, injured, or distressed lay person." Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 465; see Zauderer, 471
U.S. at 678 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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have reached the same result the Court reached under the Com-
mercial Speech Doctrine. However, a court applying the Rela-
tional Framework would base its conclusion more appropriately on
a close analysis of such factors as the impact of a per se rule on
protected speech, the nature of the protected speech adversely af-
fected by the rule, and, perhaps most importantly, the nature of
the relationship between the lawyer and the prospective client at
the time of the solicitation to determine how to allocate the truth
burden. On balance, rather than allowing a ban of all face-to-face
for-profit solicitation, the first amendment should prevent a court
from enforcing a statutory ban unless there are special circum-
stances that render the risk of exploitation excessive. Apparently
Justice Marshall saw Ohralik as such a case; an experienced law-
yer solicited one of the prospective clients, a teenage woman, in
her hospital room where she lay in traction immediately after she
had been injured in a car accident."'
Similarly, the first amendment might require a state to focus
more on specific proven deceivers or on deceptive speech, but only
after the fact. For instance, the first amendment might allow a
right to damages on a case-by-case basis, 2 or it might allow a
requirement that certain disclosures be included in all solicita-
tions, such as requiring lawyers to disclose whether they have ever
been found to have committed malpractice." 3
111. Justice Marshall characterized Ohralik as an experienced lawyer in practice for
over 25 years who approached two 18 year old women shortly after they had been in an
accident and while they were still in pain and on medication. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 469
(Marshall, J., concurring). Ohralik himself conceded that a subset of in-person solicitations
might be inherently injurious. See id. at 466 n.27.
112. The Zauderer Court expressed a strong preference for case-by-case regulation,
as opposed to a prophylactic approach in regulating fraudulent speech. See Zauderer, 471
U.S. at 649.
113. The Court has yet to decide whether a state can require a professional to dis-
close prior misconduct to prospective clients. See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 186 n.11
(1985). The Supreme Court has approved the power of the state to require a lawyer to
make certain disclosures to eliminate consumer confusion caused by statements in the law-
yer's advertisement. The Zauderer Court upheld a requirement that a lawyer set out addi-
tional information about the terms of his representation to ensure that prospective clients
would not be misled as to their costs. See 471 U.S. at 650-53. The Court did state that a
requirement to disclose more information might itself interfere with speaker values pro-
tected by the first amendment if the requirement, unjustified or unduly burdensome, would
chill protected speech. See id. at 651. The Court announced as its disclosure requirement
test, that an advertiser's first amendment rights would be adequately protected "as long as
disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing decep-
tion of consumers." Id. (footnote omitted). The Zauderer Court, which was dealing with a
commercial speech issue, might limit its test to commercial disclosures. It is unlikely the
1128 [Vol. 41:1093
1991] DECEPTIVE SPEECH 1129
Although the results the Court reached in both Ohralik and
Primus are defensible, the Relational Framework would have pro-
vided the Court with a fairer and more reasoned analytical ap-
proach to deciding the first amendment issues raised in the cases
than the Commercial Speech Doctrine employed by the Court.
2. Investment Newsletters
An excellent example of the Commercial Speech Doctrine's
inadequacies in deceptive speech cases is illustrated by Judge
Oakes's opinion for the Second Circuit in SEC v. Lowe.114 Judge
Court would permit similar disclosure requirements to be imposed on political speakers.
See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 16 (1986).
The constitutionality of disclosure requirements is more appropriately analyzed under
the Relational Framework than under the Commercial Speech Doctrine. For example, ap-
plying the second prong of the Relational Framework, the state's authority to require dis-
closures would contract the more the speech implicates speaker values. Under prong three,
the less justified the listener's reliance on the speaker, the less appropriate it would be for
the state to impose a disclosure requirement. For application of the Relational Framework
to a specific disclosure requirement, see infra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
114. 725 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 472 U.S. 181 (1985). Judge Oakes's opin-
ion describes Christopher Lowe as a registered investment adviser from 1974 and continu-
ing until his license was revoked in 1981. See id. at 894-95. As an investment adviser,
Lowe, among other activities, published various investment newsletters. See id. at 894. The
SEC revoked Lowe's license to practice investment advice on the basis of his convictions
for various deceptive acts, some of which related to his investment advisory business. See
id. at 894-95. After his license was revoked, Lowe continued to publish investment newslet-
ters, which resulted in the SEC petitioning the United States District Court to enjoin Lowe
from continuing to distribute his newsletters to paid subscribers. See id. at 895-96. The
District Court judge, Chief Judge Weinstein, declined to issue the injunction on the
grounds that it would violate Lowe's first amendment right of free speech and freedom of
the press. See id. at 896. However, Judge Weinstein did not find the Investment Advisers
Act unconstitutional but rather construed the Act's definition of investment adviser nar-
rowly to limit the SEC's authority to regulate those who give personal or person-to-person
advice. Therefore, because Lowe's newsletters were mere publications, or impersonal in-
vestment advice, the SEC had no power to ban them. See id. Judge Weinstein did enter a
limited injunction banning Lowe from giving personal investment advice through telephone
conversations and similar media. See id.
The Second Circuit reversed the lower court, with Judge Oakes concluding that Lowe
was engaged in the business of investment advice within the meaning of the Investment
Advisers Act and that the SEC was authorized to regulate Lowe's newsletters. See id. at
897-98. Furthermore, Judge Oakes held that such regulation would not violate first amend-
ment rights under a commercial speech doctrine analysis. See id. at 899-901. Lowe ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court, which reversed. See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 211 (1985).
Although the Court granted certiorari to decide whether the permanent injunction
authorized by the second circuit banning Lowe from continuing to publish his newsletters
was or was not consistent with the first amendment, see id. at 188-89, the majority con-
cluded, as a matter of statutory construction, that Lowe's publications were not within the
SEC's regulatory powers under the Investment Advisers Act. See id. at 211. Therefore, the
Court found it unnecessary to address or comment on Judge Oakes's first amendment anal-
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Oakes and the Second Circuit were confronted with a first amend-
ment defense against the imposition of an injunction against the
publisher of various investment newsletters, whose license to prac-
tice as an investment adviser had earlier been revoked by the
SEC.11 5
The court indicated that the prior restraint of potentially de-
ceptive speech, historically an odious form of regulation,"' would
ysis, which relied on the Commercial Speech Doctrine. See id.
Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, concurred in the judgment but dis-
agreed with the majority's construction of the Investment Advisers Act, concluding that in
light of the Act's language, history, and purpose, it was intended to reach nonpersonalized
investment advice, such as Lowe's newsletters. See id. at 227 (White, J., concurring). Con-
sequently, Justice White found it necessary to address the first amendment issue. In decid-
ing the issue in Lowe's favor, Justice White concluded that the Act conflicted with the first
amendment because it extended beyond personalized investment advice (advice tailored to
the individual needs of individual clients) and also covered impersonal investment advice
published for public consumption. See id. at 233, 236 (White, J., concurring). While his
personal versus impersonal analysis represents an alternative approach to Judge Oakes's
commercial speech analysis, and comports more closely with the Relational Framework's
third prong, Justice White did consider whether Judge Oakes had properly applied the
Commercial Speech Doctrine. Justice White acknowledged that even if "mere 'commercial
speech' [was] concerned, the First Amendment permits restraints on speech only when they
are narrowly tailored to advance a legitimate governmental interest." Id. at 234 (White, J.,
concurring). In this instance, Justice White concluded that, although the government had a
legitimate interest, the means chosen were too extreme and therefore unconstitutional. See
id. at 234-35 (White, J., concurring).
Although overruling Judge Oakes, the Supreme Court's approach (both that of the
majority and Justice White) confirms the point made in the text and illustrated by Judge
Oakes's opinion that the Commercial Speech Doctrine has not provided courts with ade-
quate analytical assistance largely because courts have been unable to define the bounda-
ries of commercial speech. In light of the split in the lower courts, where two judges be-
lieved Lowe's speech was commercial, and two believed it was noncommercial, see supra
note 86, one would have expected the Court to have clarified the meaning of commercial
speech so as to provide more guidance. Yet, not one of the eight Justices participating in
the case attempted to do so.
115. See Lowe, 725 F.2d at 894-95.
116. The Supreme Court of the United States defines prior restraints broadly to
cover not only administrative licensing schemes but also court issued injunctions. See New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (stating that an injunction
imposed upon a newspaper preventing it from publishing a classified study, like "'[a]ny
system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption
against its constitutional validity.'" (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58,
70 (1963))).
The Court's antipathy towards injunctions, at least in certain cases, may not be war-
ranted. When limited to banning specific speech already adjudged by a court to be false or
otherwise unprotected, issuing an injunction as a remedy does not appear to raise serious
first amendment concerns. The threat of an injunction limited to speech found to be unpro-
tected is unlikely to chill protected speech. See Jeffries, Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92
YALE L.J. 409, 429 (1983) (arguing that an injunction with specifically drawn commands
make it less likely to threaten protected speech). The injunction sought by the SEC in
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be unconstitutional if the speech were noncommercial, fully pro-
tected speech, but would be constitutional if the speech were
commercial.117
Due largely to the Supreme Court's inability to establish
clear guidelines for the definition of commercial speech, Judge
Oakes, although unable to articulate his own definition of com-
mercial speech, seemed to have little difficulty vaguely concluding
that commercial speech is "broad enough to encompass Lowe's
publications."" 8 Two other judges in the same case-Judge Brie-
ant, the dissenting member of the appellate panel, and Judge
Weinstein, the district court judge-applied a very narrow defini-
tion of commercial speech 1 9 and concluded that the subject
speech was noncommercial. 20
Such an unpredictable standard disserves judges, not to men-
tion speakers, in need of a clear set of constitutional rules, or at
least policies. Conservative speakers, fearful that their "potentially
deceptive" speech will be deemed "commercial" by an unguided
judge, may be chilled from speaking and risking arbitrary sanc-
tion. Even the most well-intentioned judge will find little value in
this vague definition, while a result-oriented decision maker will
be unrestrained by the elastic doctrine.
Even if the Commercial Speech Doctrine contained a coher-
ent standard, use of the doctrine as the primary tool for first
amendment analysis causes the decision maker to gloss over sev-
eral fundamental first amendment concerns. As the Relational
Framework recognizes, the court must first consider the impact of
the regulation on protected speech. To the extent that Lowe's
speech is nondeceptive, the regulation directly and intentionally
suppresses nondeceptive, protected speech, which in this case, at
Lowe was somewhat more odious because it was not confined to speech found to be false or
misleading but would have prohibited Lowe from publishing an investment newsletter con-
taining no false or misleading statements. See Lowe, 472 U.S. at 235 n.12 (White, J.,
concurring).
117. For instance, after acknowledging that commercial speech deserves only "'mid-
dle level'" protection, Lowe, 725 F.2d at 901 n.6, the court prohibited Lowe from selling
clients specific securities advice, but he was not prohibited from publishing or stating his
views on any matter of public interest, see id. at 902, which is the type of speech usually
associated with full first amendment protection.
118. Id. at 901.
119. Both judges equated commercial speech with commercial advertising. See 1d. at
904 (Bneant, J., dissenting); 556 F Supp. 1359, 1366 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
120. See Lowe, 725 F.2d at 904 (Bneant, J., dissenting); 556 F Supp. at f367.
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least, paying subscribers apparently want to receive. 121 Conceiva-
bly, other truthful speakers might also be chilled by the regula-
tions. Normally the Relational Framework would consider the ob-
jectivity and hardiness 22 of the investment advice, as well as the
chilling and suppressing effect of the statutory standards (for ex-
ample, fraudulent intent versus negligence), statutory procedures,
and the remedy permitted (prior restraint/injunctive relief). How-
ever, in this case, chill will be limited. Since the regulations only
applied to Lowe after the SEC revoked his registration as an in-
vestment adviser because he had been convicted twice of crimes
relating to his investment advisory business, it is unlikely a
speaker with honest intent will feel threatened. This factor obvi-
ates to some extent the need for an in depth analysis of the other
chill factors. 2 '
The commercial speech analysis employed by Judge Oakes
was also oversimplified regarding the nature of the speech chilled
or suppressed, which is covered by the Relational Framework's
second prong. The court should have considered the extent to
which the regulated speech was informational (high listener value)
or interpretative and ideological (high speaker value), and
whether silencing Lowe would adversely affect his readers' ability
to form important political or personal judgments. Indeed, Judge
Brieant found that much of the information in investment newslet-
ters like Lowe's is similar to the content of political writings-for
example, predictions about interest rates or the effect certain
world events might have on financial markets. 24
121. See Lowe, 725 F.2d at 895.
122. Investment newsletters and advice are both speech and "products" that are pur-
chased by listeners. This "product speech," discussed at length infra notes 223-30 and
accompanying text, can be considered relatively hardy. As noted there, a speaker of prod-
uct speech who stops speaking is literally out of business. The survival instinct will serve to
fortify such speech against chill. See infra note 229 and accompanying text.
123. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e)(1) (1988) provides that the SEC may censure, suspend,
or revoke the license of an investment adviser for filing false reports with the SEC. One
assumes that criminal liability for making a false report would be premised on a finding of
criminal intent. Consequently, license revocation and an accompanying ban on professional
speech would not be invoked as a penalty unless knowingly false speech was made earlier.
In this respect, the imposition of an injunction would chill speech no more, and possibly
less, than imposing damages after a finding of actual malice in the context of defamatory
speech.
124. Judge Brieant wrote:
I cannot express a better description of a typical investment newsletter than that
found in the majority opinion; whether in recommending specific stocks or pre-
dicting near and long term market trends, Lowe, and the typical investment
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Finally, unlike Judge Oakes's abbreviated analysis, the Rela-
tional Framework focuses on the justification for the regulation
and the need to protect the reader's reliance-that is, why and to
what extent the government should be allowed to place the burden
of determining truth or accuracy on the investment adviser rather
than on the reader. Such an analysis requires, among other things,
focusing on the relationship between the speaker and the listener.
Justice White, in his Lowe concurrence, seemed to be pursuing
this sort of analysis in arguing that impersonal investment advice
should be more protected from regulation than personal advice,
since a person giving personalized advice is more like a fiduciary
who owes a special duty to the reader.12
newsletter writer is in effect "publishing or stating his views as to any matter of
current interest, economic or otherwise, such as the likelihood of war, the trend
in interest rates, whether the next election will affect market conditions, or
whether future enforcement of the Anti-Dumping Act to protect basic American
smokestack industry from foreign competition is likely."
Lowe, 725 F.2d at 909 (Brieant, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 902 (opinion of the court)).
The Second Circuit's reversal of Judge Weinstein's decision was limited to upholding
an injunction that would ban "selling to clients advice and counsel, analysis and reports as
to the value of specific securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing or
selling or holding specific securities." Id. at 902 (footnote omitted). However, such advice
might also include analysis of the nature described by Judge Bricant. Presuiably Judge
Oakes would uphold an injunction prohibiting Lowe from publishing a newsletter that said,
"I would strongly recommend that you buy (sell?) Exxon because I believe there is a good
prospect that war will break out soon in the middle east." Concededly, Judge Oakes would
allow Lowe to publish his war analysis if he deleted his Exxon recommendation, but clearly
the market for much of Lowe's social, political, and economic analysis is dependent on
linkage to specific recommendations. Therefore, Judge Oakes's authorized injunction, while
technically permitting any analysis not linked to specific recommendations, further ensures
that a substantial amount of such analysis will never be published.
In the end then, much protected speech could be suppressed. Indeed, a majority of
Supreme Court Justices in Lowe characterized Lowe's newsletters, which were one court
decision away from being banned, as containing factual information about past transac-
tions and market trends, and also containing commentary on general market conditions.
Concerning this speech, the Court concluded: "[T]here can be no doubt about the pro-
tected character of the communications . 472 U.S. at 210 (footnote omitted).
125.
One who takes the affairs of a client personally in hand and purports to exercise
judgment on behalf of the client in the light of the client's individual needs and
circumstances is properly viewed as engaging in the practice of a profession
.... Where the personal nexus between professional and client does not exist,
and a speaker does not purport to be exercising judgment on behalf of any par-
ticular individual with whose circumstances he is directly acquainted, govern-
ment regulation ceases to function as legitimate regulation of professional prac-
tice with only incidental impact on speech; it becomes regulation of speaking or
publishing as such, subject to the First Amendment's command that "Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."
Lowe, 472 U.S. at 232 (White, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
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For a court applying the Relational Framework to Lowe, the
most difficult assessment might be that of characterizing the rela-
tionship between Lowe and his subscribers, and determining the
extent to which subscribers of investment advice are entitled to
accurate speech. 126 The more the information falls within the ad-
viser's expertise and the more the subscriber uses the information
to aid in making investment decisions, the greater the justification
for placing the truth burden on the speaker. This is true even if an
investment adviser does not tailor advice to a specific client . 2 7 On
the other hand, where the speech contained in the investment
newsletter is more subjective and deals with topics on which the
investment adviser is not uniquely qualified to speak, such as polit-
ical events, and subscribers utilize this information for making po-
litical decisions as well as investment decisions, any government
regulation of such speech would be more problematic under the
first amendment. 28 Where one places Lowe's newsletter or that of
any other investment adviser along the spectrum from objective,
expert investment advice to subjective, political analysis is an em-
pirical question for a court to answer in each individual case.
There is a final consideration that courts need to appraise. In
Lowe, perhaps more important than the relationship between the
speaker and listener (fiduciary/trust versus impersonal/skeptical)
and the nature of the speech (personalized/informational versus
impersonal/ideological) is the fact that the regulation involved an
attempt by the government to prevent a man convicted of criminal
126. Justice White's distinction between personal and impersonal advice, see supra
note 114, while useful, cannot be dispositive. Commercial advertisers cannot be said to be
speaking "personally" to individual consumers, yet the Supreme Court's commercial speech
decisions are premised on a finding that false or misleading speech by commercial advertis-
ers may be restricted. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) ("Untruthful speech, commercial or other-
wise, has never been protected for its own sake.") Therefore, the simple fact that Lowe's
newsletter was aimed at a large audience and not tailored to the needs of any one individ-
ual should not determine whether he owes a fiduciary duty to his listeners to speak truth-
fully. Instead it might be more appropriate to determine whether Lowe's speech is more
analogous to a commercial advertisement that is based in part on the speaker's expertise.
127. In such a case the investment adviser would be speaking more as a commercial
advertiser than as a citizen or a politician. The type of information or analysis that an
investment adviser could provide as an expert would not include predictions about war and
peace, but might include predictions about the effect of either on individual stocks or the
stock market generally.
128. It is arguable that government regulation of similar speech in a commercial
advertisement would also raise serious first amendment concerns. See infra notes 130-218
and accompanying text.
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fraud from defrauding again. The government should generally be
permitted to burden twice convicted criminals rather than their
innocent victims, absent some major countervailing policy.129 If
the regulation had been triggered by a simple negligence stan-
dard, a very different analysis might apply, for then the justifica-
tion for the regulation and the risk of chill would be much more
controversial.
3. Mixed Commercial/Political Advertising
Another category of deceptive speech over which the Com-
mercial Speech Doctrine reigns with dismal effect is the regula-
tion of businesses allegedly making false or misleading statements
about issues affecting their profits and yet also involving matters
of public concern. Examples of these sorts of statements include
insurance company advertisements criticizing large damage
awards in tort cases, tobacco company advertisements criticizing
the government's position regarding the health effects of smoking,
egg industry advertisements arguing that eating eggs does not in-
crease the risk of heart disease, and health care insurer/provider
comparative advertisements claiming superiority of products over
those of their competitors.
In all these cases government agencies or private litigants
have attempted to control the speech in question pursuant to fed-
eral or state laws restricting "false or misleading" statements by
businesses, and the business speakers have defended on first
amendment grounds. In most of these cases courts have begun and
virtually ended their first amendment analyses by deciding
whether the speech is "commercial" speech or not; if it is, the
regulation is constitutional, but if it is not the regulation is usually
unconstitutional.
As with the judicial review of other deceptive speech regula-
tions discussed in this article, the first problem with the courts'
simplistic approach is the lack of a good definition of commercial
speech. Befuddled by the murky and shifting definition of com-
mercial speech, judges often reach conflicting results in simi-
129. Concededly, any penalty restricting speech implicates first amendment con-
cerns. However, restricting a professional from continuing to provide informational speech
for a fee because he intentionally misled clients in the past does not seem to constitute a
substantial abridgement of free speech. In contrast, prohibiting a candidate from continu-
ing to speak out on political issues after the candidate was found to have made, even inten-
tionally, false political statements would raise more serious first amendment concerns.
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lar-and in some instances even in the same---cases. 130 What is
worse, the decision makers are unable to generate cogent argu-
ments to persuade those disagreeing with their judgments, since,
simply as a matter of definition, there are no convincing reasons
why one definition of commercial speech is better than another.
Few judges attempt to explain why a particular definition of com-
mercial speech is legally correct, much less why applying such a
categorization is correct, however it is defined. Finally, the sim-
plistic definitional approach fails to account for many relevant
first amendment factors. Many of these factors, if weighed explic-
itly instead of implicitly or not at all, could actually make the
decision easier and certainly less arbitrary. All of these factors,
which are mentioned briefly below, are considered carefully in the
Relational Framework but are basically ignored in the commercial
speech analyses currently used by courts, at least if the speech is
deemed commercial.
First, virtually all of these cases involve laws purporting to
reach misleading speech in addition to false speech.'' Some
courts define misleading speech so broadly as to include speech
that would mislead only the most ignorant, unthinking, or credu-
lous of listeners. 32 Thus, such a statute could render illegal
130. See, e.g., SEC v. Lowe, 556 F.Supp. 1359 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd, 725 F.2d
892 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 472 U.S. 181 (1985).
131. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
132. See Quinn v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 96 Misc. 2d 545, 554, 409 N.Y.S.2d
473, 478 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (unfair business acts statute was "enacted to safeguard the 'vast
multitude which includes the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous.'" (quoting State
v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 47 A.D.2d 868, 868, 366 N.Y.S.2d 157, 158 (1975))). Tradi-
tionally, the federal appellate courts have interpreted section five of the FTC Act as also
protecting careless and unsophisticated listener-consumers. See, e.g., Parker Pen Co. v.
FTC, 159 F.2d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 1946) (In protecting the public against deceptive adver-
tising, "the Commission's duty is to protect the casual, one might even say the negligent,
reader, as well as the vigilant and more intelligent and discerning public."); Charles of the
Ritz Distribs. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676, 679 (2d Cir. 1944) (noting that the FTC Act
was designed to protect the public, not experts). Beginning with the Reagan Administra-
tion, however, and under the leadership of its Chairman, James Miller III, the FTC sought
to substitute a "reasonable person" standard for the "gullible" or "credulous" consumer
standard. Representative John D. Dingell, Chairman of the House Committee on Energy
and Commerce, which oversees the FTC, voiced congressional opposition to the change.
Letter from Chairman Dingell to Chairman Miller (Oct. 25, 1983), reprinted in 5 Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,455, at 56,086 (Oct. 31, 1983). Recently, however, the FTC has
applied a "reasonable person" standard in section five cases. See, e.g., Thompson Medical
Co., 104 F.T.C. 648, 808 (1984) (utilizing a reasonable, ordinary, average consumer stan-
dard), afftd, 791 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1086 (1987); In re
Cliffdale Assocs., 103 F.T.C. 110, 164-65 (1984) (adopting a reasonable consumer
standard).
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speech that is neither false nor misleading to the vast majority of
the public. Second, all of these statutes have a strict liability stan-
dard. The intent or level of care of the speaker is irrelevant.
133
Third, some of the statutes in question allocate the decision of
whether the speech is commercial and whether it is false or mis-
leading to administrative agencies." 4 Courts always defer to
agency determinations of whether the speech is deceptive. 3 5 This
can be contrasted with all other first amendment judicial review of
unprotected forms of speech, such as obscenity and libel, which
courts have clearly stated must receive independent judicial review
under the first amendment. 13 6 Fourth, the cases all involve multi-
ple relationships, that is, between advertising businesses and vari-
ous categories of listeners-consumers, the public, voters, and po-
tential jurors, to name a few. 13 7 Lastly, some cases also involve
prior restraint regulations, 138 a highly suspect form of regulation
of speech under the first amendment. 139 Discussing some of these
cases specifically clarifies the Commercial Speech Doctrine's inad-
equacies and the Relational Framework's usefulness.
(a) Insurance Industry Advertisements
In Quinn v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 14 0 a state court judge
ruled that an insurance company's advertisements blaming high
insurance premiums on large tort damage awards was commercial
speech and, thus, could be enjoined if found to be false or mislead-
ing. When the case was removed to federal district court, the
133. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
137. See, e.g., infra notes 130-218 and accompanying text.
138. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 140-58 (discussing a case involving an
injunction) & 178-98 (discussing a case involving a cease and desist order). In some cases,
the false advertiser may also be liable for damages. For example, the Lanham Act autho-
rizes private lawsuits by competitors injured by false advertisements. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125
(1988). Moreover, unlike the Lanham Act, most state consumer protection acts provide for
private causes of action against false advertisers by consumers. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus.
LAW § 350-e(3) (McKinney Supp. 1991).
139. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
140. 96 Misc. 2d 545, 409 N.Y.S.2d 473 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
141. Plaintiffs involved in on-going personal injury actions sought to enjoin Aetna
from continuing publication of statements in certain magazines that criticized the tort sys-
tem and what Aetna perceived to be excessive damages awarded in many personal injury
cases. See id. at 548-49, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 474-75. The plaintiffs argued, among other
things, that the advertisements should be enjoined because they contained misleading state-
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district court judge concluded that the advertisements were not
commercial speech,'43 and the Second Circuit affirmed. 144 With-
out explaining, much less justifying, his definition of commercial
speech, the federal district judge simply concluded that the state
court judge had "engaged in a fundamental misconception by call-
ing the advertisements here in question 'commercial speech.' ,,145
Compared to the Relational Framework, this conclusory war of
definitions leaves everything to be desired. In definitional terms,
the speech is clearly both commercial and political. 46 Judges at-
ments violating New York law. See id. at 549, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 475. In response Aetna
argued that their publications, which Aetna characterized as advocating tort law reform,
were political expression and fully protected by the first amendment. See id. The state
judge disagreed with Aetna's characterization of its publication, finding that the statements
were commercial speech-deserving less than full first amendment protection. He also rea-
soned that, unlike fully protected political speech, less protected commercial speech could
be enjoined if false or misleading. See id. at 553-54, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 478.
The court's decision turned on its characterization of Aetna's speech as less protected
commercial speech. The court did not explain, however, why Aetna's speech was not fully
protected political commentary, as the company argued. Moreover, much of what the court
said about the speech contradicted its finding that the speech was commercial. The judge
held that the speaker's purpose was to influence potential jurors to give lower damage
awards. See id. at 554, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 478. He did not find that Aetna had targeted its
statement at consumers or that the statement sought to promote insurance products.
142. Aetna was successful in removing the case to federal district court. See Quinn
v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 482 F. Supp. 22, 25 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), affd, 616 F.2d 38
(2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
143. See id. at 29.
144. In affirming, the Second Circuit provided only scant analysis. See Quinn v.
Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 616 F.2d at 40.
145. 482 F. Supp. at 29. In Rutledge v. Liability Ins. Indus., 487 F. Supp. 5 (W.D.
La. 1979), involving insurance company advertising statements similar in content to those
published by Aetna in Quinn, the district court judge, like his counterparts in Quinn, held
that the advertisements were not commercial speech. See id. at 8. However, unlike the
federal district and appellate judges in Quinn, the Rutledge district court judge attempted
to explain why the publications were not commercial speech. Defining commercial speech
narrowly as speech proposing a commercial transaction, see id., the district court judge
concluded that the advertising was not commercial speech because "[tihe ads [made] no
attempt to sell insurance or to recommend any particular type of insurance coverage
. .. Id Finding the speech to be fiully protected noncommercial speech, the district
court, with little analysis, concluded that issuing an injunction in the case would be tanta-
mount to imposing a prior restraint on publication in violation of the first amendment. See
id. at 8-9. Rutledge is distinguishable from Quinn in one other significant way. In Rut-
ledge, the plaintiffs did not aver that the advertising was false. Their sole concern was that
the advertisements might improperly influence jurors to award lower damage awards. See
id. at 7.
146. "Commercial" means merely that Aetna and the insurance industry were moti-
vated exclusively (given their corporate raison d'etre of maximizing profits) by economic
concerns and their advertisements were related to those concerns. Aetna did not write the
advertisements because of an abstract concern over good public policy. It saw the existing
tort system as adversely impacting on its profits. Moreover, although both the Quinn and
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tempting to enforce the first amendment are poorly served by a
doctrine that bases its result almost entirely on an arbitrary ei-
ther/or decision about whether speech that is both commercial
and political shall be deemed commercial.
In contrast, the Relational Framework enables a court to con-
sider all relevant factors in a single coordinated process, and not
merely by presumption or secondarily after rendering the critical
decision--"commercial or not." The Relational Framework's first
concern is the extent to which the regulation-in this case an in-
junction against the insurance company ad-would affect pro-
tected speech.1 47 Answering this question requires an assessment
of some of the factors mentioned earlier, such as the chilling na-
ture of a regulation making speakers strictly liable for speech that
is misleading only to a minority, as determined by zealous
bureaucrats.14s
As previously discussed, the chill analysis also considers the
hardiness and objectivity of the speech.149 Arguably, the profit-
motivated speech in Quinn is relatively hardy. 50 Since the speech
involves company statements about what affects its, own prices or
premiums, the speech contains a measure of objectivity and
speaker expertise. However, other portions of the speech, such as
statements about whether jury damage awards are too high or not,
is a classically subjective, nonexpert opinion.15' Finally, the prior
Rutledge courts understood that the advertisements were directed at both potential jurors,
who might be influenced to render lower awards, and to voters, who might be influenced to
support changes in the tort system, it is conceivable that the advertisements were also di-
rected to consumers, seeking to convey the message: "Don't blame the insurance company
for high premiums. Blame the tort system." The advertisements can also be characterized
as political speech because they communicated a political message to citizens and jurors.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 31-50.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 132-34. In Quinn, the only relevant impact
factors missing were administrative enforcement and the availability of damage awards.
See supra note 134. All the other significant impact factors were present. The case involved
an injunction sought pursuant to a statute imposing a strict standard of liability, see N.Y.
GEN. Bus. LAw § 350 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1991), and a deceptive speech definition
covering speech that might leave false impressions on the credulous and naive. See Quinn,
96 Misc. 2d at 554, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 478. With the later amendment to the New York
unfair business practices act allowing a private cause of action against advertisers for their
false advertising, the threat of damages was added as an additional impact factor. See N.Y.
GEN. Bus. LAw § 350-e(3) (McKinney Supp. 1991). The amended statute also allows
treble damages for knowingly made false advertisements. See id.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
150. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
151. Thus the listener should be on notice to assess critically such claims and not to
rely on any of the speaker's expertise. In fact, the speaker's obvious economic bias should
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restraint aspect of the regulation, although traditionally anathema
under the first amendment, actually chills other speakers much
less than, for example, compensatory or punitive damages or crim-
inal penalties. Even so, a company concerned about both its public
relations and its litigation budget might be quite chilled from
making statements that could expose it to publicized litigation for
illegal business practices and result in court orders.
The Relational Framework next considers the nature of the
speech being chilled.1 52 Business criticism of jury behavior, which
is presumably intended to influence jurors and voters as much as
insurance consumers, can be considered relatively close to core
first amendment values of public debate on politically and socially
significant issues. On the other hand, notwithstanding First Na-
tional Bank v. Bellotti,15' ideological speech by incorporated, eco-
nomic entities motivated solely by profit-that is, devoid of self-
actualization values-may have less speaker value than speech by
individuals.154
Finally, the Relational Framework considers the justification
of the regulation, given the relationship between the speaker and
the listener. 15 5 Statements about what causes high insurance pre-
miums are addressed at least primarily to insurance consumers.
Between insurance companies and their consumers, government
might understandably allocate the "truth duty" to the companies,
although adding the dimension of "misleading" speech compli-
make the listener somewhat skeptical of the "opinion."
152. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
153. 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978) (first amendment protects corporate political speech).
154. In Bellotti, neither the majority nor the dissent saw corporate speech as impli-
cating self-expression concerns. The majority was willing to protect corporate political
speech only because such speech served listeners and furthered the informational function
of the first amendment. See id. at 781-83. Justice White, in a dissent joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall, explicitly stated that corporate speech has no value in terms of the
first amendment interest in promoting speaker self-actualization. See id. at 804-05 (White,
J., dissenting) ("Indeed, what some have considered to be the principal function of the
First Amendment, the use of communication as a means of self-expression, self-realization,
and self-fulfillment, is not at all furthered by corporate speech." (footnote omitted)).
Arguably, however, a corporate manager speaking on behalf of his or her corporation
may, to some extent, also be speaking on behalf of himself or herself personally. Perhaps
that is one reason the individual sought, took, or kept the job. Admittedly, many of Justice
White's arguments about the unfair use of corporate funds by managers to engage in politi-
cal speech, see id. at 809-21 (White, J., dissenting), may well support allowing the govern-
ment greater control over corporate political speech than purely individual political expres-
sion. However, the majority and dissent may have been too quick in rejecting the relevance
of speaker values to corporate political speech.
155. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
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cates the decision. 156 On the other hand, speech about whether
jury awards are too high is more obviously a matter of opin-
ion-and obviously biased opinion-addressed to the public at
large, and possibly prospective jurors in particular. The public
should be able to discount such speech accordingly, without the
benefit of protective government intervention, except to the extent
that a naive listener might be tempted to defer to the "expertise"
of the insurance company, which has had to pay all these
judgments. 157
In some ways, the speech regulated in Quinn is more like a
report on jury reform by an American Bar Association committee
than a simple sales pitch, except that, like the latter, it is the
product of profit motive.158 Moreover, these insurance industry ad-
vertisements seem closer to speech directed at the reader as citi-
zen and voter than the reader as consumer.
The purpose of this exercise was not to re-decide Quinn using
the Relational Framework, or even to suggest which of its conflict-
ing results was correct. Rather, it is to show how the Relational
Framework would enable a decision maker to undertake a more
appropriately complex and precise analysis-one that might be
used to make fairer, more convincing decisions than those reached
156. In Quinn, the state judge concluded Aetna's criticism of high jury awards was
misleading because it failed to mention that many of those awards are overturned or re-
duced on appeal. See Quinn v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 96 Misc. 2d 545, 554, 409
N.Y.S.2d 473, 478 (Sup. Ct. 1978). Of course, some of the awards are not reduced on
appeal. Moreover, all statements are incomplete in one way or another and could be eluci-
dated to reduce the risk of misleading a gullible or naive listener. Completeness and the
risk of someone being misled are matters of degree, not absolute values. The threat of
chilling protected speech is enhanced by the uncertainty created by drawing lines between
acceptable and unacceptable completeness and acceptable and unacceptable risk of naive
misunderstandings. Moreover, even the "extra" speech that a judge thinks can "cure" one
misunderstanding may itself be incomplete or potentially misleading possibly leading to an
infinite regress of "clarifications." For example, the statement that "many excessive jury
awards are overturned on appeal" could lead some listeners to think that the jury system is
very inaccurate or inefficient.
157. The Supreme Court itself accepts the empirical claim that listeners may con-
sider the speech's source and the risks of distortions caused by the speaker's biases. In
Bellotti Justice Powell wrote, "Moreover, the people in our democracy are entrusted with
the responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments.
They may consider, in making their judgment, the source and credibility of the advocate."
435 U.S. at 791-92 (footnotes omitted). Perhaps Justice Powell was making an empirical
observation as well as stating a normative belief that individuals have a responsibility to
listen and judge. See also supra note 76.
158. Perhaps it is more accurate to state that the profit motive may be somewhat
greater in the case of the insurance company. Obviously, economic considerations may in-
fluence an ABA committee's recommendations.
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under the Commercial Speech Doctrine. Nevertheless, it is fairly
clear that the Relational Framework would tend to afford corpo-
rate political speech such as that in Quinn virtually the same pro-
tection as similar speech by an individual.
(b) Cigarette Industry Advertising
The determinative power, and yet frustrating imprecision, of
the Commercial Speech Doctrine is perhaps best illustrated by a
case before the Federal Trade Commission involving tobacco in-
dustry attacks on the federal government's position that there ex-
ists a link between smoking and heart disease. On June 16, 1986,
the FTC issued a complaint against R.J. Reynolds ("RJR") alleg-
ing that RJR's criticisms were false and misleading advertising in
violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 59 The adminis-
159. See In re R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., III F.T.C. 539, 539-40 (1988). The
FTC's complaint was directed at an advertisement RJR disseminated entitled "Of Ciga-
rettes and Science." Id. at 539. The advertisement discussed an experiment known as the
Multiple Risk Factor Intervention Trial (MR. FIT). Id. at 539-40. As described by RJR in
its publication, the experiment involved several thousand men who smoked and had ele-
vated blood pressure and cholesterol levels. Id. at 554 (Oliver, Chairman, dissenting).
These men were divided into two groups. The men in one of the groups received mandatory
medical treatment that consistently reduced their smoking and their blood pressure and
cholesterol levels. Those in the other group were not subject to the mandatory medical
care. Id. (Oliver, Chairman, dissenting). The tag line of the RJR publication was its state-
ment that: "After 10 years, there was no statistically significant difference between the two
groups in the number of heart disease deaths." Id. (Oliver, Chairman, dissenting). The
RJR publication went on to say that the company was not claiming that the MR. FIT
"study proves that smoking doesn't cause heart disease." Id. (Oliver, Chairman, dissent-
ing). Rather RJR had referred to the MR. FIT study as support for two different claims
the company was making. First, RJR argued that a fair reading of the results of existing
scientific testing on the relationship between smoking and heart disease would lead to the
conclusion that the smoking-heart disease thesis has yet to be proven or disproven. Id.
(Oliver, Chairman, dissenting). Second, RJR argued that the federal government's position
that the thesis has been proven establishes that the government is applying a scientific
double standard. If the government applied standards of proof normally required in scien-
tific inquiries, it would have reached the conclusion that the question remains open. Id. at
554-55 (Oliver, Chairman, dissenting).
The FTC charged in its complaint that RJR's publication constituted a commercial
advertisement which misrepresented both the purpose and results of the MR. FIT study.
Id. at 540. Specifically, the FTC alleged that the advertisement contained three false and
misleading claims about the study: (1) that it was designed and performed to test whether
cigarette smoking causes heart disease; (2) that it provides credible scientific evidence that
smoking is not as hazardous as the public has been led to believe; and (3) that it tends to
refute the theory that smoking causes heart disease. Id.
It is interesting that Chairman Oliver, who dissented from the majority's decision
overturning the administrative law judge's decision, read the advertisement the way RJR
read its publication and not the way the FTC counsel read it. He understood RJR simply
to be saying that in its judgment there still exists a scientific question whether the theory
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trative law judge held that the advertisements were not commer-
cial speech, and thus the first amendment fully protected them
against the FTC's enforcement. 160 On appeal the majority of the
Commission decided the administrative law judge had misapplied
the Commercial Speech Doctrine,161 while the Chairman, in dis-
sent, concluded the speech was not commercial.1 62 The only view
the entire Commission shared was that the determination of
whether the speech was commercial or not would dictate the final
result.16 3
The heart of the disagreement among the commissioners was
whether the mixed commercial/political speech should be deemed
one or the other-admittedly a difficult question when it was so
obviously both, just as were Aetna's advertisements.1 64 This forced
determination would be analogous to requiring an art appraiser to
decide first whether a black and white painting was either black
or white in order to judge its value.
Although primarily relying on the characteristic-based test
employed in Bolger,6 5 the majority did distinguish commercial
speech from "speech that does not benefit the economic interests
of the speaker by influencing the reader or listener in the role of
consumer, but instead provides ...information relevant to indi-
vidual political decisions, or to artistic or cultural choices." '66 Al-
though not in the context of defining speech as commercial, the
Relational Framework's third prong also focuses on the same sorts
of elements in assessing whether the truth burden should be
linking smoking and heart disease is valid, and that those scientists who support the theory
have applied a less rigorous standard of proof than generally applied to scientific questions.
Id. at 551-52 (Oliver, Chairman, dissenting).
160. See id. at 539.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 552 (Oliver, Chairman, dissenting).
163. See id. at 541 ("We [the majority] agree with the parties and the ALJ that
unless the Reynolds advertisement can be classified as commercial speech, it is not subject
to the Commission's jurisdiction."); id. at 551 (Oliver, Chairman, dissenting) ("The Com-
mission's jurisdictional authority extends to the hawking of wares, not the hawking of
ideas.").
164. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
165. From its review of the complaint and the advertisement itself, the majority con-
cluded that RJR's advertisement possessed all three of the Bolger factors: (1) the speech
was in the form of a paid advertisement; (2) it referred, at least generically, to a specific
product, i.e., cigarettes and (3) since the advertiser was a manufacturer of cigarettes, it
was "reasonable to infer that Reynolds, as a seller of cigarettes, had a direct, sales-related
motive for disseminating the . . . advertisement." In re R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 111
F.T.C. 539, 547 (1988).
166. Id. at 546.
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placed on the speaker or the listener.1 67 Despite recognizing these
elements, the majority indicated that the advertisement was com-
mercial speech and, thus, could be regulated freely by the govern-
ment.""8 This is especially problematic because RJR's publication
was an attempt to criticize a governmental stand. 6 9 Commercial
or not, rebutting controversial government positions could hardly
be closer to core first amendment values.170
The dissent's analysis also suggested elements of the Rela-
tional Framework. For example, the Chairman questioned both
the objectivity' 7 ' and hardiness 72 of the company's advertise-
167. Applying the Relational Framework's third prong, the more the speech can be
found to be directed at voters and as an attempt to influence voters in making political
judgments, the less the speech's recipient should be entitled to have the government require
the speaker to speak accurately. See supra text accompanying notes 68-76.
168. See R.J. Reynolds, Ill F.T.C. at 546-48.
169. See id. at 565 (Oliver, Chairman, dissenting) ("[RJR] has challenged the offi-
cial position taken by the Surgeon General and the United States Congress.").
170. See Posner, supra note 4, at 11; ("The most important aspect of freedom of
political speech is simply the right to criticize government officials and policies .... ").
See generally Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FouND. RES. J. 521 (examining the idea that free speech is valuable, in part, because of its
ability to check official power). The Court itself has noted that "[fireedom of expression
has particular significance with respect to government because '[i]t is here that the state
has a special incentive to repress opposition and often wields a more effective power of
suppression.'" First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 n.l1 (1978) (quoting T.
EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 9 (1966)).
Moreover, like the insurance publications in Quinn v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 482
F. Supp. 22, 25 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), affid, 616 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1980); see supra notes 140-
58 and accompanying text, and Rutledge v. Liability Ins. Indus., 487 F. Supp. 5 (W.D. La.
1979), RJR's publication seemed more directed at voters than consumers, as Chairman
Oliver argued. See In re R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 111 F.T.C. 539, 569 (1988) (Oliver,
Chairman, dissenting) ("[RJR's publication] is, on its face, direct comment on a public
issue and not commercial speech."). In this setting readers should be found to have little
entitlement to government protection against false claims by openly biased corporations, on
subjects over which the corporation has no special expertise, or unique or special access to
such expertise.
171. See R.J. Reynolds, 111 F.T.C. at 563 (Oliver, Chairman, dissenting). Chair-
man Oliver concluded that RJR's speech should not be seen to be particularly objective.
See id. (Oliver, Chairman, dissenting). However, his conclusion was not based on an as-
sessment of the lack of objectivity of the claims themselves. Rather, Chairman Oliver's
point was directed at the issue of expertise and special access to the factual information
contained in the publication or information on which other more valuative statements
rested. See id. (Oliver, Chairman, dissenting) ("[T]he claims made. . . do not address an
aspect of cigarettes uniquely within the knowledge of RJR."). He noted that RJR's publi-
cation did not discuss information about the company's brand name cigarettes such as
price, weight, and composition, which is the type of information that the advertiser can find
and objectively verify better than others. See id. at 563 & n.21 (Oliver, Chairman,
dissenting).
Chairman Oliver's objectivity analysis implicates considerations of the Relational
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ments. Although his purpose seems to have been to buttress his
conclusion that the speech should not be defined as commercial,
his consideration of the subjective and nonhardy nature of the
speech is similar to the way the impact of the regulation on pro-
tected speech would be analyzed under the Relational Frame-
work's first prong.173
Similar to the Relational Framework's second prong, the dis-
senting commissioner also focused on the nature of the speech af-
Framework's first and third prongs. Under the first prong, the speech's objectivity is impor-
tant to assessing impact because the less objective the speech the government seeks to
regulate, the greater the risk the regulation will chill or suppress protected speech. See
supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. However, as Chairman Oliver's analysis sug-
gests, objectivity is also relevant to the third prong in that the listener should not rely on
factual statements or valuative claims resting on specific facts, where the listener can inves-
tigate the facts or learn about them as easily as the speaker. See supra text accompanying
notes 61-66 and accompanying text. Thus, in Relational Framework terms, speakers should
be held less responsible for their misrepresentations, especially their misleading statements,
when the speaker is no better situated than the listener to investigate and ascertain whether
the statements made are true or false. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 551 com-
ment k (1976).
172. Chairman Oliver did not view RJR's speech as hardy. See R.J. Reynolds 111
F.T.C. at 563 (Oliver, Chairman, dissenting). Without explaining why, he simply stated
that "since the subject matter discussed by RJR is a matter of public concern, this type of
speech by RJR is particularly susceptible to being crushed by regulation." Id. (Oliver,
Chairman, dissenting). Chairman Oliver supported his conclusion by noting that the com-
pany had stopped publishing the statement after the FTC filed its complaint. See id. (Oli-
ver, Chairman, dissenting). While Chairman Oliver can be faulted for not providing more
analysis supporting his nonhardiness reasoning, especially considering that RJR's commen-
tary may have been quite hardy since the issue of the adverse health consequences of smok-
ing affected RJR's profits, he should be commended for at least addressing the hardiness of
the speech the government sought to regulate.
173. The debate between the majority and Chairman Oliver over whether RJR's
statement was commercial speech, as the majority viewed it, or political commentary, as
Chairman Oliver saw it, again points out the inadequacy of the Bolger criteria for distin-
guishing between commercial and noncommercial speech. Both the majority and Chairman
Oliver claimed Bolger as their lodestar, yet they reached opposite conclusions. The major-
ity, mechanically applying the three Bolger factors and apparently assuming that any
speech possessing all three characteristics is commercial speech, found all the Bolger fac-
tors present and indicated that RJR's publication was commercial speech. See id. at 546-
48. In contrast, Chairman Oliver found that RJR's publication satisfied the third Bolger
factor but not the first or second criteria. Chairman Oliver found the first criteria, that the
speech be in the form of a paid advertisement, absent. See id. at 563 (Oliver, Chairman,
dissenting). He defined a paid advertisement as speech that the speaker not only has paid
to have published, but also speech whose content promotes a specific product or service. To
Chairman Oliver, RJR's publication was not an advertisement, although the company had
paid to have it published, because it did not promote the company's cigarettes. See id. at
563-64 (Oliver, Chairman, dissenting). Chairman Oliver also found the second factor,
product specification, absent. Chairman Oliver appeared to require, at least as to this pub-
lication by RJR, specific reference to RJR's brand name cigarettes to satisfy the second
criteria. See id. (Oliver, Chairman, dissenting).
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fected. He characterized the company's speech as a direct com-
ment on a matter of public concern, making it largely immune to
government regulation. 17 4
The dissent's analysis also anticipated aspects of the Rela-
tional Framework's third analytical prong by suggesting that RJR
had targeted its advertisement as much to voters and citizens as to
consumers. 171 Moreover, the dissent noted that the government,
rather than RJR, had prepared the study the company was dis-
cussing and that others with equal expertise could likewise com-
ment on the study's truthfulness. 7 The lack of any special exper-
tise by the company and the likelihood of rebuttal speech in the
market would weigh in favor of placing the truth burden on the
listener, instead of the speaker. 77
The Reynolds case demonstrates the fundamental weakness
of Commercial Speech Doctrine. Whether mixed commercial/po-
litical speech is primarily commercial or primarily political should
not dictate, by itself, the extent to which and the manner in which
the political portion or dimension of the speech should be pro-
tected by the first amendment. Without subjecting the Reynolds
174. See id. at 564 (Oliver, Chairman, dissenting). Significantly, Chairman Oliver
believed the majority's holding would allow the government to regulate any statement
made by a corporation if the statement could influence a consumer to purchase the corpo-
ration's products. See id. at 562 (Oliver, Chairman, dissenting). If Chairman Oliver's un-
derstanding is accurate, then the majority would limit Bellotti's full first amendment pro-
tection of corporate political speech, see supra note 153, to those statements that could
influence voters, but not consumers. The consequence of holding corporations accountable
for the accuracy of any statement, whether political or not, that could influence a consumer
purchasing decision, as Chairman Oliver pointed out, wduld be the introduction of a double
standard of first amendment protection for some corporate political speech. As Chairman
Oliver saw it, "Virtually every other person and corporation in America is free to partici-
pate in the debate about cigarette smoking and health, without government evaluation
whether their claims are true or false." Id. at 564 (Oliver, Chairman, dissenting). Only
corporations such as RJR, because it manufactures cigarettes, would find their political
speech regarding cigarettes subject to regulation. Such a double standard seems inappro-
priate, especially where the manufacturer's statements are directed to voters as well as
consumers.
175. See id. at 563-65 (Oliver, Chairman, dissenting). To Chairman Oliver, RJR's
speech was noncommercial, even though some of its statements might influence some con-
sumers to buy cigarettes. Again, Chairman Oliver explained that allowing a corporate po-
litical claim to be turned into a commercial claim because the statements might influence
individuals as consumers would make any statement by the company regarding the health
effects of its product commercial speech, since such statements would invariably involve
"an attribute of cigarette smoking of concern to purchasers of its product." Id. at 564
(Oliver, Chairman, dissenting).
176. See id. at 563 (Oliver, Chairman, dissenting).
177. See supra text accompanying notes 68-73.
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case to the entire Relational Framework analysis, it is worth not-
ing that the Relational Framework supports substantial first
amendment protection. Much as discussed above, key factors in-
clude the speech's political nature, its presentation as political
commentary, its discussion of facts not within the speaker's con-
trol or expertise, and its antigovernment slant.
(c) Egg Industry Advertising
Another FTC case involving mixed commercial/political
speech is National Commission on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 1 7  in
which the Seventh Circuit upheld an FTC order prohibiting an
egg industry trade association from making certain statements
about the health value of eggs. 19
178. 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978).
179. See id. at 158-59. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with some modification an FTC
order prohibiting the egg industry from making several specific claims including that: (1)
there is no scientific evidence linking eggs with heart disease; (2) there is scientific evidence
that eating eggs decreases the risk of heart disease; (3) avoiding eating eggs increases the
risk of heart disease; (4) eating eggs does not increase blood cholesterol level in a normal
person; (5) blood cholesterol levels are not affected by eating eggs; and (6) that scientific
studies establishing a link between egg consumption and heart disease are insignificant. See
id. at 165-67. The Seventh Circuit also approved the imposition of certain disclosure re-
quirements on the egg industry that would be triggered when the industry makes certain
representations. Thus, the FTC order did not prohibit the egg industry from representing
that eating eggs does not increase the risk of heart disease. However. the order did require
the industry, when making such a representation, to also indicate the existence of a contro-
versy among medical experts and that the industry was presenting its side of the contro-
versy. See id. at 165-66. Similarly, the order did not prohibit the egg industry from indicat-
ing that there is scientific evidence supporting the theory that eating eggs does not increase
the risk of heart disease. However, the industry, at the same time it discussed this evidence,
was required to disclose that many medical experts disagree and believe that existing evi-
dence supports the link between egg consumption and heart disease. See id.
In the Seventh Circuit case, the egg industry primarily challenged the FTC order
banning industry claims "that there is no scientific evidence linking the eating of eggs to an
increased risk of heart and circulatory disease." Id. at 160. As an initial matter, the egg
industry argued that the statement was not false and, therefore, could not be banned. See
id. The egg industry noted that while many scientists believe there is sufficient evidence
supporting the theory of a link between egg consumption and heart disease, other scientists
and doctors disagree and do not believe credible evidence exists supporting this theory. For
these scientists and doctors the claim that "there is no scientific evidence linking the eating
of eggs to an increased risk of heart and circulatory disease" is a truthful statement. See
id. at 160-61.
The industry also argued that FTC regulation of the statement violated the industry's
first amendment rights. See id. at 161-63. The industry argued that the statement was
either a commercial statement on a controversial public issue in which case the statement,
even if false, could not be regulated unless it could be shown to have been made with
actual malice, or an expression of a political opinion fully protected by the first amend-
ment. See id.
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The case illustrates the extreme lengths to which a court is
prepared to go to allow government regulation of speech it deems
commercial. In particular, the court approved the FTC position
that commercial speech that can be interpreted to mean different
things is unlawful if one of its interpretations, whether intended
by the speaker or not, would make the statement false.'8 0 The
court did so by characterizing determinations of meaning and de-
ception as factual findings of an administrative agency, which
should be given deference.' 8' This deference conflicts with basic
first amendment doctrine that requires courts to determine for
themselves whether the first amendment protects particular
speech.18
Interestingly, the egg industry, analogizing between its state-
ments and a defamatory statement about a public official, had
contended that the first amendment limits liability for false state-
ments concerning a controversial public issue to those made with
actual malice, as defined in New York Times. sa The court held
that a strict liability standard was acceptable for one reason-the
speech was commercial.'8 The court held that claims as to the
harmlessness of a product asserted to persuade consumers to buy
the product constitute commercial speech.'8 5 One wonders how an
either/or test would treat even closer cases, such as a government
180. See id. at 161 & n.4. The court cited with approval FTC decisions holding that
language susceptible of more than one meaning will be deemed misleading if one of its
meanings is false. See id. at 161 n.4. Here, the court found that the FTC had not acted
unreasonably by interpreting the "no scientific evidence" claim to convey at least to a sub-
stantial number of readers the meaning that there are no studies supporting a link between
egg consumption and heart disease. See id. at 161. Moreover, the court believed that since
such studies did exist, regardless of whether some scientists found the studies unpersuasive,
a statement denying the existence of such studies was clearly false. See id.
181. See id. at 161 (" '[w]hether particular advertising has a tendency to deceive or
mislead is obviously an impressionistic determination more closely akin to a finding of fact
than to a conclusion of law.'" (quoting Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 617 (3d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977))).
182. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
183. See 570 F.2d at 162.
184. See id.
185. See id at 163. The Seventh Circuit rejected the egg industry's argument that its
statements were noncommercial speech because the statements did "more than propose a
commercial transaction . . . ." See id. at 162-63. The Seventh Circuit read the Supreme
Court's commercial speech decisions more broadly than the egg industry contended it
should: "[T]he Supreme Court's expressions were not intended to be narrowly limited to
the mere proposal of a particular commercial transaction but extend to false claims as to
the harmlessness of the advertiser's product asserted for the purpose of persuading mem-
bers of the reading public to buy the product." Id. at 163.
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restriction on the same statements made by a scientist employed,
or even just funded, by the egg industry.
By contrast, the Relational Framework enables a judge to as-
sess the constitutional choice between a strict liability standard
and the actual malice standard in the same manner the Court em-
ployed in New York Timesl 86 -by focusing on the extent to which
the applicable standard chills protected speech, the nature of the
speech chilled, and the societal justification or need for the chal-
lenged standard. Without engaging in a full Relational Frame-
work analysis here, it is sufficient to note that the analysis would
be similar in many ways to the analysis applied to the insurance
and cigarette speech cases discussed earlier.1 87 Again, this discus-
sion's purpose is not to suggest that the result in the Egg Nutri-
tion case was wrong-just the manner of the Court's analysis.188
It is conceivable that judicial wisdom might reach the same re-
sult-that is, allowing the agency to prohibit the speech-by ap-
plying the Relational Framework. However, the Relational
Framework suggests that the first amendment entitles a speaker to
the court's full application of the Relational Framework's complex
and inclusive analysis, and not merely judicial deference to an
agency conclusion that certain speech is commercial, whatever
that means, and could be interpreted, or so an administrative
agency would believe, by some to mean something the agency
thinks is false.189 Public debate on controversial issues of public
concern (even where one of the speakers is trying to sell some-
186. See supra text accompanying notes 11-19.
187. See supra text accompanying notes 140-77.
188. Professor Farber has defended the result reached by the Seventh Circuit by
analogizing the egg industry publication to an express warranty by a seller that its product
is safe. See Farber, supra note 36, at 390. Under well-settled principles of contract law, a
seller is obligated to deliver its product in conformity with its description set out in the
contract and in conformity with all express warranties. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS
§§ 312, 314, 327 (1932). There are at least two problems with Professor Farber's analogy.
First, the warranty analogy is weakened if one accepts the egg industry's argument that it
simply was saying that there is no credible scientific evidence linking eggs to heart disease.
Arguably, this falls short of a warranty-type assertion that in fact there is no such link
between eating eggs and heart disease. Second, the warranty analogy is inapt to the extent
that the egg industry was speaking to voters on a controversial political issue concerning
the regulation of eggs, and not just to consumers in order to influence them to buy eggs.
Professor Farber assumes, without explanation, that contract rules dealing with ex-
press warranties are themselves consistent with free speech norms. Applying the Relational
Framework to such principles one can establish that such rules do not raise serious first
amendment concerns although, as Professor Farber recognizes, these principles do at least
raise first amendment questions. See Farber, supra note 36, at 386.
189. See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
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thing, but especially when the speaker is trying to rebut govern-
ment orthodoxy) deserves more careful analysis, if not more pro-
tection, under the first amendment. Certainly a court should be
willing and equipped with serviceable doctrines to decide when the
impact on speech, the nature of the speech affected, and the justi-
fication for the regulation, when considered together, require an
independent application of an actual malice standard instead of a
rubber-stamped strict liability standard for speech that an agency
deems misleading.
The Relational Framework's analysis in the egg industry case
can be compared to the preceding discussion of the cigarette in-
dustry case.190 Both cases involve industry speech criticizing gov-
ernment interpretations of scientific claims about the health value
of a product'91 as well as speech not peculiarly within the
speaker's expertise. 92 Under the Relational Framework, these
factors would not generally favor allowing strict regulation of the
speech.
On the other hand, there is at least one reason that the
speech at issue in the egg industry case should be more readily
regulable. The advertisement in the egg industry case was more
clearly directed at consumers, as opposed to voters, than the ad-
vertisement in the cigarette case. 9 For this reason, the Relational
Framework's hostility towards state protection of listener reliance
on the accuracy of political statements19 4 would apply less in the
egg industry case.
One other aspect of the egg industry case deserves special at-
tention under the Relational Framework and the first amendment.
In the egg industry case, the FTC sought to compel the industry
speaker, when referring to the health value of eggs, to acknowl-
edge the existence of contrary scientific studies.'9 5 A similar sort
of compelled speech regulation was held unconstitutional in Pa-
cific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission.96 In Pa-
cific Gas & Electric, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a
190. See In re R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 111 F.T.C. 539 (1988).
191. See supra notes 159 & 179 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. Likewise, the egg industry did not
discuss information uniquely within its knowledge such as the price, weight, and composi-
tion of its product.
193. See supra note 170.
194. See infra text accompanying note 273.
195. Egg Nutrition, 570 F.2d at 165-66.
196. 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
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state utility commission requirement that a utility company pro-
vide space in its billing envelope for opposing political view-
points.197 Although not disallowing any compelled speech regula-
tion categorically, the Relational Framework would carefully
consider the extent to which such a compelled speech requirement
would chill protected speech, the nature of the speech chilled, and
the extent to which the relationship between the speaker and-the
listener justified such a requirement. Considering the foregoing
factors and the analysis in the cigar ette industry case,l98 but with-
out completing an exhaustive analysis under the Relational
Framework, a general position can be articulated: the Relational
Framework would not tolerate a compelled speech regulation such
as that in the egg industry case if it is likely that the regulation
would substantially chill protected speech and if the regulated
speech is speech that listeners should analyze more with citizen-
listener skills than with consumer-listener skills.
197. See id. at 4-7. In one sense the compelled speech requirement in the egg indus-
try case might be seen as even more offensive to first amendment principles than that in
Pacific Gas & Electric. In Pacific Gas & Electric, the utility was required only to include
the opposing side's statement in the same envelope. See id. at 5-7. In contrast, in the egg
industry case the FTC ordered the regulated company itself to express the opposing view-
point, at least to an extent. See supra note 179. However, since the egg industry was only
being ordered to acknowledge an opposing position, rather than to express it in detail, this
distinction may not be significant. Nevertheless, the first amendment has long restricted the
right of the government to force people to express views they find abhorrent. See Wooley v.
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S.
241, 258 (1974); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
A second distinction between the egg industry case and Pacific Gas & Electric is that
the purported purpose of the regulation in Pacific Gas & Electric was to provide for a
diversity of views, see 475 U.S. at 6, while in the egg industry case the regulation was
intended to protect against deceptive speech. See Egg Nutrition, 570 F.2d at 164. This
distinction would be relevant to the first two prongs of the Relational Framework only to
the extent that one type of regulation might chill more, or different, speech than another.
With respect to the Relational Framework's third prong, the policy against the state's pro-
tection of political speech listeners would apply as equally, if not more, to government
efforts to ensure that listeners hear all sides of a political issue from one speaker as it would
to government efforts to ensure that one side speaks more accurately. Conceivably, the
Relational Framework's third prong could be modified to assess whether a listener does or
should rely on the completeness or diversity of a speaker's communications, or whether
there is a need to impose on a powerful speaker's communications to ensure that a listener
hears the opposing views of weaker speakers. However, it is unlikely that regulations man-
dating sponsorship of diverse speech would be deemed acceptable under the Relational
Framework if they appreciably chilled protected speech. Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
48-49 (1976) ("the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of
our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment").
198. See supra text accompanying notes 159-77.
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(d) Health Insurance/Provider Comparative Advertising
The Third Circuit's decision in United States Healthcare Inc.
v. Blue Cross 99 also illustrates the comparative inadequacy of the
Commercial Speech Doctrine in reviewing a first amendment
challenge to government regulation of corporate deceptive speech
concerning a public issue. The case involved counter suits by rival
health care provider/insurers each accusing the other of false ad-
vertising in violation of the Lanham Act200 and state laws against
commercial disparagement, defamation, and tortious interference
with contractual relations. 0 1
The district court judge held that for either side to prevail on
its Lanham Act and/or ancillary state causes of action it had to
prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the opposing party's
misrepresentations were made knowingly or recklessly. 02 The im-
position of the New York Times actual malice standard was man-
dated by the first amendment, the district court reasoned, because
of the political nature of the advertisements. 03 On appeal the
199. 898 F.2d 914 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 58 (1990).
200. See id. at 917. Federal law allows competitors to sue each other for injuries
caused by commercial advertising misrepresentations about the qualities of their own or
their competitors' products. See Lanham Act § 43(A), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(A)(2) (1988). A
competitor-plaintiff must prove: (1) that the competitor-defendant made a material misrep-
resentation that deceived or had the tendency to deceive a substantial segment of the audi-
ence and (2) that the competitor-plaintiff has been or is likely to be injured either by lost
sales or lost goodwill with the public. See, e.g., Skil Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 375 F.
Supp. 777, 783 (N.D. Ill. 1974). Similar to commercial advertiser liability under the FTC
Act, the defendant can be found to have violated the Lanham Act even if its misrepresen-
tation was made in good faith and was neither knowingly nor negligently false. See, e.g.,
Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co., 255 F.2d 641, 648 (3d Cir. 1958) ("The fact
that the name appeared on the wrapper because of a mistake is not a defense to an action
under this section [of the Lanham Act].").
The Lanham Act permits the assessment of damages. See Lanham Act § 35, 15
U.S.C. § 1117(A) (1988). Most dramatically, the court can award additional damages, up
to three times the amount awarded for actual damages, "according to the circumstances of
the case . . . ." Id. Unlike similar remedy provisions, such as that found in New York's
unfair business practices act providing treble damages up to $1,000 after a finding that a
misrepresentation was made knowingly, see N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 350-e(e) (McKinney
Supp. 1991), the Lanham Act places no limit on the amount of treble damages awarded
and does not explicitly limit treble damages to knowing misrepresentations. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1117(A). Nor do courts believe that treble damages are necessarily limited to misrepre-
sentations made knowingly, recklessly, or even negligently. See, e.g., Alpo Petfoods, Inc. v.
Ralston Purina Co., 913 F.2d 958, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
201. See United States Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 917.
202. See id. at 920.
203. As noted by the Third Circuit, the district court characterized the comparative
advertising campaign "as a 'dispute . . .about how best to deal with spiraling medical
costs .... .' Id. at 927. Therefore, "'[tlo characterize the advertisements in this case as
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Third Circuit framed the issue as whether the principles of New
York Times apply to defamatory statements involving compara-
tive advertising. 04
The Third Circuit first noted that some forms of speech re-
ceive less first amendment protection because they are "'less cen-
tral to the interests of the First Amendment.' "205 The Third Cir-
cuit reasoned, "[if the speech here is commercial speech, then it
likely does not mandate heightened constitutional protection. '20 6
Accordingly, the Third Circuit concluded that the heightened pro-
tection afforded by the actual malice standard should be confined
to political, as opposed to commercial, defamatory speech.207
Next, the court had to determine whether the speech was po-
litical speech, deserving of the actual malice standard, or merely
commercial speech, unworthy of such heightened protection. Find-
ing all three Bolger factors 08 present in the advertisements, the
Third Circuit concluded that "'common sense' informs us that the
statements here propose a commercial transaction, and thus differ
from other types of speech. 209
Similar to the Relational Framework's first prong, the Third
Circuit buttressed its Bolger analysis by assessing the extent to
which the advertisements would be chilled by the regulation. Cit-
ing the size of the health care market and the economic self-inter-
est behind the advertisements, the court concluded that "it would
have to be a cold day before these corporations would be chilled
from speaking about the comparative merits of their products. 210
Also consistent with analysis under the Relational Frame-
work's first prong, the Third Circuit found "[t]he facts upon
which the advertisements [were] based-comparative price, proce-
dures, and services offered-[to be] readily objectifiable. ' '211
Consistent with analysis under the Relational Framework's
mere commercial speech ignores the fact that, at their core, they are instruments in a
debate between two providers of public health care intimately involved in the resolution of
important public questions.'" Id.
204. See id. at 928.
205. Id. at 930 (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472
U.S. 749, 758 n.5 (1985)).
206. Id. at 932 (footnote omitted).
207. See id. at 932-33.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 77-80.
209. United States Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 935.
210. Id.
211. Id. The Court also noted that in addition to being objective, the advertisements
contained information about which the advertisers knew more than anyone else. See id.
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second prong, the Third Circuit also analyzed the nature of the
advertisements. Although conceding that some of the advertising
claims dealt with public concerns about costs and consequences of
competing health insurance and health care delivery programs,212
the court found that other possibly defamatory claims add "little
information and even fewer ideas to the marketplace of health
care thought.121  However, even as to those claims contained
within the advertisements that the court recognized as contribut-
ing to political and social understanding, the court nevertheless
indicated they would be viewed as less protected commercial
speech, rather than fully protected political speech, because the
claims were made within the context of a commercial
advertisement.1 4
In what might be compared to analysis under the Relational
Framework's third prong, which focuses on the relationship be-
tween the speaker and listener, the court seemed to distinguish
corporate statements addressing an issue of public concern and in-
volving a competitor that are not made in the context of a com-
mercial advertisement from the same statements made as part of
a commercial advertisement. 5 One might infer from the court's
analysis that it is less willing to afford corporate speakers protec-
tion for their false and misleading statements when those state-
212. The court found that one advertisement alleging that a financial disincentive
exists for health maintenance organization ("HMO") primary care physicians to make spe-
cialist referrals, implicated an important health care concern. See id. at 935 n.26.
213. Id. at 935. The court gave examples of advertisements that do not contribute to
political debate: (1) an advertisement depicting a grieving woman complaining that her
HMO had sent her to an inadequate hospital, and (2) an advertisement suggesting that one
health plan provided such inadequate health care services that it could jeopardize the lives
of patients. See id. at 935 n.26. As to both advertisements, the court concluded: "'There is
simply no credible argument that this type of [advertisement] requires special protection to
ensure that debate on public issues [will] be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.'" Id.
(quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 762 (1985)).
Notwithstanding the court's views, both advertisements sought to make the same point:
that the competitor did not provide adequate health care services, which charge clearly
implicates ultimate health care concerns.
214. The court wrote:
Like the energy products advertised in Central Hudson, the products advertised
here-health care insurance and delivery-are at the center of public debate.
Consequently, while we agree that the quality, availability, and cost of health
care are among the most important and debated issues of our time, these partic-
ular advertisements for specific health care products do not escape the commer-
cial speech category.
Id. at 937.
215. See id. at 938-39.
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ments are directed at consumers rather than voters.216
The court's use of the Commercial .Speech Doctrine served to
obfuscate rather than clarify the first amendment interests present
in the case. The court's mechanical application of the Bolger fac-
tors to find the advertisements commercial speech glossed over the
political nature of many of the claims. Moreover, the court's use
of the Commercial Speech Doctrine prevented it from addressing
the key issues in the case, such as whether the regulation uncon-
stitutionally denied citizens the opportunity to hear an important
debate between knowledgeable speakers on issues of important
public interest, and whether the regulation unduly affected the po-
litical process by denying corporate speakers sufficient freedom to
speak out on controversial public issues involving their products.
Strict regulation of comparative advertisements, with the threat of
treble damages, could jeopardize significant first amendment val-
ues by chilling the speech of key players in important debates.
Comparative advertising between competitors about adequate
health care could be as important as debate between opposing po-
litical candidates.
It was not until the Third Circuit relinquished its reliance on
the Commercial Speech Doctrine and looked more directly at (1)
the impact of the regulatory scheme on protected speech,17 (2)
the nature of the speech the regulation seeks to punish, and (3)
the nature of the relationship between the advertisers and their
audience, that the court began any meaningful assessment of the
first amendment interests implicated in the case. Even here the
court's dependency on the Commercial Speech Doctrine under-
mined its effort. For example, the concern the court evidenced
about the regulation's impact on protected corporate political
speech was assumed away by the court's finding that the speech
was lower value, less protected commercial speech. 18 In this re-
spect the Commercial Speech Doctrine functioned not simply as
216. Certainly the Third Circuit saw the health provider publications as pitched to
consumers. Resting in part on motivational analysis, the court stated that "the parties have
acted primarily to generate revenue by influencing customers, not to resolve 'the issues
involved.'" Id. at 939.
217. While the court did consider the hardiness and objectivity of the advertise-
ments, the court should also have evaluated other factors, such as the chilling effect of the
Lanham Act's strict liability standard (as compared to the fault standard in the state cor-
porate defamation cause of action), the Lanham Act's extension to misleading rather than
merely false claims, and perhaps most significantly the availability of treble damages.
218. Id. at 936-37.
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an unnecessary additional step in the analysis but one that inter-
fered with the proper analysis.
III. DECEPTIVE SPEECH REGULATIONS ESCAPING FIRST
AMENDMENT REVIEW
Ever since its seminal defamation decision in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan,21 the Supreme Court has considered first
amendment issues in connection with a growing number of decep-
tive speech regulations: false light,220 false and misleading profes-
sional advertising, 211 and intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress.222  However, many other kinds of deceptive speech
regulations, such as product-speech liability and professional mal-
practice, have not yet received first amendment review. In this
section, the reasons courts have given, implicitly or explicitly, for
not considering first amendment issues in each of these areas are
critiqued, and the Relational Framework is applied to each regu-
lation to determine whether the regulation violates the first
amendment.
A. Speech-as-Product-Products Liability
On occasion speech has been characterized by courts as a
product, subject to products liability claims. To date few courts
have recognized the applicability of first amendment protection in
this area. Courts subjecting product-speech to product liability
have treated the speech as a product instead of speech, and thus
not entitled to first amendment protection. However, the two cate-
gories are not mutually exclusive; product-speech is both a prod-
uct and speech.
In a series of cases, federal and state courts have held airline
navigational charts to be products subject to product liability.
With the exception of one case, Brocklesby v. United States,22 no
courts have subjected the regulation of navigational charts to first
amendment review. In Brocklesby, the Ninth Circuit held,
219. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (holding that a public official must prove actual
malice to recover in a defamation action).
220. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967).
221. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1,
12-15 (1979).
222. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988).
223. 753 F.2d 794 (9th Cir.), vacated, 767 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1101 (1986).
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strangely, that navigational charts are either nonspeech products
or commercial speech, and, thus, not entitled to substantial first
amendment protection.224 These illogical categorizations again
demonstrate the proposition that a court determined to regulate a
category of speech has little choice under current doctrine but to
stretch the commercial speech category to include the speech or to
shrink the definition of speech to exclude it.225 The Relational
Framework enables a court to allow a speech regulation without
finding it to be a regulation of commercial speech or of nonspeech
or a regulation compelled by a state interest. However, it is signifi-
cant that, aside from Brocklesby, every other navigational chart
case has failed to recognize the charts as speech at all.226 An air-
line navigational chart is a combination of words and pictures
designed and used for the communication of information and
ideas.2 27 In short, it is speech. Few would question the appropri-
ateness of a doctrine allowing parties injured in a crash caused by
a defective navigational chart to recover damages from the author
or publisher of the chart. However, a court must determine, sim-
ply because the charts are speech, that the law protecting the in-
jured traveler does not violate the first amendment. Such a viola-
tion would occur if the law excessively chilled protected,
nondeceptive charts. Fortunately, the Relational Framework dem-
onstrates why this risk is minimal in the case of airline naviga-
tional charts.
The Relational Framework's first prong, which examines the
224. See id. at 800, 803. The court's perfunctory response to the chart publisher's
argument that the imposition of strict liability conflicted with protection afforded commer-
cial speech under the first amendment was a mere assertion that even if the court viewed
the charts as commercial speech, rather than tortious conduct, the first amendment would
not bar liability because false and misleading commercial speech is subject to regulation.
See id. at 803. The court also stated, without explanation, that requiring a chart manufac-
turer to produce a safe product would not impede the publication of truthful navigational
speech. See id.
225. In this respect, the Ninth Circuit's opinion resembles the Second Circuit's opin-
ion in SEC v. Lowe, where the court characterized Lowe's newsletters as either professional
conduct or commercial speech. See id. at 901.
226. Compare Brocklesby v. United States, 767 F.2d 1288, 1295 n.9 (9th Cir. 1985)
(refusing to consider a first amendment claim because it was raised for the first time on
appeal), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1101 (1986), with Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co., 707 F.2d
671, 676-77 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that navigational charts were properly classified as
products), affig Halstead v. United States, 535 F. Supp. 782 (D. Conn 1982), Aetna Casu-
alty & Sur. Co. v. Jeppesen & Co., 642 F.2d 339, 342 (9th Cir. 1981) (same), and Fluor
Corp. v. Jeppesen & Co., 170 Cal. App. 3d 468, 475, 216 Cal. Rptr. 68, 71 (1985) (same).
227. See Aetna, 642 F.2d at 342.
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impact of a regulation on protected speech, is a standoff between
very strong factors. On the one hand, subjecting airline naviga-
tional charts to product liability exposes the speech to a number of
potentially potent chill factors-a strict liability standard of care,
the availability of a judgment for broad fact-based damages, and
the unavailability of independent judicial review of determinations
by fact finders. Any one of these factors, by itself, could doom a
speech regulation under the first amendment. Combined, they
could constitute an especially severe chill on protected speech.228
On the other hand, a number of factors will work to minimize
the chilling effect. An airline navigational chart is an unusually
hardy and objective form of speech. One key aspect of the hardi-
ness of product-speech such as this is the fact that the product
being sold is the speech itself. In Virginia State Board of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., the Supreme
Court noted that advertising is relatively resistant to chilling effect
because it is driven by the speaker's economic profit incentive.229
Many companies will suffer lower profits if they are unable to ad-
vertise. However, the economic impact on a seller of a speech
product is more direct and immediate-a seller of product-speech
who stops speaking is, by definition, simply out of business. It is
hard to imagine a survival-minded speaker lightly succumbing to
chill factors.
Another anti-chill factor is the great objectivity of naviga-
tional charts. Makers of accurate charts should be able to distin-
guish their own work from the mistakes they see punished in the
courts. One hopes navigational chart makers find incorporating se-
vere standards of accuracy a manageable burden. If any potential
chart maker is daunted by the concept of sanctions for dangerous
inaccuracies, one should probably be thankful-so long as there
are enough chart makers left to satisfy the demand.
Focusing on the Relational Framework's second prong, which
questions the nature of the speech affected, the navigational chart
228. Professor Tribe has observed that various features of a regulatory scheme can
combine to chill protected speech. He sees some Supreme Court cases as involving a chil-
ling effect on speech that "was caused not by any discrete act of a government official, but
by the fabric of legal rules developed in a given jurisdiction over time . . . ." Tribe, The
Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn from Modern Physics, 103
HARV. L. REv. 1, 26 (1989). This fabric involves "the overall shape of the state's body of
judge-made rules for awarding damages to people allegedly injured by speeches or publica-
tions." Id.
229. 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976); see also supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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does not fare well. Recognized first amendment speaker values of
self-expression and self-fulfillment are not strongly implicated by
navigational charts. In terms of promoting first amendment val-
ues, speech in the form of a navigational chart is best understood
as fostering listener interests in obtaining accurate information
needed for making certain decisions that are largely void of ideo-
logical considerations. In fact, navigational chart speech is not
much more than a means to a specific nonverbal end-safe air
travel.
The Relational Framework's third prong, which examines the
state's justification for protecting the listener's reliance, compels
strict regulation. The typical reader of a chart-the pilot in the
cockpit-is hardly in a position to verify the chart's accuracy or
procure a second opinion (market corrections through trial and
error should also be ruled out). The reader is virtually at the
mercy of the chart maker. Forcing chart makers to internalize the
costs of their errors allocates the risk to the proper party.230 More-
over, considering the high stakes-human life-and the small
margins of error, a strict liability standard and a remedy of dam-
ages seem entirely reasonable, if severe, measures.
Given the objectivity and hardiness of the speech, and its rel-
atively low functional value in terms of core speaker-based first
amendment interests, on balance the Relational Framework would
countenance virtually any regulation of navigational charts, con-
sistent with due process, reasonably necessary to save human lives.
B. Professional Speech and Malpractice
In many malpractice cases, professionals, including law-
yers,231 accountants,232 doctors,2 33 health care providers,23 4 and air
traffic controllers,3 5 have been held liable to clients and certain
third parties for injuries caused by their erroneous, negligent
speech. Courts that have subjected such speech to malpractice lia-
bility have treated it identically to any other negligent professional
230. See Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70
YALE L.J. 499, 500-07 (1961).
231. See, e.g., In re Edson, 108 N.J. 464, 530 A.2d 1246 (1987) (attorney disbarred
for counseling client to fabricate a defense).
232. See, e.g., Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
233. See, e.g., Hensley v. Heavrin, 277 S.C. 86, 282 S.E.2d 854 (1981).
234. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 334 N.E.2d 590, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638
(1975).
235. See, e.g., Dickens v. United States, 545 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1977).
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conduct, without considering whether the first amendment applies
to the speech regulation.
Even if negligent professional speech is not protected by the
first amendment, subjecting the negligent speech to a damage
judgment could chill nonnegligent speech fully protected under
the first amendment. As New York Times Co. v. Sullivan held
with respect to defamation law,236 the first amendment requires
that the application of tort law to professional speech not unrea-
sonably chill or restrict protected, nondeceptive speech. The risk
of malpractice liability could conceivably discourage a lawyer
from expressing certain opinions about legal or political issues, in
fear that a jury might some day find that the opinion contributed
to some flawed course of action by the client.
Fortunately, the Relational Framework demonstrates that
malpractice law generally does not pose substantial or unjustified
risks to protected professional speech. To reach this conclusion,
the Relational Framework does not require one to characterize the
speech as commercial.
The Relational Framework's first prong assesses the impact
of the law on protected speech. Several aspects of malpractice law
increase the risk of chill: liability based on negligence instead of
actual malice or intent; the availability of money damages and the
threat of disbarment as opposed to a mere injunction; and appel-
late court deference to jury and trial judge findings of negligence
in lieu of independent review.
The inherent vagueness of the negligence standard could be
particularly problematic to the extent it could include truthful yet
misleading speech, as with the unfair business practice laws dis-
cussed earlier,27 and subjective advice and opinions. On the other
hand, even a vague negligence standard would be less chilling
than the strict liability standard used in the unfair business prac-
tice laws. 238
Other factors indicate less risk of chill. Limiting a profes-
sional's duty of care to a defined group of listeners-clients and
certain third parties 239 -allows professionals to express their views
freely to virtually everyone else. Moreover, professional speech, in
236. 376 U.S. 254, 277-83 (1964).
237. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
238. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
239. See, e.g., Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 322 N.C. 200,
210, 214, 367 S.E.2d 609, 614, 617 (1988).
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general, is relatively hardy and less susceptible to chill. As with
navigational charts, professional speech itself constitutes part of
the service the professional provides to the client. Allowing one's
professional speech to be unduly chilled could cripple one's effec-
tiveness as a professional, and thus one's livelihood.
Professional speech is also relatively objective-that is, sub-
ject to empirical or external verification-although perhaps less so
in many cases than navigational charts. Interpreting a law is obvi-
ously less objective than charting a mountain, though probably
objective enough to allow a fact finder to determine fairly when
the interpretation is incorrect and negligent.24 °
On balance, although a certain amount of protected speech
will be chilled by the threat of malpractice liability, few if any
professionals will be prevented from responsibly expressing .their
views, with the possible exception of certain kinds of questionable
statements to clients.
The Relational Framework's second prong assesses the nature
and value of speech chilled by the law. Contrary to most prong
two analysis in this article, malpractice laws regulate ideas and
opinions as much as facts. However, perhaps expert opinion
should be subject to a more rigorous accuracy standard, almost
like facts, than lay opinion. In a sense, expert opinion can and
should be determined to be correct or incorrect, much like a fac-
tual statement and unlike most lay opinions. 241 Although it is diffi-
cult to generalize, speech (even as to opinion) that is chilled be-
cause a trained professional fears it is inaccurate and could injure
his or her client is generally not primary within the hierarchy of
speaker-based first amendment values. Like navigational charts,
professional speech might be considered little more than utilita-
rian speech-speech that has little inherent value for the speaker,
in self-actualization terms or otherwise, or for society, except to
the extent it is accurate and can be safely relied upon by the
client.
The Relational Framework's third prong focuses on the rela-
tionship between the speaker and the listener, and the state's justi-
fication for allocating the truth burden between them. Clearly, the
argument for placing a substantial truth burden on the speaker is
strong. The speaker is trained and then paid a premium to give
expert advice or technical judgments to a lay person. Even in this
240. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORS § 545 (1976).
241. See 2 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, supra note 11, § 7.8, at 424.
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day of the "second opinion," it is not efficient to have professionals
feel there are no direct costs to being wrong, except possibly the
risk of losing out to more accurate competitors over the long run.
Moreover, malpractice law only protects the reasonable reliance of
certain protected parties, such as clients. Malpractice law does not
prevent professionals from speaking relatively freely to nonclients
or even clients, so long as disclaimers prevent reliance.
Moreover, if professional speech is little more than a means
to the end of serving or helping the listener-that is, its value is
basically its value to the listener who relies on it-then a law
causing it to be more accurate serves first amendment values more
than it threatens them.
Fortunately, many malpractice cases may involve specific, ob-
jective, nonideological misstatements-"The hearing is on Friday"
or "You can take this pill with that pill"-upon which a client
can be expected to rely.242 Professionals are rarely held liable for
more subjective or ideological speech, partially because clients are
less likely to rely upon it because of the speaker's lack of exper-
tise-"Divorce is very bad for families" or "Try to exercise every
day."243 This is consistent with the need to have more freedom of
speech under the first amendment in subjective and ideological
speech.
Of course there are middle cases, such as a doctor warning a
patient about the risks of abortion. However, so long as the profes-
sional separates strict medical statements from personal opinions,
the interests of both malpractice law and the first amendment are
reconcilable.244
Considered together, the Relational Framework's elements do
not indicate a fundamental first amendment concern with the cur-
rent operation of malpractice law. In a given case, however, a
court may be compelled to find that subjecting a professional's
particular statement to civil liability, although consistent with cur-
rent malpractice doctrine, should be constrained by the first
242. See, e.g., Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560, 1561-62 (7th Cir. 1987); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 545 comments a, b.
243. Generally speaking, lawyers are not liable for incorrectly advising clients how a
court will resolve an unsettled point of law. See I R. MALLEN & J. SMITH. LEGAL MAL-
PRACTICE § 14, at 812-13 (3d ed. 1989).
244. Presumably a doctor could be found liable for negligently misrepresenting the
comparative health risks to the mother of childbirth versus abortion. It seems less clear
that a doctor, opposed to abortion, should be liable for telling a patient that "aborted fe-
tuses go to hell."
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amendment, similar to the analysis in New York Times.245 When
a court does so, though, its analysis should be based on the factors
in the Relational Framework, and not some tortured, arbitrary
characterization of the speech as "commercial" or as
"nonspeech."
IV. THE RELATIONAL FRAMEWORK AND NONCOMMERCIAL
SPEECH
One of the Relational Framework's benefits is that it can be
applied to all forms of deceptive speech, not just commercial
speech. In this section the Relational Framework is applied to the
regulation of two categories of noncommercial deceptive
speech-deceptive political speech and "how-to" books that con-
tain mistakes. Without the Relational Framework's benefits, most
courts make the mistake of perpetuating the either/or formalism
of the Commercial Speech Doctrine. After concluding (or assum-
ing) that the regulated speech is noncommercial, courts often con-
clude that the speech is virtually immune to regulation. Other
courts impose standards similar to strict scrutiny or otherwise
limit regulations without adequate analysis or explanation.
In this section, the analysis currently employed by courts in
these areas is contrasted with the Relational Framework to
demonstrate that the latter is more coherent, inclusive, and sys-
tematic. At the same time, however, many courts are already fo-
cusing on various elements of the Relational Framework, although
not in the comprehensive, structured manner proposed here.
A. Deceptive Political Speech
Many states have laws regulating deceptive speech in politi-
cal campaigns.246 Courts subject these laws to at least strict scru-
tiny under the first amendment, applying standards and analyses
245. 376 U.S. at 277-83.
246. Some statutes proscribe only false statements made about a candidate. See, e.g.,
ALASKA STAT. § 15.56.010(a)(3) (1988); MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-875 (1986); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 163-274(8) (1987); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.091(B) (Anderson 1988);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-19-142 (1985); W. VA. CODE § 3-8-1l(e) (1990). Some others, also
ban false statements about referenda issues. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-13-109
(1980); NEB. REV. STAT. § 49-1465 (1988); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-10-04 (1991); OR.
REV. STAT. § 260.532 (1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-14-28 (1984). Making a false politi-
cal statement can also serve as the basis for dismissal from public employment. See Picker-
ing v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968); Brasslett v. Cota, 761 F.2d 827, 839 (1st
Cir. 1985).
11631991]
1164 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1093
totally different than with commercial speech.
This extreme double standard is perhaps best demonstrated
by comparing how courts determine whether speech is deceptive.
Courts permit laws to classify a certain instance of commercial
speech as deceptive if it could possibly mislead hypothetical "igno-
rant, unthinking or credulous" listeners, even if the majority of
listeners and readers would interpret the speech correctly.241 7 In
contrast, some courts confronted with ambiguous noncommercial
speech will not find it deceptive if hypothetical listeners could rea-
sonably interpret the speech so as to render it not misleading or
protected opinion.248 Truthful noncommercial speech, and espe-
cially truthful political speech, seems virtually immune from de-
ceptive speech regulation, regardless of whether it could be or ac-
tually is misleading.249
Some courts have suggested that the first amendment prohib-
its imposing any sanctions against deceptive political speech, in-
cluding intentional lies.250 Other courts have limited political de-
ceptive speech regulations with substantive and procedural
requirements. Interestingly, all of these requirements can best be
247. See, e.g., Quinn v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 96 Misc. 2d 545, 554, 409
N.Y.S.2d 473, 478 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
248. See, e.g., Mosee v. Clark, 253 Or. 83, 87, 453 P.2d 176, 177 (1969); Sumner v.
Bennett, 45 Or. App. 275, 280, 608 P.2d 566, 569 (1980).
249. See Lebron v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 749 F.2d 893, 898-99
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (suggesting that the first amendment prohibits any governmental assess-
ment of the deceptiveness of political speech); O'Connor v. Superior Court, 177 Cal. App.
3d 1013, 1019-20, 223 Cal. Rptr. 357, 360-61 (1986) (intimating that the first amendment
permits government regulation of commercial speech, but not misleading political speech).
250. In Rudisill v. Flynn, 619 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1980), the court held:
We do not regard intentional misstatements of fact made during an election
campaign as "election frauds" in the ordinary sense. The merits of a ballot issue
are matters reserved for public and private discussion and debate between oppo-
nents and proponents. It is for the voters, not this court to decide whom to elect
and what ballot issues to approve.
Id. at 694 (footnote omitted). More support for finding that the first amendment absolutely
bars government interference with political speech can be found in Good v. Roy, 459 F.
Supp. 403 (D. Kan. 1978):
The political system of the United States is dependent upon the virtually unfet-
tered exchange of expressions and opinions. In the context of political campaigns
that exchange often takes the form of claims and denials, accusations and
counter-accusations, allegations and refutations. Such is the stuff of popular,
democratic elections. It is incumbent upon the courts not to interfere with the
free and vigorous campaign debate. It is the prerogative of the voters, not the
courts, to weigh, balance, sift and sort the words and actions of political
candidates.
Id. at 406.
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understood as relevant factors in the Relational Framework, and
in particular in connection with the Relational Framework's first
prong, which focuses on factors affecting the extent to which the
regulation impacts on protected speech. For example, some courts,
including the Supreme Court of the United States, have, by way
of analogy to the public libel doctrine, limited regulations of de-
ceptive political speech to intentional falsehoods or actual mal-
ice.251 Another tact is the prohibition of certain statutory penalties
provided for deceptive political speakers. One state appellate court
upheld the lower court's imposition of a fine against a member of
a candidate's selection committee found knowingly to have made
false statements about the opposition candidate but overturned on
first amendment grounds the lower court's requirement that the
defendant not engage in any political activity during the term of
her probation.252 On the other hand, courts may grant injunctions
banning candidates from repeating false statements or distributing
literature containing false statements, 253 and, as mentioned, fines
251. In Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1982), the Court suggested it would extend
the actual malice standard to nondefamatory, false political speech cases:
Although the state interest in protecting the political process from distortions
caused by untrue and inaccurate speech is somewhat different from the state
interest in protecting individuals from defamatory falsehoods, the principles un-
derlying the First Amendment remain paramount. Whenever compatible with
the underlying interests at stake, under the regime of that Amendment "we de-
pend for. . correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the
competition of other ideas." In a political campaign, a candidate's factual blun-
der is unlikely to escape the notice of, and correction by, the erring candidate's
political opponent. The preferred First Amendment remedy of "more speech, not
enforced silence" thus has special force. There has been no showing in this case
that petitioner made the disputed statement other than in good faith and without
knowledge of its falsity, or that he made the statement with reckless disregard as
to whether it was false or not.
Id. at 61 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974); Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
Similarly, several lower courts, both state and federal, have held that state laws regu-
lating nondefamatory, false political speech, in order to survive first amendment review,
must be premised on proof and application of the actual malice standard as defined in New
York Times. See Pestrak v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 670 F. Supp. 1368, 1375-77 (S.D.
Ohio 1987), modified, 926 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1991); Vanasco v. Schwartz, 401 F. Supp.
87, 91 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), affd mem., 423 U.S. 1041 (1976); State v. Davis, 27 Ohio App.
3d 65, 67-68, 499 N.E.2d 1255, 1258-59 (1985); Dewine v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 61
Ohio App. 2d 25, 27-29, 399 N.E.2d 99, 102-03 (1978).
252. See Davis, 27 Ohio App. 3d at 66-68, 69, 499 N.E.2d at 1257-59, 1260.
253. See, e.g., Tomei v. Finley, 512 F. Supp. 695, 699 (N.D. I1. 1981); Treasurer of
the Committee to Elect Gerald D. Lostracco v. Fox, 150 Mich. App. 617, 623, 389
N.W.2d 446, 449 (1986).
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may be levied.2 5 4
Finally, courts have imposed procedural requirements on de-
ceptive political speech regulations, such as requirements that
courts rather than administrative agencies enforce the regula-
tions,255 and that appellate courts conduct an independent review
of findings of actual malice or deceptiveness 2 6
Courts have enforced all of the foregoing limits on the regu-
lation of deceptive political speech explicitly or implicitly on first
amendment grounds. However, courts have not done so on the ba-
sis of a systematic analysis such as the Relational Framework.
Each of the foregoing limits have been discussed earlier in
this article as an important factor in assessing the impact of a
regulation on protected speech.257 Clearly an actual malice or in-
tentional falsehood requirement will chill truthful political speech
less than a negligence or strict liability standard. Similarly, a har-
sher penalty (for example, broadly prohibiting any future speech
for a probationary period) will directly and indirectly restrict pro-
tected speech far more than a tailored injunction against repeti-
tion of a statement that has been proven false. Finally, as previ-
ously discussed, procedural safeguards, such as judicial rather
than agency enforcement and independent factual review, can give
protected speakers a certain amount of comfort that they will not
be victims of arbitrary regulation.258
In addition to these factors, the Relational Framework's first
prong would assess the hardiness and objectivity of the political
speech. Although there are obvious exceptions-such as single is-
sue zealots-arguably political speech is less hardy than commer-
cial speech motivated by profit.259 Objectivity varies even more de-
254. See Davis, 27 Ohio App. 3d at 66-68, 499 N.E.2d at 1257-59; see also supra
note 252 and accompanying text.
255. See, e.g., Lebron v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 749 F.2d 893, 898-
99 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Pestrak, 670 F. Supp. at 1377-78.
256. See, e.g., Lebron, 749 F.2d at 897; Pestrakv. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 670 F.
Supp. 1368, 1377-78 (S.D. Ohio 1987), modified, 926 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1991). •
257. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
258. Courts have also required that deception be proven by clear and convincing
evidence as required by New York Times in libel actions involving public issues and public
officials. See Pestrak, 670 F. Supp. at 1376-77; Vanasco v. Schwartz, 401 F. Supp. 87, 99
(E.D.N.Y. 1975), affid mem., 423 U.S. 1041 (1976).
259. Some commentators subscribing to a fragile political speech thesis rely on eco-
nomic principles of supply and demand. Professor Lillian BeVier, for example, attributes
the fragility of political speech to a lack of demand for such speech. Individual voters, she
argues, do not place as high a value on political speech as individual consumers place on
commercial information. See BeVier, A Comment on Professor Wolfson's "The First
1166 [Vol. 41-1093
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pending on the specific type of speech at issue. A politician's
financial disclosure report is no less objective than a tax return,26°
and many political statements, such as "I am a Berliner," may be
"true" on a level deeper than mere accuracy or signification.
However, many political deception laws are aimed at the most ob-
jective extreme of the political speech spectrum-intentional lies
about a candidate's endorsements, 261 resume,26 2 incumbency, 263 or
voting record, 6 4 rather than distortions about ideology or colorful
rhetoric.6 5
The Relational Framework's first prong assesses all of these
factors to determine the extent to which protected speech is af-
fected by a regulation. After doing so, however, the Relational
Framework also considers the nature of the speech affected (prong
two) and the justification for the regulation in terms of the rela-
tionship between speaker and listener (prong three).
Both the second and third prongs strongly support minimiz-
ing the acceptable scope of regulation of deceptive political speech
under the first amendment. Clearly political campaign speech is at
the core of the first amendment, both in terms of the successful
Amendment and the SEC,' 20 CONN. L. REV. 325, 328 (1988). Judge Posner reaches the
same conclusion but emphasizes the lower value speakers (as well as listeners) assign their
political speech in comparison to this speech. Commercial speakers, Judge Posner reasons,
can pass on the costs of their commercial speech to the purchasers of their products and
services. In contrast, political speakers (especially noncandidates) will rarely receive much
return on their investment in political speech. See Posner, supra note 4, at 39-40. Logically
extending Judge Posner's reasoning, for most individuals the costs of speaking politically
will appear to outweigh the gains, so they will be disinclined to engage in political speech.
260. Early critics of footnote 24 in Virginia Pharmacy disputed the Court's empiri-
cal claim, based in common sense, that commercial speech is more verifiable than noncom-
marcial speech. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. Several offered their own com-
mon sense rebuttal pointing out that a substantial amount of noncommercial speech,
including political speech, is no less factual or verifiable than commercial speech. See Far-
ber, supra note 36, at 386 ("political speech is often quite verifiable by the speaker");
Redish, supra note 36, at 633 ("many statements made in the course of political debate
. . . are simply assertions of fact, which are presumably verifiable"); Shiffrin, supra note 4,
at 1218 ("the verification distinction [between commercial and political speech] has weak
empirical foundation").
261. Several states specifically prohibit false claims of endorsement. See, e.g., Miss.
CODE ANN. § 23-15-1065 (1990); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.091(B)(8) (Anderson
1988).
262. See, e.g., Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.091(B)(2).
263. See OR. REV. STAT. § 260.545 (1989).
264. See Oino REv. CODE ANN. § 3599.091(B)(9).
265. Several state courts have interpreted their deceptive campaign speech statutes
to reach only false statements of specific facts. See, e.g., Bundlie v. Christensen, 276
N.W.2d 69, 71 (Minn. 1979) (does not include criticism of opponent); State ex rel. Skibin-
ski v. Tadych, 31 Wis. 2d 189, 193, 142 N.W.2d 838, 840 (1966).
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operation of the democratic system26 and speaker self-actualiza-
tion.267 Even objective facts play a special role in political speech,
as they are often used by speakers to buttress rhetorically political
ideas and arguments. 68 This can be contrasted with most com-
mercial facts, or with airline navigational facts, -for example,
which are merely means to important but nonideological ends
such as informed commerce or safe travel. Moreover, political
speech is the form of speech most likely to be subjected to bad-
faith government censorship, and thus its regulation is almost pre-
sumptively suspect.269
The Relational Framework's third prong shows a clear dis-
tinction between political speech and speech commonly deemed
commercial or professional. Whereas efficient commercial and
professional markets may benefit from placing the truth burden on
manufacturers and retailers of goods instead of consumers, and on
professionals rather than clients and patients,270 a democracy will
suffer if listeners-citizens-begin to rely primarily on political
speakers for the accuracy of political statements. On one level, it
may be more inefficient to force citizens to listen to political
266. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) ("[T]here is practically uni-
versal agreement that a major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free
discussion of governmental affairs."); A. MEIKLEJOHN. POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960).
267. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 n.12 (1978) ("The individ-
ual's interest in self-expression is a concern of the First Amendment separate from the
concern for open and informed discussion, although the two often converge."); see also
Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REv. 964, 990-91
(1978).
268. Justice Stewart recognized this important point in Virginia Pharmacy:
Ideological expression, be it oral, literary, pictorial or theatrical, is integrally
related to the exposition of thought-thought that may shape our concepts of the
whole universe of man. Although such expression may convey factual informa-
tion relevant to social and individual decisionmaking, it is protected by the Con-
stitution, whether or not it contains factual representations and even if it in-
cludes inaccurate assertions of fact. Indeed, disregard of the "'truth" may be
employed to give force to the underlying idea expressed by the speaker.
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
779-80 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
269. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777 n. 11 ("Freedom of expression has particular sig-
nificance with respect to government because '[iut is here that the state has a special incen-
tive to repress opposition and often wields a more effective power of suppression.'" (quot-
ing T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 9 (1966))); L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13-26, at 1129 (2d ed. 1988) ("The fear that a
prevailing government might some day wield its power over political campaigns so as to
perpetuate its rule generates a commendable reluctance to invest government with broad
control over the conduct of political campaigns.").
270. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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speech with a questioning, active ear. Certainly a candidate knows
better than the voter whether he or she ever graduated from col-
lege or owns stock in Lockheed, 271 and certainly false statements
can interfere with the democratic process.2 7 2 Assessing the accu-
racy of political speech, however, is a fundamental part of forming
political judgments. The risks that inhere in a citizen's delegation
of any substantial part of that judgment to the government may
often outweigh the efficiency gains of allowing the citizen to rely
complacently on heavily regulated political speech. Moreover,
even for a politician who has spent a lifetime studying politics,
there are obvious risks inherent in voters/citizens considering such
a politician an expert in this field the way one might consider a
attorney or doctor an expert. In an ideal democracy, the lay voter
should not defer to the expert opinion of professional politicians.273
In short, while economic efficiency may justify compromising the
principle of caveat emptor to protect consumers, clients, and pa-
tients, the democratic need for skeptical, independent, and judg-
mental voters calls for "caveat citizen." -
Considering the three prongs of the Relational Framework
together, there exist substantial risks of impact from heavy-
handed regulation of a category of speech at the core of the first
amendment. As between speakers and listeners, perhaps the truth
burden should be primarily borne by the listener. Of course each
case must be considered on its own, based on its peculiar facts. In
general, however, the Relational Framework would require that
courts strictly scrutinize the constitutionality of any element of a
political speech regulation-be it the standard of care (actual
malice, negligence, strict liability), the remedy (narrow injunction,
reasonable fine, or broad prohibitions on protected political activ-
ity), or the procedure (judicial/agency determination, independent
review/deference to fact finder).
271. The economics of information collection that support fixing the duty of investi-
gation on the advertiser rather than the consumer, see supra note 63 and accompanying
text, also justify placing the truth burden on the candidate, rather than the voter, with
respect to candidate claims about educational accomplishments and stock ownership.
272. See Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 52 (1982) ("States have a legitimate in-
terest in preserving the integrity of their electoral processes."); see also supra note 11 and
accompanying text.
273. In general, the common law tort of misrepresentation requires a finding that the
listener justifiably relied on the speaker's speech. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
537 (1976). Where both the listener and the speaker are similarly situated-both experts
or both nonexperts-tort doctrine, as a general matter, offers no protection to the deceived
recipient. See id. § 542 comment d.
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B. Nonfiction "How-To" Books
Courts uniformly hold that publishers of inaccurate how-to
books are not liable in damages to readers who are injured. 4
Often courts view such holdings as virtually mandated by the first
amendment. 5 Since such speech does not fit neatly into the cur-
rent judicial category of commercial speech, many courts seem
unable to give the speech any less than virtually the same most
favored speech status as political speech or artistic expression.
Such either/or formalism, however, prevents a court from recog-
nizing the intermediate nature of much how-to speech and the le-
gitimacy of its regulation. In contrast, the Reltional Framework
suggests that the first amendment permits, in many cases, holding
publishers and certainly authors accountable to injured readers
who detrimentally rely on inaccurate and dangerous instructional
advice. The Relational Framework shows that, in terms of the first
amendment, many how-to statements are more like professional
malpractice or airline navigation charts than political or artistic
speech, and as such are more readily regulable under the first
amendment. At the same time, the Relational Framework pro-
vides a basis for distinguishing permitted, recoverable claims from
actions that should be barred by the first amendment.
Often these cases involve readers' claims that the how-to in-
structions were inaccurate and led the readers to make dangerous
274. Consistently courts have rejected efforts by injured readers to subject publishers
to tort liability under either negligent misrepresentation or strict liability. See Jones v. J.B.
Lippincott Co., 694 F. Supp. 1216, 1217 (D. Md. 1988) (medical text); Lewin v. Mc-
Creight, 655 F. Supp. 282, 284 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (how-to book); Aim v. Van Nostrand
Reinhold Co., 134 Ill. App. 3d 716, 721, 480 N.E.2d 1263, 1267 (1985) (how-to book);
Walter v. Bauer, 109 Misc. 2d 189, 191, 439 N.Y.S.2d 821, 822 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (school
textbook), modified, 88 A.D.2d 787, 451 N.Y.S.2d 533 (1982).
Similarly, some courts have held that newspaper publishers are not liable to their sub-
scribers for negligently or innocently made false statements, whether in a news story or
advertisement. See, e.g., Pittman v. Dow Jones & Co., 662 F. Supp. 921, 922 (E.D. La.)
(advertisement), afi'd, 834 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1987); Daniel v. Dow Jones & Co., 137
Misc. 2d 94, 96-100, 520 N.Y.S.2d 334, 336-39 (Civ. Ct. 1987) (news story); Gutter v.
Dow Jones & Co., 22 Ohio St. 3d 286, 291, 490 N.E.2d 898, 902 (1986) (news story).
There is support for the idea that a newspaper would be liable for knowingly publish-
ing false advertisements. See Goldstein v. Garlick, 65 Misc. 2d 538, 542-43, 318 N.Y.S.2d
370, 374-75 (Sup. Ct. 1971). A recent state court decision, however, held that the first
amendment protects the publisher of a how-to book from any and all civil liability for
misrepresentations. See Smith v. Linn, 386 Pa. Super. 392, 395-97, 563 A.2d 123, 125-26
(1989), aff'd, 587 A.2d 309 (1991).
275. See, e.g., Daniel, 137 Misc.2d at 101, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 339; Aim, 134 II1. App.
3d at 722, 480 N.E.2d at 1267.
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mistakes or that the instructions failed to include warnings of
foreseeable dangers that might have prevented the mistakes.276
The key question is whether the publisher or the writer owes a
duty of care to the injured reader. Most courts find that there is
no such duty, often for the reason that enforcing such a duty
could violate the first amendment. 7 Such findings conflict with
many related tort and constitutional law doctrines. It is difficult to
distinguish many of these cases from similar cases in which manu-
facturers and sellers are held strictly liable to consumers for inju-
ries caused by faulty products, including even inaccurate or mis-
leading airline navigational charts 8.27  For instance, compare a
store that accidentally sells a poisonous mushroom with a field
manual that incorrectly identifies a poisonous mushroom as safe to
eat, and compare the faulty field manual with the flawed airline
chart.
Manufacturers and distributors can also be strictly liable to
consumers for failure to provide accurate instruction manuals that
enable the consumer to use the product safely. Compare a de-
fective hair dryer with a hair dryer accompanied by an instruction
manual that, through a typographical error, states that the dryer
should be used in the shower. Next, consider a third party beauty
guide that makes the same mistake. Does the first amendment re-
ally require courts to impose dramatically different standards in
these cases? Finally, many courts hold publishers less responsible
for the faulty content of how-to books and articles than authors. 280
276. For example, in Walter v. Bauer, 109 Misc. 2d 189, 439 N.Y.S.2d 821 (Sup.
Ct. 1981), modified, 88 A.D.2d 787, 451 N.Y.S.2d 533 (1982), a fourth grade student
suffered injuries while performing a science experiment described in a science textbook.
The father of the injured child sued the publisher of the textbook alleging that the textbook
was defective because it did not contain warnings of foreseeable dangers from conducting
experiments outlined in the textbook. See id. at 189-90, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 822.
277. See supra notes 274-75 and accompanying text.
278. See supra text accompanying notes 223-30.
279. See, e.g., Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 287, 282 A.2d 206, 219 (1971);
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402B (1976).
280. Some courts have distinguished the author of a how-to book from the publisher,
suggesting that only the former may be held accountable for negligently made misrepresen-
tations. See Jones v. J.B. Lippincott Co., 694 F. Supp. 1216, 1216-17 (D. Md. 1988);
Lewin v. McCreight, 655 F. Supp. 282, 283-84 (E.D. Mich. 1987); Alm v. Van Nostrand
Reinhold Co., 134 I11. App. 3d 716, 721, 480 N.E.2d 1263, 1267 (1985).
Courts similarly have imposed a duty of care on commercial advertisers but not on
newspapers that publish the advertisements. Compare Gootee v. Colt Indus., Inc., 712 F.2d
1057, 1062-63 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that a commercial advertiser is potentially liable
for negligent representations), with Yahas v. Mudge, 129 N.J. Super. 207, 209, 322 A.2d
824, 825 (App. Div. 1974) (holding that a magazine publisher owes no duty to readers for
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The following Relational Framework analysis addresses these in-
consistencies and recommends a more coherent approach for this
area.
Under the Relational Framework's first prong, one must con-
sider the impact on protected speech of a legal rule that holds
publishers or authors liable to readers for faulty how-to state-
ments. The first question, of course, is whether the mistaken
speech is itself protected. To the extent that the primary, if not
the sole, value of a how-to book is to inform the reader accurately,
there is little reason that inaccurate speech would be much pro-
tected for its own sake.28'
The second question, then, is whether a regulation on false
instructions would affect other truthful and protected speech.
Here, it is necessary to assess a number of chill factors, such as
the hardiness and objectivity of the speech, the standard of liabil-
ity, and the severity of the penalty. As with some other speech,282
and unlike mere commercial advertisements, a how-to book is it-
self the product being sold. Allowing regulations to chill speech
would mean that speakers would have to give up some of their
business.2 3 Admittedly, publishers, if not authors, could survive
regulation by publishing works on other subjects,"8 4 so perhaps the
misrepresentations in commercial advertisements published in its magazine). The pub-
lisher-author distinction drawn by these courts can be contrasted with public defamation.
There courts hold the author and publisher to the same standard of liability. For example,
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the Supreme Court made no
attempt to distinguish between the newspaper and the authors of the political advertise-
ment. As to either, for a public official to prevail on a libel suit, he or she would have to
prove actual malice. See id. at 279-80, 285-86. Also, the protection from negligent liability
given by these courts to newspaper publishers for their nondefamatory misrepresentations
in news stories or advertisements, can be contrasted with the Supreme Court's holding in
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), that newspapers can be held accounta-
ble for publishing negligent libelous speech about private individuals. See id. at 347 ("We
hold that, so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for
themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher . . . of defamatory false-
hood injurious to a private individual.").
281. If the how-to book is primarily ideological or entertaining, and only incidentally
instructional (e.g., R. PIRSIG, ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTORCYCLE MAINTENANCE: AN IN-
QUIRY INTO VALUES (1974)), then accuracy per se is less relevant, and even inaccurate
speech, therefore, deserves protection.
282. See supra notes 223-30 and accompanying text.
283. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
284. The chill on authors may be greater than that on publishers. While it can be
debated whether any author has the capacity to write a certain number of books, authors
of how-to books, perhaps more persuasively, can argue that in their case the number is one:
a book on the subject of their expertise. If that is the case, then regulating how-to books
more than other books may chill certain authors from writing at all. It might also impede
DECEPTIVE SPEECH
how-to speech should be characterized as somewhat more hardy
than professional malpractice or airline navigation charts.
Objectivity is a somewhat easier question, especially with re-
spect to false speech. For one thing, the less objective the speech
the less readers should rely on it-and thus the less speakers will
be exposed to liability under the substantive law. Moreover, more
objective speech is by definition more verifiable, and thus it may
be less chilling to require speakers to get it right. Of course, in
any given case the cost of determining the accuracy of the speech
may chill speakers who would rather not, or cannot afford the ex-
pense. In such cases, it might be preferable for the publisher (and
author) to disclaim knowledge, admitting to the reader that they
did not have the time or money to verify the facts . 8 5 At a certain
point, however, disclaimers become legal fictions. If readers actu-
ally rely on the books, and the publishers and authors expect them
to, enforcing a meaningless disclaimer may be against public
policy. 286
Liability for misleading speech is somewhat more compli-
cated. Generally, it is easier to determine whether a statement is
accurate than whether certain listeners will be misled by it in spite
of its accuracy. On the other hand, courts may find in many cases
that a limited number of false and dangerous impressions can be
reasonably and foreseeably drawn from a statement, and a court
may hold a speaker liable for them.287
the publishing of how-to books on certain subjects. See Walter v. Bauer, 109 Misc. 2d 189,
191, 439 N.Y.S.2d 821, 822-23 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (holding authors of how-to books strictly
liable for their misrepresentations would deter authors from writing on subjects that might
result in physical injury, the topic of how to cut down trees for example), modified, 88
A.D.2d 787, 451 N.Y.S.2d 533 (1982).
285. In the same way a commercial seller, by express and conspicuous language, can
disclaim certain implied warranties concerning his goods, see U.C.C. § 2-316 (1989), an
author and publisher might be permitted to disavow expertise as to certain matters dis-
cussed in a book.
286. A first amendment counterpart to the commercial doctrine of unconscionability,
see, e.g., Industralease Automated & Scientific Equip. Corp. v. R.M.E. Enters., Inc., 58
A.D.2d 482, 490, 396 N.Y.S.2d 427, 432 (1977), could develop, limiting an author's or
publisher's ability to plead ignorance in certain cases.
287. To date, most of the "how-to" book cases have involved allegations that the
book misleadingly failed to adequately contradict an appearance of safety through warn-
ings and instructions. See, e.g., Lewin v. McCreight, 655 F. Supp. 282, 283 (E.D. Mich.
1987); Cardozo v. True, 342 So. 2d 1053, 1054-55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Alm v. Van
Nostrand Reinhold Co., 134 Ill. App. 3d 716, 716-17, 480 N.E.2d 1263, 1264 (1985).
Those courts prepared to hold publishers of how-to books liable for negligently failing to
provide adequate warnings could seek guidance from nonpublisher failure to warn doctrine.
See, e.g., REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 311 (1976).
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The risk of chill is increased substantially by the availability
of money damages sufficient to compensate the victim. In compar-
ison, prior restraint, rescission, and corrective advertising will
seem like minor inconveniences to an author or publisher who sud-
denly has to pay a lifetime of medical bills for a class of injured
readers.288 Similarly, imposing a standard of strict liability on
publishers or authors, by analogy to products liability law as well
as the airline navigation chart cases, will be far more chilling than
a negligence standard or an actual malice, wilfulness, or reckless-
ness rule.28 9
As several courts have mentioned, the standard of care seems
especially relevant when considering the liability of a publisher
who has little firsthand knowledge of the author's research.9"
However, if substantial damage is being done by judgment-proof
authors and careless publishers, one can imagine a court reasona-
bly finding that the publisher also has a duty of care to readers.
Under that duty, a publisher might be held negligent, if not
strictly liable, for example, for not asking an author or his editors
to substantiate foreseeably dangerous information before a book is
published. Certainly a publisher of a book recommending use of a
hair dryer in the shower might reasonably be expected to ask a
few questions before disseminating the dangerous information to
the public. Even the weighty risk of money damages will not nec-
essarily cause an undue chilling effect, particularly if publishers
and authors can fairly disclaim their certainty regarding the accu-
racy of the work so as to minimize the extent to which reasonable
288. Courts have cited the risk of unlimited liability as a major factor in refusing to
hold publishers liable to their readers for negligently publishing false information. See, e.g.,
Pittman v. Dow Jones & Co., 662 F. Supp. 921, 922 (E.D. La. 1987); Demuth Dev. Corp.
v. Merck & Co., 432 F.Supp. 990, 993-94 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
289. Nevertheless, strict liability has been proposed for physical harm to consumers
resulting from a seller's misrepresentations concerning the character or quality of chattels.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B.
290. Courts view any requirement that publishers investigate and double check fac-
tual claims contained in their publications as unrealistic and overly burdensome. See
Lewin, 655 F. Supp. at 283-84; Aim, 134 Ill. App. 3d at 721-22, 480 N.E.2d at 1267.
In the defamation area, although the Supreme Court has similarly stated that a
speaker's failure to investigate the accuracy of published defamatory statements concerning
public officials or figures does not alone support liability, see St. Amant v. Thompson, 390
U.S. 727, 732-33 (1968), it is unclear whether publishers have any duty to independently
investigate the accuracy of statements made by sources under the negligence standard ap-
proved for private defamation actions in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347
(1974).
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readers could rely.2 '
The Relational Framework's second prong is less controver-
sial than the first. Few would contend that the typical how-to
book, especially if it is inaccurate or misleading, lies close to core,
speaker-centered first amendment values. To the extent this
speech is little more than a means to an end, its value is directly
related to its degree of accuracy. On the other hand, such speech
may implicate speaker interests in self-expression somewhat more
than the airline navigational charts discussed earlier.2"2 The books
are designed to teach readers to do something. Education, even if
relatively utilitarian and nonideological, implicates many impor-
tant first amendment values. On balance, though, for the vast ma-
jority of these works, there is little more political or creative ex-
pression, self-actualization, criticism, autonomy, or debate, than
exists in many nonspeech tasks performed by a worker, or even
the quasi-speech task of one worker training another. It is not that
those values are not served by the speech. Of course they are, just
as they are also served by anyone doing his job. However, in most
cases there is little in the speech, as speech, that requires resort to
the first amendment to give it more protection than any other eco-
nomic activity.2 93
The Relational Framework's third prong focuses on the justi-
fication for a regulation in terms of the relationship between the
speaker and the audience. In this case the constitutional question
is basically the same as the fundamental common law is-
sue-whether a reader reasonably and foreseeably relies on the
how-to instructions. Occasionally courts will and should find, as a
matter of tort doctrine, that such reliance was not reasonable.2 94
However, where tort law would find reasonable and foreseeable
reliance, and hold a speaker liable for resulting injuries, the Rela-
tional Framework, in many cases, suggests that the first amend-
291. See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 223-30 and accompanying text.
293. In this context, Robert Bork's critique of self-actualization justifications for pro-
tecting speech seems closer to the mark. Bork argues the self-actualization values cannot
serve to distinguish speech, at least not in any principled way, from other human activities.
See Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 25
(1971). In terms of promoting self-realization of the speaker, authoring a how-to book may
be more like "trading on the stock market" or "working as a barmaid" than like writing a
novel or painting a landscape. See id.
294. For example, it may be unreasonable to make an investment, having relied
solely on financial information published in a newspaper. See Gutter v. Dow Jones & Co.,
22 Ohio St. 3d 286, 289, 490 N.E.2d 898, 900 (1986).
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ment poses no additional substantial barrier.
Otherwise, the argument for permitting the regulation of
how-to speech is very similar to the analysis of government regula-
tion of commercial advertisements, airline navigational charts, and
professional malpractice. In all these cases, fairness as well as the
market efficiency of allocating the bulk of the truth burden to the
expert speaker strongly supports government regulation of the
speech. If statutory or common law determines that society is best
served by allocating the truth burden to the speaker who purports
to have expertise, if the speaker profits from listeners paying for
and relying upon his speech, and if the content of the speech has
little value except to the listener-and then only to the extent it is
accurate-the first amendment should not bar such an allocation,
unless there is some countervailing policy, such as preventing a
threat to protected free speech, in the particular case. For many
how-to books, it would appear that there is no such policy suffi-
cient to outweigh the regulation's benefits. Whether or not such
regulation is permitted under the Relational Framework in any
given case, the either/or formalism of the Commercial Speech
Doctrine is less useful to a court than an analysis based on the
Relational Framework's three prongs.
CONCLUSION
This Article proposes a Relational Framework to replace the
Commercial Speech Doctrine in determining whether deceptive
speech regulations violate the first amendment. The Commercial
Speech Doctrine should be abandoned primarily for two reasons.
First, the Commercial Speech Doctrine turns on an amorphous
definition of commercial speech that has yet to coalesce into a co-
herent category. Second, the Commercial Speech Doctrine justi-
fies diminished first amendment protection by according commer-
cial speech less value, cutting against the policy of content
neutrality that lies at the heart of the first amendment.295
295. There is a parallel between the Court's Commercial Speech Doctrine and its
Public Speech Doctrine as endorsed by five members of the Court in Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985). The majority's attempt to distin-
guish speech on the basis of its content--as speech of public importance or only of private
importance-and then to assign higher first amendment value to the former, see id. at 757-
61, replicates the Commercial Speech Doctrine's two major flaws.
First, the majority has sought to draw a distinction between two categories of pro-
tected speech that will be as difficult to distinguish as commercial and noncommercial
speech. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Dun & Bradstreet, is clearly correct in noting that it
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The Relational Framework's first two prongs descend directly
from New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,296 which established the
fundamental principle that the first amendment restricts the ex-
tent to which any government regulation of unprotected speech,
including common law doctrines such as libel law, can chill or af-
fect protected speech.29 7 It is a short step from one area of tort
law (libel) to another (misrepresentation) to realize that the first
amendment must also restrict the extent to which any deceptive
speech regulation might chill truthful, protected speech.
The second and third prongs of the Relational Framework
attempt to assess whether the basis for a deceptive speech regula-
tion justifies the chill on affected speech. The Relational Frame-
work primarily performs this analysis by determining whether the
affected speech implicates speaker-based values or listener-based
values. Where strong listener-based values are present, the Rela-
tional Framework is more likely to find the deceptive speech regu-
lation constitutional. One exception to this presumption occurs
when the listener is operating in a citizen mode rather than a con-
sumer mode, in which case there is a countervailing policy in
will be difficult, if not impossible, for judges to decide on an ad hoc basis which publica-
tions address issues of general or public importance and which do not. See id. at 777 n.3
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Examining the credit report in Dun & Bradstreet, which the
majority deemed to be private speech, see id. at 762, it is hard.to disagree with Justice
Brennan that reporting on a company's financial position and especially on its alleged filing
for bankruptcy, is hardly a subject lacking in public importance. See id. at 789 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). Second, the Court's desire to permit the government greater regulatory con-
trol over some forms of deceptive speech than others mandate, as the Commercial Speech
doctrine has mandated, different degrees of value for different categories of protected
speech, based on the content of the speech.
The Relational Framework avoids both flaws. It would be unnecessary to distinguish
speech based on its public or private character, or to assign more value to one type of
speech than the other. Rather, any regulation of a defamatory credit report would be ana-
lyzed under the Relational Framework's three prongs. To what extent would a regulatory
scheme allowing for punitive damages absent finding of actual malice and arguably without
even a finding of fault, see id. at 774 (White, J., concurring) be found to impact on pro-
tected speech? Whether characterized as speech of public or private concern, is such
speech primarily informational (promoting listener interests) or ideological (promoting
speaker interests) in nature? And finally, to what extent should the recipient of credit
reports have a protected right, enforced by a damage award to the defamed third party, to
rely on the accuracy of the reports?
296. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
297. See id. at 279-80 (adopting an actual malice standard for defamation suits
brought by public officials). As Justice Brennan wrote in Dun & Bradstreet, "Our cases
since New York Times Co. v. Sullivan have proceeded from the general premise that all
libel law implicates First Amendment values to the extent it deters true speech that would
otherwise be protected by the First Amendment." 472 U.S. at 778 (Brennan. J., dissenting)
(citation omitted).
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favor of imposing self-reliance on the citizen listener, for funda-
mental reasons underlying the democratic process.29 8 Admittedly,
drawing distinctions between citizen listeners and consumer listen-
ers, and between speaker-based values and listener-based values,
may prove as challenging for courts as distinguishing between
commercial speech and noncommercial speech. However, at least
these are distinctions drawing on a venerable and well-reasoned
body of tort law analysis-in particular the doctrine of reasonable
reliance. Moreover, and perhaps more important, the distinctions
at the heart of the Relational Framework do not require a court to
assign less value to a certain kind of speech because of its content.
Even if the Relational Framework's distinctions prove to be no
more precise than the Commercial Speech Doctrine, the fact that
they reduce the Commercial Speech Doctrine's unseemly assault
on the first amendment principle of content neutrality may alone
justify their use.
298. Arguably, the Relational Framework's prong three analysis also could have
helped the Court in New York Times find additional support for its near absolute protec-
tion for public libels. See 376 U.S. at 279-80. The policy favoring self-reliance for citizens
listening to deceptive political speech could be used to support a call for more self-reliance
(less legal regulation) for persons hearing public libels. Allowing public figures to suffer
some injury as a result of this policy might be an acceptable cost of assuring that citizen
listeners do not lapse into complacent reliance on government control of speech concerning
civic issues. See Skolnick, Foreword: The Sociological Tort of Defamation, 74 CALIF. L.
REv. 677, 687 (1986) ("The New York Times doctrine assumes that consumers of infor-
mation are supposed to question, not necessarily believe, what they read and hear.").
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